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I.

EUGENICS.

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The deepest instinct of every organism is self-preservation. We find, therefore, already in the very simplest forms of plant and animal life both in their structural composition and in their modes of reproduction specific provisions which have grown out of this profound instinct. Most unicellular organisms only thrive in a liquid environment; if that dries up they lose their usual shape, as well as their power of locomotion and form spores, minute spherical masses surrounded by an impenetrable membrane. In this form they can survive the unfavorable conditions of their environment for a very long time without injury, returning to the original status of their being at the first favorable opportunity. Moreover, ordinarily they reproduce themselves by simple fission, but after spore-formation the individual breaks up into many daughter individuals by multiple fission. Fission or division is, however, not the only mode of reproduction, for, if carried on through too many generations of offspring, the nuclear protoplasm would be exhausted and the species would die out. Nature has, therefore, provided a counter process, viz., conjugation or copulation. Two individuals of different parentage either temporarily unite and exchange their nuclear protoplasm, thereby rejuvenating their lives, or they completely

fuse and now constitute a new parent. Similar precautions exist among the more complex organisms. The fresh-water sponge, at some time or other forced from its original marine environment dies down to the ground at the approach of winter exactly like a plant but it leaves behind a large number of well protected internal buds or gemmules which hibernate at the bottom of brook or pond, only to sprout out again with the returning spring and to grow into many new sponges. Many animals and plants of sessile habits are continually exposed to the danger of extinction on account of their inability to run away from their enemies; nature has therefore given them a hermaphroditic character; they carry both male and female germs and with them the possibility of self-fertilization. Others, such as the oyster, vary in their sexuality with the conditions of the environment. The oysters on the eastern coasts, favored by the warm currents of the gulf stream are unisexual, while those on the western coasts, where the polar currents prevail, are hermaphrodites. Again, animals which scatter their germs broadcast produce an unusually large number of such germs, because most of them are destroyed, while those whose germs are more protected produce only a comparatively small number of eggs. Besides there are a thousand other devices by means of which the species endeavors to assure its continuation, significant among which are the cooperative measures of symbiosis, mesmatism and commensalism. Such cooperative devices for self-preservation found already among the very lowest unicellular organisms as, *e. g.*, among the lichens, clearly proves the instinct of self-preservation to be not merely individual but social or racial. It does not only suggest the constancy and continuity of a species but also explains its variations, which are frequently the results of newly acquired adjustments, and in most cases variation means progress towards a more complex and a richer life. These phenomena are strikingly illustrated by the history of the human race. From times immemorial man has dreamed of the eternal preservation of the race and has devised his

theories of salvation. From the happy hunting grounds of the savage Indian to the new heaven and the new earth of the Christian, the hopes and aspirations of the race have ever been directed towards a larger and more perfect life, and the efforts to reach it have produced the highly complex protective measures of our modern civilization. To preserve life at any cost and to constantly improve the methods of redeeming even the utterly worthless existences is the most potent formative aim of our age. The pure animal instinct of self-preservation has been gradually enlarged and transformed into intelligent and sublime valuation of human life, on the lowest scale confined to the affectionate care of the members of the family, later passing into tribal predilections and national chauvinism and finally reaching its climax in the Christian pronouncement of the universal brotherhood of man.

But as selfish individualism gradually changed into race love, as animal hunger developed into spiritual aspirations the factors involved in this evolution also underwent a change of valuation. The purely physical factors of life received only minor considerations, bodily life as such was in certain quarters even looked upon as a positive evil not worthy of preservation—a betrayal of self for the sake of self was but a grotesque outgrowth from the exalted instinct of self-preservation, a morbid exaggeration of the factors that make for animal death. Happily, however, the nineteenth century has witnessed the complete overthrow of such dualistic heresies and at the same time heralded such new and wonderful revelations about the animal body that the protective measures have increased a thousand fold and the instinct of self-preservation has become a purposeful scientific method by means of which all destructive dangers threatening the race can be almost completely controlled. This new scientific method has aroused a host of latent energies in the race and stimulated fruitful inquiry into the minute character and possibility of human life. We no longer emphasize the total depravity of the individual and the impotence of human effort, but rather the

total ability and capacity of human powers and their inherent divinity. We scorn the idea that we have wandered away from God and insist that just the opposite is true, viz., that the deepest instinct in the struggle for preservation has been the groping for God and the effort to find him, and that the whole history of human development centers in the search for God. The latest phase in this modern movement, therefore, deals with the elimination of a past pessimism, inquires into the causes of its transmission and seeks to establish laws for future improvement. In its broadest sense it is known under the name of the biological method, more specifically applied to human improvement it has been termed *Eugenics*. Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, coined the word and used it for the first time in his *Inquiry into Human Faculty and its Development*, published in London in 1883. According to him *Eugenics is the science which deals with the improvement of the human race by better breeding*. It concerns itself with all the influences that can improve the inborn qualities of man—physical, intellectual and moral.

Eugenics, as a science, is one of the many results that grew out of the discussion and application of the Darwinian principle of natural selection, according to which new species arise by gradual and slow variations and which applied to man must result in his intellectual and physical improvement. Darwin himself entertained such views in his discourses on modern social conditions and the future of the human race. He showed on the one hand how sociability and altruism had arisen in primitive tribes and how such tribes who had among them the larger number of valorous and wise men had better chances for survival and on the other had, how the protection of the weak would lead to a decay of humanity unless the opportunity for marriage among the defectives would be lessened. He even went so far as to demand that a law should be passed to regulate such conditions. He meditated on the effects of ill-applied wealth leading to excess and degeneracy and so defeating its own bad effects; how civilization improving the food

of man becomes useful to man, and so weighing the advantages and disadvantages of civilization concludes that we are slowly progressing. Sir Francis Galton inquired more definitely into human faculties and their improvement. He was so thoroughly convinced of the inheritability of acquired qualities that he ventured to prove that the exercise of body and mind, the suppression of evil inclinations, the prevention of marriages among the insane, the struggle against overpopulation through late marriages, etc., practised for several generations would surely bring about physical as well as intellectual progress of humanity. Modern sociologists agreed that natural selection of this kind was the only stimulus for progress and that it must be supported in order to bring about an improved humanity. Sympathy with the weak and the hygiene which prolongs the life of the sick weaken society and must be abolished. The responsibility for coming generations must be strengthened and habitual criminals should be castrated, as already Schopenhauer advocated. Such is the program of scientific eugenics and the question naturally arises: is it truly just and humane and can it be carried out?

So far the reader has no doubt seen that both Darwin's and Galton's conclusions and suggestions were at first largely derived from theoretical considerations. But a science is not a body of theories; its primary function is to collect and classify facts and its ultimate business is to establish laws by means of which events and results as the outcome of definite phenomena can be foretold with absolute accuracy. Do we have such a science of eugenics, which can be applied with beneficent results to the improvement of humanity: I think the question can be answered in the affirmative. The central principle which underlies this particular science is that of heredity and the facts to be ascertained cluster around this one principle and its various aspects. We ask, what kind of qualities are transmitted from parent to offspring, how and by what apparatus, and what are the proofs of the claims? Ideas of heredity are as old as humanity. The dogma of original sin,

the Daemonion of the Greeks, the predestination doctrine of St. Augustine, the caste system and inherited privileges are all theories of inheritance. They are of as little value in our consideration as the pseudo-scientific and philosophical theories of Meckel, Lucas, Morel and Buckle. Darwin in his *Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication* made the first scientific attempt to gather facts and to tabulate and codify them and a host of biologists followed in his footsteps, notably Sir Francis Galton, who collected an immense amount of statistical material on inheritance, maintaining the inheritance of the size of the body, the color of the skin, and of the eyes, of muscular strength, intelligence, will power, morality and especially genius, and finally formulating a law, known since as *Galton's Law of Ancestral Inheritance*, according to which "the two parents contribute between them on the average one half of the total heritage of the offspring; the four grandparents one quarter, the eight great-grandparents one eighth" and so on. This was the first definite advance in the whole discussion of the subject. On the basis of data obtained from the stature of man and the coat-color of Basset hounds, he had proved that inheritance is not merely dual, but through the parents it is multiple, and the average contributions made by grandparents, great-grandparents, etc., are definite and diminish in precise ratio according to the remoteness of the ancestors. At first very little stress was laid on the distinction between the transmission of native qualities and of such as had been acquired, because this difference was of little importance in Darwin's origin of species. However, this very distinction became in the course of time the storm center of discussion.

Professor August Weismann, of the University of Freiburg, became the master mind in the discussion. He established beyond the shadow of a doubt the fact that protoplasm was the real carrier of life and thereby gave the impetus to the closer study of the *apparatus of inheritance*. The complex structure of the germ nucleus was discovered and Weismann advanced

the view that every organism is composed of certain properties and all these properties or qualities are contained in the nucleus of the germ cell side by side in what he called the germ plasm. When the nucleus divides in the process of segmentation these qualities are distributed to the right and the left, upward and downward, forward and rearward, each producing its own peculiar organization, viz., the head qualities form the head, those of the foot this particular organ, etc. He distinguished then between the germ plasm and the soma plasm, the latter composing the nuclear substance of the main body cells and later advanced the theory, apparently based on experiments, that only those qualities are transmitted which are present in the germ plasm, *i. e.*, inborn, while habits and structures newly acquired by the body cells are never transmitted. Darwin's theory of natural selection was therefore limited to sexual selection, or the struggle for existence within and between the germ cells. But, however widespread Weismann's theory of the omnipotence of sexual selection became, it has to-day lost its quondam brilliancy, largely because Weismann now admits the transmission of certain acquired characters, such *e. g.*, as immunity.

The most valuable contribution Weismann has made to the study of heredity is his ingenious interpretation of the physical basis of inheritance, the germ plasm, which he showed to consist of a definite number of minute bodies, the chromosomes, each one of which in turn consisted—by interpretation—of ids composed of numerous constituents or determinants, representing definite individual qualities. But the actual proof for the existence of such unit qualities or characters was furnished by another man with whom the whole subject of heredity became a matter of actual demonstration leading to the solid establishment of eugenics as a science. As early as 1866 Gregor Johann Mendel, abbot and professor at the Real-schule at Brünn had published in the "proceedings" of the local Natural History Society a paper on experiments with the edible pea, which presented a very important conclusion in

regard to the inbreeding of hybrids, a conclusion which is generally referred to as "*Mendel's law*," one of the greatest biological discoveries ever made. This paper, however, remained practically unnoticed, until similar discoveries were made independently in 1900 by the botanists De Vries, Correns and Tschermack. The two names most eminent in modern times in the domain of experimental inheritance are Mendel and De Vries, the former the great forerunner of Galton, the latter the master interpreter and investigator of the origin of species by sudden variation and the author of the theory of mutation. Mendel was led to his discoveries by experimenting to find the law of inheritance in hybrid varieties. He selected as already stated the edible pea for his experiments. For fully eight years he watched the growth and reproduction of twenty-two varieties, each one separated from the other, until he had ascertained that each possessed definite constant characters and could easily be fertilized by artificial means. After having carefully established such constant characters as the form of the seeds, the color of the reserve material, the shape and color of the pods, the length of the stems and the position of the flowers he crossfertilized them, investigating one character at a time. He found that each pair showed only one of the contrasted characters to the total or almost total exclusion of the other. These prevailing characters he called *dominant* the suppressed ones *recessive*. In transferring the pollen of a short stemmed variety upon a long stemmed one and vice versa he found that all the offspring had tall stems. "Tallness" is then the dominant character, dwarfness the recessive. The next generation on self-fertilization showed the two original forms in the proportion of three dominants to one recessive. The offspring of the recessive dwarfs were pure recessives for any number of generations—they bred true—while the offspring of the dominants were one third pure and two thirds crossbred dominants, the latter producing on self-fertilization a mixture of dominants and recessives in proportion of 3:1. Expressed in words, Mendel's law would read

as follows: "Wherever there occurs a pair of different strong characters of which one is dominant over the other, three possibilities exist: there are recessives which always breed true to the recessive character; there are dominants which breed true to the dominant character and are therefore pure; and thirdly there are dominants which may be called impure and which on self-fertilization (or inbreeding where the sexes are separate) give both dominant and recessive forms in the fixed proportion of three of the former to one of the latter." (R. L. Punnett, 1905.) This law was verified by Correns on peas, maize and gardenstock, by Tschermack on peas, by De Vries on maize, by Bateson on a large variety of organisms, by Darbishire on mice, by Hurst on rabbits by Toyome on silk moths and by Davenport on poultry and of late on man. A gray house mouse was crossed with a white mouse; the offspring were all gray. Grayness is dominant, albinism recessive. The gray hybrids were inbred, the offspring was gray and white in proportion of 3:1. If these white ones are inbred they produce only whites for all subsequent generations. But the grays inbred produce two kinds of offspring: one third produce only grays, which continue to do so, while the other two thirds produce both grays and whites.

The discovery that variation is not merely a fortuitous difference between parent and child as held hitherto, but a form of heredity proceeding according to definite laws marks a turning point in our conception of the subject. Professor Hugo de Vries, of the University of Amsterdam, went still farther and actually proved that by this process new varieties and species arose not gradually, but suddenly by what he called *mutation*, a phenomenon only faintly suggested by Darwin. Some twenty-five years ago he looked about around Amsterdam to find a plant which would show indications of having a changeable mood. After experimenting with and testing a hundred species in vain he finally discovered on a deserted potato-field at Hilversum his long looked for mutable plant, an evening primrose, the *Oenothera Lamarckiana*. Its

chief characteristic was its changefulness, some were annual, others biennial and a few triennial; almost all its organs were varying, showing extraordinary freaks such as fasciation and pitcher forming; most important of all some looked like new species in the making. Only one year after his discovery of the potato-field he obtained two well defined new forms, which on self-fertilization bred true. Their likes were found nowhere else and must have arisen by a sudden mutation from the seed of an individual parent. Upon further experimentation he obtained seven more constant species and verified the statements of Mendel's law. But while according to Mendel's theory the characters were segregated in the germ cells De Vries held that the characters are sharply separated from each other, representing elementary units. Both views remind us of Weismann's theory of the determinants composing the germ plasm and of Galton's suggestion of the "presence of elements in the germ cells of one generation, which are of two kinds, viz., active or dominant elements and groups of elements which determine the heritable characters of the progeny or second generation, and latent or recessive elements which pass through the bodies of one or more generations without appearing to affect them." For all practical purposes these results present a consensus omnium, which establishes once for all the existence of independent unit characters in every germ cell that may be inherited independently and not *en masse*. Dr. Charles B. Davenport, director of the Carnegie Institute at Cold Spring Harbor and undoubtedly the highest authority on Eugenics in this country sums up our present state of knowledge on this subject as follows: "Three fundamental principles are to be kept clearly in mind. The principle of independent unit characters, the principle of the determiner in the germ plasm and the principle of segregation of determiners. The principle of independent unit characters states that the qualities or characteristics of organisms are, or may be analyzed into distinct units that are inherited independently. It follows that the characters of a parent or a par-

ticular relative are not inherited as a whole, but each individual is a mosaic of characters that appear in a variety of relatives. The principle of the determiner in the germ plasm states that each unit character is represented in the germ by a molecule or associated groups of molecules called a determiner. These determiners are transmitted in the germ plasm and are the only things that are truly inherited. The principle of segregation of determiners in the germ plasm states that characteristics do not blend. That if one parent has a characteristic while the other lacks it, then the offspring get a determiner from one side only instead of from both sides and when the germ cells are formed in such offspring half of them have the determiner and half of them lack it. There is thus a segregation of presence and of absence of the determiners in the germ cells of the mixed offspring." The characteristic in the offspring that is due to a single (instead of the normal double) determiner is called a simplex characteristic. Such a characteristic is frequently distinguished from one that is due to the double determiner by its imperfect development. Thus the offspring of a pure black eyed and a blue eyed parent will have brown eyes. It can easily be deduced from these fundamental statements that it is now possible to predict the results of marriages, provided the pedigrees on each side are known, *i. e.*, the unit characteristics both parents either possess or lack and how they differ; also whether these characteristics are due to the absence or presence of a determiner. If to the sum total Galton's law of ancestral inheritance is applied the future of any mating can be foretold with startling precision.

We owe therefore a debt of gratitude to Sir Francis Galton for enlisting man's conscious coöperation in controlling nature's most potent force and thereby making the eugenic principle play its beneficent rôle in human affairs. He read his initial paper on this subject before the English Sociological Society in 1904 and followed it up by addressing to every member a form containing a series of questions concerning his relatives to be answered by each one in detail. The results being care-

fully tabulated and analyzed, conclusively proved that there existed in England a large number of families whose members were of priceless value to the country as such and to the human race in general. By leaps and bounds the American Committee on Eugenics under the leadership of president David Starr Jordan and the coöperation of such men as Dr. Davenport, Dr. Castle and Luther Burbank have far outstripped the English leaders. Luther Burbank's application of the eugenic principles to plant breeding is one of the marvels of the present age and the still profounder investigation of human defectives by Dr. Davenport and his corps of able assistants at Cold Spring Harbor, L. I., must be hailed as one of the most beneficent and far reaching efforts at human redemption the world has yet known.

As a matter of course the finest and most accurate results have been obtained in the domain of plant and animal breeding. Those experiments have had the double beneficent result of increasing on the one hand our knowledge of determiners and enlarging on the other hand the variety of useful plants and animals. So far the determiners which have been established in man as absolutely certain factors of inheritance are but few. On the normal physical side the color of eyes and hair, on the mental musical and mathematical gifts furnish the best illustrations. By experiment with animals and observation of men it has been found that the absence of iris pigment is a proof of the absence of the pigment determiner from the germ plasm. If both parents have blue eyes all the children will have blue eyes. If one parent has simplex brown eyes and the other blue eyes, one half of the children will have blue eyes; if both parents have brown eyes simplex, one in four of the children will have blue eyes. The same is true of flaxen or dark haired conditions. If both parents have musical or mathematical talent all the children will be likewise gifted. The application of the method of eugenics to cases of abnormalities and diseases has resulted in still more important discoveries. Dr. Davenport reports that brachy-

dactly (lack of one digit in each finger) even in only one parent will be transmitted to 50 or even 100 per cent. of the children, the same is true of presenile cataract, of keratosis or congenital thickening of the skin, of early baldheadedness, probably also of diabetes and stationary night blindness. When the abnormality is due to the absence of a characteristic or quality the results are the same. Even the normal offspring of an albino and a pigmented parent may transmit the albinic condition. Such is also the case with the degenerative disease of the retina, with deafmutism, with imbecility, maniac-depressive insanity, partial hermaphroditism, St. Vitus dance and a host of defects, among them chronic inflammation of the mucous membrane, from which develop weakness of the ear, the nose, the throat and the lungs, or skin diseases, notably boils and eczema; or tubercles and abscesses, or Bright's disease and dropsy, syphilis, uremic poisoning and rheumatism, or heart disease, paralysis, neurasthenia, nervousness, headaches and stomach trouble and migraine. In all such cases intermarriages between two defectives are unfit, and between a normal and a defective may be unfit. If the defects themselves are not transmitted the susceptibility towards defect generally is, although it may not show itself for two or three generations. Intermarriage between first cousins of a stock with a defective strain is in the nature of the case criminally unfit, while such a union of normal stock may be highly beneficial.

But the reader may ask, are there not defective strains in every human family, which would naturally condemn every marriage as unfit. Will not love laugh at eugenics and go on its errand of mating in spite of the most solemn warnings? Will people tolerate any interference with their matrimonial intentions? Sir Francis Galton has answered these objections in a recently published paper, which, summarized, states that the work of eugenics is one of gradual education. History proves that in a course of centuries many restrictions have been introduced and become customs. The Roman Catholic may

not even marry a third cousin, in a great many sects endogamy, which forbids marriage outside the particular communion, has become a custom, and man, not monogamous by nature, has submitted to the monogamous restriction. If public opinion can inaugurate such restrictions why can it not control the marriage of the epileptic, the "borderland" insane, the consumptive and the criminal? When eugenics is once incorporated into the national conscience and has become an integral part of the great Christian scheme of redemption we may hope that celibacy may become a universal ordinance, however not celibacy among the fit, but among the palpably unfit, whose marital state would retard God's plan of human salvation. *The great and the good and the strong will be on the increase and our 300,000 insane and feeble-minded, our 160,000 blind or deaf, our 80,000 prisoners and the thousands of criminals not in prison and our 100,000 paupers in almshouses will be burdens of the past.* But, whatever legislation of one kind or other may do in this great movement the preaching of the *gospel of Jesus Christ with its essential stress on the love of one's neighbor* must ever be the most powerful means for the improvement of the human race not by or through but towards better breeding. *The first requisite in the practice of such love is the intelligent appreciation of the great dangers of close, indiscriminate inbreeding, which is to-day the curse of certain Christian sects who have grown insane on the subject of their own exclusive right to salvation and the wholesale condemnation of all outsiders. Dwarfs, insane, deaf mutes and crippled of all sorts abound among them. Physical and mental normality are, however, the first steps towards holiness, and it is only from such stock that we can expect to come the salvation of the human race.*

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II.

THE DIALECTICAL METHOD OF SOCRATES.

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As applied to the Socratic method, all later definitions of the term "dialectical" must give way to the etymological sense that is given in Plato's "Republic,"¹ who defines it as "the art of developing knowledge conversationally by question and answer." Xenophon² says to the same effect that Socrates considered the dialectical process as consisting in coming together and taking common counsel to distinguish and distribute things in genera or families, so as to learn what each separate thing really was. Socrates was so infatuated with this way of discussion, and felt so incapable of living without that colloquial interchange of ideas, that some think that he made no defense at his trial and was willing to die because *impending old age made conversation difficult or impossible.*³ It must also be kept in mind that the Socratic method was not consciously adopted by the author, after careful investigation of its validity. He rather alighted upon it by instinct. A man's aim determines very largely his method, that is, the way to reach that end. So the Socratic method resulted from the notions the great Athenian had formed respecting the object of philosophy, and while in pursuit of this object, his peculiar method "grew on him." Schwegeler⁴ is right in saying: "Of the Socratic method we must understand that, in contrast to what is now called method, it rose not in the consciousness of Socrates formally as method, and in abstraction from

¹ Plato, *Republic*, VII, 534.

² *Memor*, V, p. 56.

³ Plato, *Crito*, 74: "Thou even didst say that thou wouldst prefer death to exile." Also Cicero, *De Oratore*, I, 54.

⁴ *History of Philosophy*, p. 49.

every concrete case, but that it had spontaneously grown up with the very mode and manner of his philosophizing which aimed not at the communication of a system, but at the schooling of the individual himself into philosophical thought and life."

THE AIM OF SOCRATES.

Method and aim can never be entirely separated. Certainly not with Socrates, where the man is the method, nor in the Socratic age, where the false aim of his predecessors and contemporaries was due, to a great extent, to a defective method. His chief aim was to establish an epistemology, a valid theory of knowledge and its limits. Before him the answer as to the causes of natural phenomena were attempted without any preliminary inquiry into the human faculty of cognition. All reliance was placed on external perception. In this endeavor he encountered four questions, the first and most important of which was, *Can we know at all?* The Sophist's answer was a decided negative. They denied the credibility of the senses, the reliability of reason, the objective reality of truth, and consequently the possibility of an adequate human knowledge and certainty. Thus they undermined the very foundations of science, and made skepticism triumphant. In the words of Zeller,⁵ "The characteristic of the Sophists consisted in their allowing only a relative value to all scientific and moral principles." They called everything into question, and attacked or defended with equal readiness every opinion. Faith in the aim of human ideas or in the validity of moral laws had wholly disappeared. Natural philosophy on which the attention of thinkers had been engrossed for upwards of a century and a half had now become distasteful and, in fine, scientific inquiry had been supplanted by a merely superficial culture of thought and language and by the acquisition of such accomplishments only as were likely to serve the purposes of social life. Against this subjectivity of the Sophists, Socrates believed it to be his

⁵ *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 195.

mission to affirm the objective reality of truth.⁶ He justly conceived the true end of philosophy to be, not to make an ostentatious display of superior learning and ability in subtle disputes and ingenious conjectures but "to free mankind from the dominion of pernicious prejudices, to inspire them with a love of real truth and thus conduct them into the path of genuine wisdom and positive objective knowledge." When, therefore, Protagoras⁷ said: "man is the measure of all things and men differ, consequently no objective but only subjective truth is possible," Socrates answered, "True, man is the measure of all things, but descend deeper into his personality by the right method, not by a defective method, applicable to the physical world, and you will find that underneath all the transitory there is a ground of steady truth. Men differ as to what is fleeting, they agree as to what is abiding and eternal. There is a difference in the region of opinion, but substantial agreement in the region of objective truth. But in order to see this agreement we must always endeavor to penetrate into that region."

The second question in the Socratic epistemology was, *To what extent can man know?* The proper study of mankind is man, not nature, was his answer. All his predecessors philosophized more or less on nature in one form or the other. They blended together cosmogony, astronomy, geometry, physics and a kind of metaphysics. Socrates himself had studied with the natural philosopher Archelaus, as we know from the comedy of the "Clouds,"⁸ where he is represented "air-treading and speculating about the sun, and his disciples seeking things hidden under ground." But later in his life he

⁶ Apologia 23 does not contradict this statement, for there Socrates only asserts that human knowledge is limited in comparison with the Divine. ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός. Comp. also Plato, *Rep.*, X., 19.

⁷ *Theæt.*, 152, states this maxim thus: χρήμάτων πάντων μέτρος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἐστίν, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν. Comp. also Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, X, 1.

⁸ *Nubes*, V, 112-115.

abandoned the study of physics altogether as leading to no certain knowledge. St. Augustine⁹ in his admirable sketch of Greek philosophy remarks: "Socrates is said to have been the first who directed the entire effort of philosophy to the correction and regulation of manners, all who went before him having expended their greatest efforts in the investigation of physical, that is, natural phenomena. For he saw that the causes of things were sought for by them, which causes he believed to be ultimately reducible to nothing else than the will of the one true and supreme God. And on this account he thought they could only be comprehended by a purified mind; and therefore that all diligence ought to be given to the purification of the life by good morals in order that the mind, delivered from the depressing weight of lusts, might raise itself upward by its native vigor to eternal things, and might, with purified understanding, contemplate that nature which is incorporeal and unchangeable light, where live the causes of all created natures."—The confusion that ruled among the different schools led him to the conviction that the gods intended these things to remain secrets and allowed the physical studies only in so far as they are necessary for practical purposes. "Do these inquirers," he asked, "think that they already know human affairs well enough that they thus begin to meddle with divine?"¹⁰ "I have not leisure for such things," he is made to say by Plato,¹¹ "and I will tell you the reason; I am not yet able, according to the Delphic inscription, to know myself; and it appears to me very ridiculous, while ignorant of myself, to inquire into what I am not concerned in." That Socrates used at times to discuss physical subjects appears, as Kuehner¹² shows from Xenophon himself, as well as from Plato's *Apology*; but he pursued a different method from that of other philosophers in such discussions.

⁹ *De Civitate Dei*, VIII, 3.

¹⁰ *Mem.*, I, 1, 11: ἐθαύμαζε δὲ εἰ μὴ φανερόν αὐτοῖς ἔστιν ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εἰπεῖν.

¹¹ Plato, *Phædr.*, 8.

¹² *Xenophontis de Socrate Commentarii*, p. 246.

The third question in the Socratic epistemology was, *What, then, can man know*, if not the external world? *Γινῶθι σεαυτὸν*—know thyself—he grew never weary to answer. Listen to that admirable dialogue in the *Memorabilia*:¹³ Socrates said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever gone to Delphia?" "Yes, twice," replied he. "And did you observe what is written somewhere on the temple wall,¹⁴ '*Know Thyself*'?" "I did." "And did you take no thought of that inscription, or did you attend to it and try to examine yourself to ascertain what sort of character you are?" "I did not, indeed, try, for I thought that I knew very well already, since I should hardly know anything else if I did not know myself." "But whether does he seem to you to know himself who knows his own name merely, or he who having ascertained with regard to himself how he is adapted for the service of mankind, knows his own abilities?" "It appears to me, I must confess, that he who does not know his own abilities does not know himself." "But is it not evident," said Socrates, "that men enjoy a great number of blessings in consequence of knowing themselves, and incur a great number of evils, through being deceived in themselves?" "Be assured," replied Euthydemus, "that I feel convinced, we must consider self-knowledge of the highest value, but as to the way in which we must begin to seek self-knowledge, I look to you for information." This precept became to Socrates the holiest of all tests. He unceasingly compelled men to take a just measure of their own real knowledge or real ignorance. His maxim was: not physiology but psychology; not matter but mind; not cosmogony but consciousness; not stars but living men. Xenophon¹⁵ says: "Socrates incessantly discussed human affairs, investigating, What is piety? What is impiety? What is the honorable and the base? What is the just and the unjust? What is

¹³ *Xen. Mem.*, IV, 2, 24.

¹⁴ It is doubtful whether this famous inscription had its origin with Thales (*Diog. Laert.*, I) or with the Delphic Pythia (Aristotle), or with Socrates (*Phædr.*, 229).

¹⁵ *Mem.*, I, 1, 12, 16; IV, 7, 6.

temperance or unsound mind? What is courage or cowardice? What is a city? What is a character fit for a citizen? What is authority over men? What is the character befitting the exercise of such authority? and other similar questions. Men who knew these matters he accounted good and honorable; men who were ignorant of them he considered slaves." The epoch-making significance of Socrates is admirably expressed by Cicero¹⁶ in his famous often quoted passage: "*Socrates primus philosophiam evocavit a coelo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis quaerere.*"

The fourth question in Socrates' epistemology was, *Are there any limits to human knowledge?* Socrates repeatedly expressed it as one of his deepest convictions that an essential part of true knowledge consisted in the consciousness of the limits of human knowledge. "The highest knowledge consists in the knowledge that man can know no more than the gods will permit him to know."¹⁷ To this conclusion he was led by the arrogance and groundless assertions of the Sophists, as well as by his own profound meditation and his deep self-knowledge. Watching carefully all that transpired within himself, he discovered a residuum of feelings and impulses which could not be explained from what he knew of his inner life. And this he regarded as a direct divine revelation which he believed he possessed in what he called his *δαίμωνιον*,¹⁸ a subject of the deepest interest, but not strictly germane to our theme.

Having discussed the definition, the nature and aim of the Socratic Method the track is clear to consider the different stages of the method.

FIRST STAGE: PURIFICATION OF THE INTELLECT.

Socrates believed that the purification of the intellect by a frank confession of ignorance was the chief condition of prog-

¹⁶ *Cic. Tusc.*, V, 4, 10.

¹⁷ *Mem.*, I, 1, 11.

¹⁸ See *Mem.*, IV, 3, 14; also, Lasaul, *Demonion*, p. 18.

ress in the attainment of truth. By his proverbial confession of ignorance he meant to say two things, first that, while conversant with the opinions of men, he lacked "conceptual knowledge"—*begriffliches Wissen*—and, secondly, that he had no ready-made system to inculcate. Thus he was not only the founder of a sound theory of knowledge but also of an agnology, a theory of ignorance. The same weapon which he applied so mercilessly to himself, he tried also on others. He was the "great talker of Athens." He "prattled without end," as his enemies described his dialectical conversation. Early in the morning Socrates frequented the public walks, the gymnasium for bodily training and the schools where youths were receiving instruction; he was to be seen in the market place at the hour when it was most crowded. He talked with any one, young or old, rich or poor, who sought to address him, and in the hearing of all who chose to stand by. As Lewes¹⁹ says: "He gave no lectures; he only talked. He wrote no books, he argued." The language is therefore undoubtedly historical which Plato²⁰ puts into his mouth respecting the inefficiency of books. "Books cannot be interrogated, cannot answer, we can only learn from them that which we knew before." Moreover, this mode of discussion, so much in harmony with the marked sociability of the Greek character, the quick recurrence of short question and answer was needful as a stimulus to the attention, at a time when the habit of close and accurate reflection on abstract subjects had been so little cultivated.

Socrates held that to make a man willing to be taught, the only condition required was to make him conscious of his own ignorance, the want of which consciousness was the real cause of his indocility. The most of all ignorance he conceived to be when a man was ignorant of himself, fancying that he knew, what he did not really, *i. e.*, conceptually, know. His elenchus was therefore animated by the truest spirit of positive science and formed an indispensable precursor to its attain-

¹⁹ *History of Philosophy*, p. 136.

²⁰ *Phædrus*, p. 96.

ment. Hence Socrates entertained no distrust of the powers of the mind to attain unto certainty. He laid down as we now believe, an erroneous line of distinction between the knowable and the unknowable, excluding physics from the former, but respecting man and society he asserted in the strongest terms possible, that certainty of knowledge was attainable even though *he* did not as yet have it. Nay, Socrates went further and asserted that every man *ought* to know what was knowable, for ignorance here was vice, while knowledge he regarded as virtue. There are two points only concerning man and society with regard to which Socrates is really a skeptic. He denies first, that men can know that upon which they have bestowed no conscious effort, no systematic study. He denies, next, that men can practice what they do not know. Socrates felt persuaded that no man could behave as a just, temperate, courageous, pious, patriotic agent, unless he taught himself to know correctly what justice, temperance, courage, piety and patriotism really were. In this, Socrates goes to the extreme, when asserting, "If it were possible wittingly to do evil, it would be better to do so than to commit it unwittingly, for in the latter case the first condition of all right action—a knowing state of mind—would be found wanting, while in the former it would be there, the doer being only faithless to it for the moment. In his campaign against "the conceit of knowledge" without the reality, he considered himself victorious even with the negative result, "We have thus seen that we know not." And many dialogues in Plato and Xenophon close ostentatiously with the above confession, as *e. g.*, the following: The famous Sophist Hippias of Elis, on his return to Athens after an absence of some time happened to come in the way of Socrates as he was observing to some people how surprising it was that, if a man wished to have another taught to be a shoemaker or a carpenter, he was at no loss whither he should send him, while as to justice, he should not know whither to go to learn it. Hippias, hearing this remark, said, as if jesting with him, "What! are you still saying the same things Socrates,

that I heard from you so long ago?" "Yes," said Socrates, "and what is more wonderful, I am not only still saying the same things, but am saying them on the same subject; but you, perhaps, from being possessed of such variety of knowledge, never say the same things on the same subjects?" "Certainly," replied Hippias, "I do always try to say something new." "About matters of which you have certain knowledge then," said Socrates, "as, for instance, about the letters of the alphabet, if any one were to ask you how many and what letters are in the word Socrates, would you try to say sometimes one thing and sometimes another?" "About such matters," replied Hippias, "I, like you, always say the same thing; but concerning justice I think that I have certainly something to say now which neither you nor any other person can refute." "By Juno," returned Socrates, "it is a great good that you say you have discovered, and I know not how I can part with you till I have learned so important a benefit from its discoverer." "You shall not hear it," returned Hippias, "until you yourself declare what you think justice to be; for it is enough that you laugh at others, questioning and confuting everybody while you yourself are unwilling to declare your opinion on any subject."—The dialogue continues at great length and both pass with the tacit understanding that neither knows what justice really is.

The method which Socrates used so effectively in these cross-questionings was the famous "Socratic Irony," which may be defined as an ignorance purposely affected to provoke or confound an antagonist and to lead him to the same conclusion that Socrates had reached in respect to himself, namely: I know not the concept of things and without such knowledge no real knowledge is possible, but only opinion and seeming. Schleiermacher²¹ ingeniously remarks that "the irony of Socrates is nothing else than the coexistence in him of the *Idea of Knowledge*, with the absence of positive acquirement." It is, therefore, a mistake to represent this irony to be merely

²¹ *Philosophische Werke*, III, 4, 9.

a trick of conversation by which to lure others on the ice in order to laugh at their fall. On the contrary, it is an earnest endeavor of Socrates, thinking himself without conceptual knowledge but prompted by a strong impulse for it, to learn from others what they know in this line. Of course in the attempt to discover real, *i. e.*, conceptual knowledge by a critical analysis of their notions, their supposed knowledge very often vanished into nothing. But this was not the end Socrates sought. Timon, the Satyrist, and Zeno, the Epicurean, are therefore wrong in describing Socrates "as a buffoon whose sole object was to turn everything into ridicule, especially men of eminence." On the contrary, it was intended to act as a stirring and propulsive force. There was a great difference between the irony peculiar to Socrates and what is usually called irony, the kind peculiar to the Athenians.

This cross-questioning Socrates regarded as a religious duty. He refers to it in the most solemn hour of his life at his trial.²² A great admirer of Socrates, Cherephon, had put the question to the Pythian priestess at Delphi whether any other man was wiser than Socrates. The reply was that no other man was wiser. Socrates affirms that he was greatly perplexed on hearing this declaration from so infallible an authority, being conscious that he possessed no wisdom on any subject. After much meditation he resolved to test the oracle by measuring the wisdom of others with his own. He conversed with politicians; poets, orators, craftsmen and others. "The result which I acquired," says Socrates, "was, that I was a wiser man than they, for neither they nor I knew anything of what was truly good or honorable. The great difference between us was that they fancied that they knew something, while I was fully conscious of my own ignorance; I was thus wiser than they inasmuch as I was exempt from that capital error of conceit. Thus the oracle was proved to be right. Fulfilling the mission imposed upon me I have thus established the veracity of the god who meant to pronounce that human wisdom was of little

²² Plato, *Apologia*, 96.

reach or worth. My service to the god has not only constrained me to live in constant poverty and neglect of political estimation but has brought upon me a host of bitter enemies in those whom I have examined and exposed. Nevertheless it would be monstrous if I from fear of death were to disobey the oracle and desert the post which the god has assigned to me, cross-questioning both myself and others. And should you even now offer to acquit me on condition of my renouncing this duty, I should tell you that I will obey the god rather than you, and that I will persist until my dying day in cross-questioning you. If I tell you that silence on my part would be disobedience to the god you will think me unjust and not believe; but so it is."

SECOND STAGE: "INTELLECTUAL PREGNANCY."

The passing away of the illusions of false knowledge led to a mental quickening, which Plato, in his exuberant fancy, calls "intellectual pregnancy." This was the middle state in the ascent to the hill of truth, the state of *φιλοσοφία*, a love of wisdom. The three stages are described thus:²³ "No god philosophizes, or desires to become wise, for they are so. And if there is any other being who is wise, neither does he philosophize. Nor do the ignorant philosophize, for they do not desire to become wise. On this very account ignorance is in a hard case, in that a person, being neither beautiful nor good, nor wise, still appears to himself to be all-sufficient. Hence, he who fancies himself to be not wanting, does not desire that of which he fancies he is not in want. Who then, are they who philosophize if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant? This is clear even to a child, that they are those between both of these, the lovers. For of the things most beautiful is wisdom. Now love is conversant with the beautiful, consequently love is necessarily attached to wisdom. A lover of wisdom, a *φιλόσοφος*, is between the wise and the ignorant.

²³ Plato, *Symposium*, 510.

THIRD STAGE: MENTAL MAIEUTICS.

It is with such parturient minds as these that Socrates busied himself. Having created in them an uneasy longing after truth he regarded it as his special vocation and skill to aid them in that mental parturition whereby they were to be relieved. "In this I imitate my mother," he says.²⁴ "She no longer bears children herself, but being a midwife she helps others to bring their births into the world. In like manner I perform the office of a midwife to my friends. I put questions to them until the hidden fruit of their understanding comes to light. But at the same time I scrutinize narrowly the offspring which they bring forth; and if it prove distorted or unpromising I cast it away with the rigor of a Lycurgean nurse, whatever might be the reluctance of the mother-mind to part with its new born."

We must not overlook that the method of Socrates resulted from the notions he had formed respecting the nature of the soul. Socrates thought that little mental improvement could be produced by expositions directly communicated, or by matter lodged in the memory. It was necessary in his opinion, that mind should work upon mind, by short question and answer in order to generate new thoughts and powers. This he thought the only effectual way of propagating the philosophic spirit. Instead, therefore, of commencing with lofty speculations, often unintelligible for most of those whom one wishes to instruct, we should in the opinion of Socrates take hold of men's minds as they are, with their ideas and even their prejudices, in order to gradually raise them to the knowledge of truth. He was persuaded that the soul contained the germs of the truth, but enveloped and even smothered by vain opinions engendered by what is fleeting and seeming. He began therefore by setting the soul free from this envelope in order to give scope for the development of these innate germs. We should, he thought, go in among these false notions, put them in opposition to each other and thus make

²⁴ *Theæt.*, 150, *μαίεσθαι με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζω γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυεν.*

them destroy one another. Hence the subtle disputations to which Socrates did not disdain to descend. It is in the dialogue "*Meno*," where Socrates unfolds this remarkable hypothesis of eternal preëxistence, boundless past experience and omniscience of the mind. All knowledge is reminiscence. When truth is presented to us we recognize it as an old friend after a long absence. We know it by reason of its conformity to our antecedent, pre-natal experience; the mind has become omniscient by having seen, heard and learned everything, both on earth and in hades, but such knowledge exists as a confused and unavoidable mass, having been buried and forgotten on the commencement of its actual life. By suitable interrogations a teacher may recall to the memory of his pupils many facts and judgments which have been hitherto forgotten. In modern terminology we would speak of these observations as the doctrine of innate ideas.

FOURTH STAGE: VALID DEFINITIONS.

In all his questioning Socrates did not deny that he was after the essence of things and the finding of the "concepts." "To search out the What of everything was the unceasing care of Socrates," says Xenophon. With this fundamental theory that true knowledge must be based on correct conceptions, however simple it may appear to us, an entire change in the intellectual process was demanded. In previous philosophy thought had been directed immediately to the object as such, things were regarded as being what they appeared to be to the senses; or if contradictory experience forbade this it clung to those appearances which made the strongest impression on the observer, declaring these to constitute the essence and thence draw further conclusions. In the Socratic philosophy thought was directed immediately to the conception, and to the object only mediately, through the conception. In so much as all scientific thought is inseparably connected Socrates attached importance to even trivial subjects as not unworthy of careful investigation regarding the connection between the

thought and the thing, because even these were connected with all truth by means of whatever truth or certainty they contained.

INDUCTION AS THE ESSENCE OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD.

The term in modern philosophy for the Socratic method is induction. By induction Socrates reached "conceptual knowledge." That is, he advanced from facts to abstractions, from the particular to the universal, from the known to cases hitherto unobserved or unexamined. "To Socrates we may unquestionably assign two novelties, inductive discourses and the definitions of general terms," writes his great pupil Aristotle. But this process of induction Socrates did not reduce within clearly-defined lines. All that he has clearly expressed is the general postulate that everything must be reduced to its concept and that true knowledge belongs only to the concept. Further details about the mode and manner of this induction and its strict logical forms were not yet molded into a theory. The method was applied by him rather as the result of individual skill.

By this entire process Socrates brought people to see, as Plato puts it, the one in the many and the many in the one. Assuredly we may echo Grote's statement, that it requires at the present day some mental effort to see anything important in the invention of notions so familiar as those of genus, definition, the individual things as comprehended in a genus—what each thing is, and to what genus it belongs, etc. Nevertheless four centuries before Christ these terms denoted mental processes which few, if any but Socrates, had a distinct recognition of, in the form of analytical consciousness. The novelty was very distasteful to those who were not seduced by it. Men resent being forced to rigor of speech and thought; they call you "pedantic" if you insist on their using terms with definite meaning; they prefer the loose flowing language of indefinite associations which picks up in its course a variety of heterogenous meanings; and are irritated at any speaker who points out to them the inaccuracy of their phrases.

The following dialogue may serve to illustrate the different stages of the Socratic method. Meno.—Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is teachable? Socrates.—I am ashamed to say that I do not even know what virtue is, and when I do not know what a thing is, how can I know anything about its attributes? M.—But is it really true, Socrates, that you do not know what virtue is? S.—Yes, and more than this I have never met with any one who did know. Meno proceeds to answer that there are many virtues: the virtue of a man—competence to transact the business of the city. The virtue of a woman—to administer the house well. The virtue of a child, of an old man, a slave, etc. Socrates rejects this answer. I asked for the virtue and you mention a host of virtues. In answer to my question you ought to declare what all the single virtues have in common, through the communion of which they are virtues. Meno tries again, and answers, “it is to be competent, to exercise command over men.” Socrates is not satisfied with this answer and rejoins: “but that will not suit for the virtue of a child or a slave.” M.—Very true. I say too, that there are other virtues, namely, courage, moderation, wisdom, etc. S.—But my good man, we are thus still in the same predicament. In looking for one virtue, we have found many; but we cannot find that one form which runs through them all. Meno in his bewilderment exclaims: “Your conversation Socrates, produces the effect of a shock of a torpedo. You stun and confound me. I have often discoursed copiously—and as I thought effectively—upon virtue, but now you have shown that I do not even know what virtue is.” Socrates replies: “If I throw you into perplexity it is only because I am myself in the like perplexity and ignorance. I do not know what virtue is any more than you and I shall be glad to continue the search after it if you will assist me.”

This dialogue illustrates admirably the various stages of the Socratic method. First, he knows not what virtue is; secondly, he examines Meno and finds that he also knows not the con-

cept of virtue, and affirms that he never found one who knew it; thirdly, he creates doubt and perplexity in the mind of Meno, accompanied by an intense desire to arrive at certainty; fourthly, Socrates assists his interlocutor in bringing to daylight what was slumbering in his mind. The whole process is inductive in that it proceeds from propositions best known to truths less known and culminates in the definition of the essence of the thing under consideration, the forming of a concept. The concept of virtue, indeed, was not found; but, what was more important to Socrates, the "concept of the concept" was found. From henceforth Meno knew what a real definition must look like.

III.

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JESUS.

LESTER REDDIN.

The matter of supreme interest to Jesus was man. He Himself makes no explicit statement to this effect, but the fact is evinced by His words and actions throughout His public ministry. In contrast with John the Baptist, around whom there clung a spirit of self-reserve, Jesus came both eating and drinking (Matt. 11: 18, 19), and mingling freely in human society. He went into the homes of the people and accepted their hospitality (Lk. 10: 38, 7: 36, Mk. 2: 15, Lk. 19: 5 ff.), attended their weddings (Jn. 2: 2), and visited their sick (Mk. 1: 30-31). The sphere of His social activity was not circumscribed by party lines nor racial boundaries; and He displayed extraordinary adaptability to the various conditions of the human mind and feelings. He discussed theological niceties with the learned doctors in the temple with a facility which astonished "all that heard Him" (Lk. 2: 47), and He talked entertainingly to the Samaritan woman concerning the superiority of the Water of Life which He gives over the water which she might draw from the ancestral well (Jn. 4: 7-26). He loved the rich young ruler whose moral life was beyond reproach (Mk. 10: 21), and His attitude toward the less pretentious class was such as to call forth from His critics the epithet, "A friend of publicans and sinners" (Matt. 11: 16-20). He found Himself perfectly at ease at a dinner given in His honor at the home of aristocratic Simon, and the simplicity of the home of Mary and Martha was not objectionable to him. Indeed, no one has ever more truly become "all things to all men" than did Jesus the Nazarene. Nor did He fail to interest men in Himself. His oft-repeated challenge to men was, "Follow me"; and, although many of those who were at

first interested in Him afterward staggered at His teaching, and "went back and walked no more with Him" (vide Jn. 6: 60, 66), the Evangelists frequently tell us of the multitudes who thronged around Him. "The common people heard Him gladly" because He was in "hearing distance" of the common people; and He could say to His own disciples: "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you." He called the rugged fishermen of Galilee to forsake their nets, and become His constant companions that they might learn to be "fishers of men." It is true, He said: "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me, and to finish His work" (Jn. 4: 34), but He was doing the will of the Father when He was ministering to the highest needs of men. As the Good Shepherd He lays down His life for the sheep, and with such service the Father is well pleased (Jn. 10: 15, 17). He was interested in men for their own sakes. He could have said with Paul: "I seek not yours, but you." He "came not to be ministered to, but to minister" (Matt. 20: 28, Mk. 10: 45). Therefore He was not willing to become entangled in the economic affairs of men. It is true that on two different occasions He multiplied the loaves and fishes and satisfied the hunger of the multitudes, but He would not allow Himself to be made king by those who "ate of the loaves and were filled." Although He admits, when on trial before Pilate, His claim to be "king of the Jews," He proceeds to explain that His "kingdom is not of this world," and, therefore, in no sense a rival to the Roman authority. He would not even claim His rightful exemption from paying the temple tax (Matt. 17: 24 ff.). He refused to become an administrator of an estate, and thus guarantee to the complaining son his proper share of his father's goods (Lk. 12: 14). He showed no inclination to use His friendly office to equalize household duties between two sisters, but He called the attention of the complaining one to the higher concerns of life (Lk. 10: 40 ff.).

One with such sympathetic interest in men, who "had no need that any one should testify concerning man, for He Him-

self knew what is in man," should be listened to as an authoritative teacher of things pertaining to the nature and possibilities of our race. This great teacher has spoken, and it is the purpose of this article to set forth His utterances on this subject.

I. THE ORIGIN OF MAN.

In the few passages in which Jesus refers to the origin of man, He speaks, not in the languages of the laboratory or the class-room in science, but in the language of a religious teacher. "Hypotheses" and "working formulæ" hold no place in His pedagogical program. He takes no cognizance of mediating causes, but goes directly to the one great First Cause. He has nothing to say concerning a method or a process of the creation of man; it is sufficient for Him to say that God made him. The assumption of this fact lies at the basis of all His teaching; it is positively stated by Him once (Mk. 10: 6, Matt. 19: 7). He does not deny that the race has made progress since the creation—a fact patent in His day as well as in our own day—but He insists that the present sex distinctions and family instincts have existed from the beginning; and He predicts that such will continue until His coming (Matt. 24: 38).

Jesus does not teach that men stand in the relation of sons to God by virtue of their creation. It is true that when speaking to His own disciples concerning God and His activities in the world and among men, He not infrequently uses such appellations as "Your Father" (Mat. 6: 8), "Your Heavenly Father" (v. 14), "Your Father who is in Heaven" (ibid., 23: 9); but, on the other hand, He said to those who boasted of their descent from Abraham and their consequent freedom: "Ye are of your father, the devil, and the desires of your father ye will do" (Jn. 8: 44). Thus it is obvious that the sonship which Jesus predicated of men is ethical rather than natural, a relationship into which men are brought, not by the operation of forces over which they have no control, but by their own free choices. To be children, therefore, of the Heavenly Father men must have a moral likeness to Him (cf.

Matt. 5: 9, 45). But as the creature of God's hand man is the object of His constant watchcare and providence. The Creator does not seclude Himself from His world nor hide His face from His creatures, but He is ever in the world, and He sees even that which is done in secret (Matt. 6: 4). Not even the minutest details in the lives of His creatures escape His notice; He even numbers the hairs of man's head. All men, irrespective of their moral character, are the constant recipients of His material blessings; "He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust" (Matt. 5: 45). Although no one of us is able, by his own anxiety, to add one cubit to his stature, yet He who clothes the lilies of the field in their robes of beauty and feeds the fowls of the air will continue to provide food and raiment for men who are of more value than many sparrows (Matt. 6: 25 ff., 10: 29 ff.).

II. MAN'S CAPACITY FOR RELIGION.

Jesus everywhere assumes that man is capable of having religious experiences. Native depravity He does not deny, but He never would admit that men are naturally so depraved that they have no religious propensities. Indeed, His teaching and appeals to men would have been folly on any other assumption than that His hearers were constitutionally capable of comprehending and responding to His message. In His words, as well as in His actions, He implies that men have a native faculty to discern and appropriate to themselves truth concerning God, and to come into vital relationship with Him. "No man," He says, "can come to me, except the Father who sent me draw him" (Jn. 6: 44), but there must first be within man that which is tractable, that which makes it possible for him to be drawn to the Son when the divine influences are brought to bear upon him. Jesus found this appetency for religion so acute in the lives of the people of His day that they were fainting from the lack of proper spiritual leadership (Matt. 9: 36). How could the Son reveal the

Father to men, unless they were able to receive His revelation? He declares that Peter had received a revelation from the Heavenly Father concerning the identity of the Christ which flesh and blood never could have made to him (Matt. 16: 17). Philip, during the "long time" that he was with his Lord, ought to have found in Him the very revelation of the Father Himself (Jn. 14: 9). He expressed wonder that Cleopas and his unnamed companion on the way to Emmaus should have been so slow to comprehend that measure of divine revelation contained in the Old Testament concerning Israel's Redeemer and His work (Lk. 24: 25ff.). Men can distinguish between light and darkness, but many deliberately choose darkness rather than light lest their deeds which are evil should be made manifest by the light. He implies, however, that men may so abuse that innate power of soul that they are no longer susceptible to spiritual impressions; when to give the gospel to them would be as useless as to cast pearls before swine (Matt. 7: 6). Exegetes are quite generally agreed that there is, in His words to those Pharisees who charged Him with casting out demons by the power of Beelzebub, an implied charge of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, a sin which He pronounces unpardonable. Perhaps the unpardonableness of their crime is grounded in the fact that they had so stifled their power of spiritual discernment as to be unable further to distinguish between the works of God and the works of Satan. It was the purpose of Jesus to train this tendency of the human soul in the right direction, and to this end He adjusted His appeal to whatever degree of religious intelligence and interest He found in the life of any given individual. In His words to the apathetic and indifferent there was a commingling of reproof, threat, and promise (Lk. 13: 1-9). He repressed rash discipleship (Matt. 8: 19-20), and sought to stimulate the sluggish (vv. 21-22); He put to the test the faith of His most devoted followers by thrusting upon them a decision between continued fidelity to Him and turning back with those who "walked no more with

Him" (Jn. 6: 66, 67). On the eve of His passion He says that those whom His Father had given Him had so exercised this power as to be assured of the divine character of Him and His message (Jn. 17: 7, 8).

III. MAN'S PRESENT RELIGIOUS STATUS.

Jesus recognizes that man in his present state is estranged from God. This estrangement results in an attitude of *antagonism on the part of man toward things divine*. Matters of a human origin, therefore, belong in an entirely different category from matters of a heavenly origin. If the baptism of John were of men, it could not have a heavenly character, because the one is incompatible with the other (Matt. 21: 25, Mk. 11: 30, Lk. 20: 4). For Peter, in his well-intended counsel to his Lord, to savor the things of men rather than the things of God was a positive "offence" to the Lord, and provoked from His lips words of rebuke such as were never spoken even to the traitor. Jesus warns His disciples of the opposition which they may expect of the world because they are not of the world. So dominant is this hostility of the world to the cause of righteousness that His great shepherd heart went out in prayer to the Father that His disciples might be divinely kept from the evil of the world (Jn. 17: 15). In that memorable passage, John 3: 16, He teaches that all men would have perished but for His coming into the world. In His defence of Himself before those who murmured at His going in to be the guest of a "sinner," He speaks of man as "that which is lost," and declares that His mission in the world is to save such. Although man is thus alienated from God and righteousness, there is hope of his recovery. The lost sheep has not strayed so far away but that the Shepherd may "go after the lost one until He find it." The prodigal son has not become so debased but that he may "come to himself" and resolve in his heart to return to his father's house. Although Jesus does not give an elaborate doctrine of sin, such, for example, as Paul gives in the

fifth chapter of his letter to the Romans, He recognizes sin as the cause of man's alienation from God. The presence of moral and spiritual disorder in the race is the occasion of His appearance in the drama of human history. The words of the angel in the annunciation to Joseph: "He shall save His people from their sins" (Matt. 1: 21), find their echo in the words of Jesus: "I came . . . to call . . . sinners to repentance" (Matt. 9: 13, Mk. 2: 17, Lk. 5: 32, cf. Lk. 15 *passim*). The remission of sins, therefore, is the great end to be accomplished by His sacrificial service. "Thus it is written that the Christ should suffer and rise from the dead the third day, and that repentance and the remission of sins should be preached in His name to all the nations" (Lk. 24: 46, 47).

IV. THE WORTH OF MAN.

Jesus seems not to have placed a very high premium on a corpse. It was not His purpose to discourage filial love and obedience; but, on the contrary, He censured those Scribes who had contrived a scheme to release a son from all filial obligation for making void the word of God by their traditions. But He would have the young man who wished to defer his discipleship until he had buried his father, to think of the body of his deceased parent as a matter of little consequence. But, on the other hand, Jesus was really the first to teach the true worth of human life. Aristotle had taught the Greeks to think of a slave as "a kind of animate machine," and the highest motive for benevolence which the great Roman moralist, Seneca, knew was the "consciousness of having a noble nature." But Jesus gave to the world an altruistic ideal; He presented a motive which is objective rather than subjective; He placed the emphasis on the worth of man. To Him life is more than meat, and, therefore, He would have His disciples infer that He who is the author of life will not withhold from His creatures those things which are necessary for the sustenance of life. Man is of incalculably more value than a sheep, and, therefore, there is a very great responsi-

bility resting upon men to care for the preservation of the lives of their fellow men. Perhaps He does not require one to hazard his own life to save the life of his fellow, although His words to the Twelve, "Love one another as I have loved you" (Jn. 15: 12), may imply this. To Cain's interrogation: "Am I my brother's keeper?" He would reply affirmatively. "Give ye them to eat," was His reply to the Twelve when they desired Him to send the multitude away from Him hungry. The example of the priest and the Levite who failed to care for the one who had been wounded by robbers is pointed out by Him in such a way as to provoke contempt rather than admiration from His hearers; whereas the example of the Samaritan who dressed the wounds of the unfortunate man and further provided for his necessities is presented in such a way as to win their approval. He teaches that it is permissible to do manual labor on the Sabbath day, if necessary to save life or to alleviate suffering. There is, furthermore, a heavy responsibility for *self*-preservation resting upon every man. It is folly to accumulate riches at the hazard of one's soul, for the whole world is not to be compared to the worth of the soul. Nor is the care of the spiritual—although of primary importance—the whole duty of man; it is incumbent on him to care for his physical life also. It is true, the Great Teacher admonishes men not to labor for "the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life"; to lose one's life for His sake and the gospel's is meritorious of eternal life, but, where there is no conflict with the eternal interests of the soul, there is a responsibility resting on every man to protect that life which God has given him. This duty of self-preservation, written by the Creator in the very nature of men, takes precedence over certain positive religious requirements. It takes precedence over the Levitical law regulating the Tabernacle and its appurtenances, and, therefore, it was proper for David to enter the House of God and eat the Shewbread, which, because of its sanctity, was "not lawful to eat but for the priests only," rather than submit to suicidal

hunger. It takes precedence over the Sabbath law, and, therefore, the disciples are justified in violating the Sabbath law by reaping grain to satisfy the hunger of their bodies.

Thus we see that the sublimest conception of man ever given to the world was given by Him who, although He spent His life in a ministry of love and mercy to men, was thought, by the members of His own family to be "beside himself," and by His enemies to be possessed by a demon.

CHESTER, PA.

IV.

PREPARATION FOR THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

A CATECHETICAL SUGGESTION ARRANGED ACCORDING TO THE TEACHING OF JESUS.

SCOTT R. WAGNER.

For many years the writer has felt that there was a vital need of something to supplement the instruction that is usually given in connection with the Heidelberg Catechism. To be a member of the Church and to live a Christian life means more today than it did in the sixteenth century. Our prospective church members need more emphasis on the devotional and ethical side of life. The following treatise has been worked out with these and other evident needs in mind, especially toward the end that the instruction before confirmation shall be more in harmony with the preaching and teaching from the pulpit after confirmation.

It is very essential to give catechumens the view point of religious education that will be familiar when they worship in the sanctuary. There was a time when the Heidelberg Catechism was the basis for much, if not most, of the pulpit utterances. Since there are very few churches any more that teach along the lines of former days it follows that if the newly confirmed are to take up the many duties of the Christian life and feel at home in the presence of the sermons they hear they must receive instruction which, to some extent, supplements that which is at present provided.

The following material has been worked out gradually and used in conjunction with the Heidelberg Catechism. It is not presumed to solve what we call in this day "the catechetical problem," but is offered as a suggestion toward that end. In its use over a period of three years it has proven to be of

value to the limited number using it. Last winter the contents of the present article was read before the Lehigh Valley Ministerial Association. The association was unanimous in asking for its publication in such form that it could be given more careful examination. Through the pages of the REVIEW it is now given to a larger circle with the hope that it will receive the criticism of each one who may read it.

Should it be the desire of a sufficient number of pastors, after some possible alteration, it will be put in such form as to be readily available for their use.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. What as a Christian is my first duty in life?

My first duty in life, as a Christian, is to preserve, develop and use all my powers of body, mind and soul in harmony with the spirit and will of God, my heavenly Father.

Lk. 2: 40; Lk. 2: 42; Lk. 2: 49; Mtt. 6: 33; Jno. 10: 30; Jno. 15: 8.

Meditation.—Am I willing to so learn God's will that I may be able to say, with Jesus, in regard to all my thoughts, plans, desires, and acts, "I must be about my Father's business"?

2. What is the purpose of this course of study?

The purpose of this course of study is to enable me, by the study of God's word, by the practice of prayer, by the aid of the Spirit, and by the direction of my teacher, to become prepared in body, mind, and soul, to live in harmony with the spirit and will of God, and to enjoy all the blessings of the Christian life.

Mtt. 6: 6; Jno. 16: 13; 2 Tim. 2: 15; 2 Tim. 3: 16-17; Eph. 4: 11-12.

Meditation.—Do I read my Bible daily, searching for the word that may be a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my path? Do I enjoy fellowship with my Father in daily prayer?

I. THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

3. What is the Christian life?

The Christian life is the life of God in the soul of man, as revealed by Jesus Christ.

Jno. 6: 38; 17: 4; 14: 9; 10: 10; Mtt. 5: 48; Mk. 9: 41.

Study.—Name the various subjects treated by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount (Mtt. 5-7).

4. How did Jesus reveal the life of God that was in him?

Jesus revealed the life of God by perfectly living a life of self sacrifice and loving service, also by his teaching and his mighty works.

Jno. 1: 4; 8: 29; 20: 30-31; Mtt. 8: 20; Lk. 8: 1.

Meditation.—Is there anything I ought to do for Jesus' sake that I leave undone?

5. How should I apply this spirit to my life?

By being ready and willing to give up and abandon any interest or desire that is merely self pleasing, for the purpose of using all my energy and ability for the welfare of others and the glory of God.

Lk. 5: 11; 9: 23-24; Jno. 17: 19; Rom. 12: 9.

Meditation.—Is there anything that I should give up that I might enter more fully into the Christian life?

6. Is the Christian life then more than to deny myself and resist evil?

Yes, Jesus taught us to deny ourselves and to resist evil that we might be the better fitted for Christian service.

Jno. 17: 17-18; Mtt. 20: 28; 29: 27; 7: 21.

Study.—The parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk. 10: 25-37) and note what Jesus commends.

7. Does Jesus commend a life of energy and activity in his service?

Jesus called only industrious men to become his disciples, and God has always set his highest approval upon those who, guided by his presence, have been most active and faithful in the pursuit of the worthy ends of life.

Mtt. 25: 21; 25: 40; Lk. 10: 37; Jno. 15: 16; 2 Thes. 3: 13.

Study.—Read the parable of the Talents (Mtt. 25: 14-30) and note what is praised and what condemned.

II. OF THE MISSION OF JESUS AND OUR MISSION.

8. Where may I learn about the life and teaching of Jesus Christ?

In the four books of the New Testament, known as the gospels according to St. Matthew, St. Mark, St. Luke and St. John.

Mtt. 1: 1; Mk. 1: 1; Lk. 1: 1-4.

Study.—Commit the names and nature of all the books in the New Testament.

9. Can I learn about the mission of Christ and the Christian life from any other sources?

Yes, many parts of the Old Testament, and most of the remainder of the New Testament, contain records and references which are not only important but necessary to a proper understanding of the mission of Christ and the Christian life.

Jno. 16: 12-13; 2 Tim. 3: 16; Heb. 1: 1-2.

Study.—Learn the divisions of the Old Testament and the names of the books in each division.

10. What does Jesus teach us concerning himself?

Jesus teaches us that he is the revelation of the Father; the Son of God; the son of Man; the Messiah; the Savior of the lost. He also declares that he and the Father are one, and that his message was not his but that of his Father who sent him.

Jno. 4: 25-26; 9: 35-37; 10: 30; 14: 9; Lk. 19: 10.

Commit.—

“Father of eternal grace,
Glorify Thyself in me;
Meekly beaming in my face,
May the world Thine image see.”

11. What does Jesus say further in regard to his mission?

“The spirit of the Lord is upon me because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the brokenhearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovery of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that

are bruised, and to preach the acceptable year of the Lord" (Lk. 4: 18-19).

Matt. 11: 2-6.

Commit.—

"The healing of the seamless dress
Is by our beds of pain.
We touch Him in life's throng and press,
And we are whole again.
O Lord and Master of us all.
Whate'er our name or sign,
We own Thy sway, we hear Thy call,
We test our lives by Thine."

12. Give some other expressions in which Jesus explains his mission.

He says: "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly"; "the son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost"; "to fulfill and not to destroy." He also refers to himself as "the way, the truth, and the life," "the bread of life," "the good shepherd"; etc., and declares that he came "not to be ministered unto but to minister."

Jno. 6: 38; Mtt. 7: 1-5.

Meditation.—"Look up and not down, look out and not in, look forward and not back, and lend a hand."

13. What is the mission of Jesus according to John 3: 16?

That because of God's eternal love for man he sent Jesus Christ to manifest that love, and offered all who accepted His divine message and believed in His mission the gift of eternal life.

Jno. 1: 12; 1: 16; 12: 46; Psal. 103: 13; Jude 21.

Study.—The twenty-third Psalm and note the attitude of God toward us.

14. What then may I understand to be my mission as a follower of Jesus?

It follows that my mission as a follower of Jesus is not only to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ as my Savior, but also to take up, establish, and extend, as though they were my own, the aims and ends for which He lived and died.

Jno. 14: 1; Lk. 10: 37; Mtt. 28: 19-20; Jno. 17: 18; 20: 21.

Commit.—

“Jesus, I live to Thee
The loveliest and best;
My life in Thee, Thy life in me,
In Thy blest love I rest.”

15. What are some of these aims that should control my life?

(1) That the result of all my desires and acts may lead me toward the perfect life of God. (2) That having been blest by my fellowship with God, in Christ Jesus, I become a blessing to my associates. (3) That I manifest, daily, the truth of the gospel to every creature.

Mtt. 5: 13-14; 5: 48; 28: 18-20; Gen. 12: 2; Mk. 5: 19; 10: 32.

Meditation.—Am I doing anything myself that I would condemn in others?

16. What does Jesus tell us is the highest good in life, toward which we should continually strive?

Jesus teaches us that the highest good in life is to be a member of the kingdom of God, living its righteousness and enjoying all the blessings which that life affords. But this cannot be had unless we seek it as of more value than any other possession.

Lk. 12: 31; Mtt. 6: 21; 5: 48; 13: 44-46; Mk. 8: 36.

Meditation.—In what definite way am I trying to add to the uplift of the lives of those with whom I come in touch?

III. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

17. What is meant by the kingdom of God?

By the kingdom of God is meant all such persons, who through faith, seek to live as brethren, in harmony with the will of God, and whose desire is to accomplish all such good works as He has prepared for them to walk in.

Matt. 5: 44-45; 23: 8-9; 25: 40; Mk. 3: 31-35; Rom. 14: 17.

Study.—Mtt. 25: 31-46 and note what traits of character are most commended and hence most desirable.

18. What is it to have faith in God?

It is to look up with love and confidence to God, whom I reverence as higher, holier, wiser, and in every way, above myself; to depend upon Him and patiently obey his will.

Heb. 11: 1-3.

Study.—The four factors of faith are reverence, confidence, dependence, obedience. Read all of Heb. 11, and notice the relation of faith to conduct.

19. What does Jesus teach as the general law of the kingdom?

The law to govern life in this kingdom is none other than the will of God.

Mtt. 6: 10; 7: 21.

Prayer.—

“Teach me, my God and King,
Thy will in all to see;
And what I do in anything,
To do it as for Thee.”

20. How may I know what the will of God is?

By the study of God's word; by the study of Christ's life; by prayer; by the preaching of the word; and by obedience to my conscience in following my highest and holiest motives.

Jn. 7: 17; Mtt. 26: 39; 5: 8.

Prayer.—Wilt Thou bless me, my Father, with such purity of heart and life that I may be able always to learn thy will and then to conform my actions to thy will?

21. What special invitation did Jesus give to take up the life of the kingdom?

“Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light” (Mtt. 11: 28-30).

Isa. 55: 1-3. Rev. 22: 17.

Commit.—

"Just as I am; Thy love unknown
Has broken every barrier down;
Now, to be Thine, yea, Thine alone,
O Lamb of God, I come, I come."

22. What special promises are extended to all who accept this invitation?

God promises to all who come unto Him and who keep his commandments that fulness and abundance of life which leads to peace, happiness and true success.

Jno. 15: 7; 14: 21; 14: 27; 13: 17; Prov. 16: 20; Psa. 37: 3-5.

Prayer.—For all thy blessings, O Lord, make us always truly grateful. Amen.

23. How should I come to God?

I should come always just as I am, willing to learn to walk as a child of the light, as God giveth me vision.

Heb. 11: 6; Jno. 3: 16.

Prayer.—

"Guide me, O Thou great Jehovah,
Pilgrim through this barren land;
I am weak, but Thou art mighty,
Hold me with Thy powerful hand.
Bread of heaven, bread of heaven,
Feed me till I want no more."

24. How then may I enter the kingdom of God and enjoy all its blessings and rewards?

(1) By seeking it with my whole heart, (2) by doing the will of God, or doing his commandments, (3) by the leading of the Spirit of God, (4) by faith, and (5) by loathing all manner of life that is contrary to his will.

Mtt. 7: 7; Jno. 14: 15; 14: 26; Mtt. 5: 8.

Prayer.—

"Gracious Spirit, love divine,
Let Thy light within me shine;
All my guilty fears remove,
Fill me full of heaven and love."

25. As a member of the kingdom of God how should I feel and act toward my fellow men?

As a member of this kingdom it behooves me to manifest always toward all people a spirit of helpfulness and fraternal service.

Mk. 9: 35; 10: 44; Mtt. 20: 25-28.

Study.—Jno. 13: 4-17, and note how Jesus unites greatness with humility.

26. What is the first commandment which Jesus has enjoined on all who profess to live in his kingdom?

Jesus says: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and mind and soul and strength; this is the first and great commandment and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Prov. 23: 26; 1 Jno. 4: 12; 2 Jno. 6.

Study.—First four of the Ten Commandments.

27. What other writers in scripture emphasize the same truths and principles?

Micah 6: 8, says "What doth the Lord God require of thee but to love mercy, do justly and to walk humbly with thy God"; St. Paul in Titus 2: 11-12 says: "For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts we should live soberly and righteously and godly in this present world"; and St. Jas. says in 1: 27: "Pure religion and undefiled before God the Father is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world."

Isa. 1: 16-20.

Study.—Ten Commandments six to ten.

28. In what direct teachings do all these references agree?

They agree that my duties and responsibilities in the Christian life are three-fold: (1) Personal and godward; (2) Personal and manward, (3) Personal and selfward.

Lk. 4: 8; Jno. 21: 15-17; Mtt. 5: 8.

Commit.—

"Don't look for the flaws as you go through life,
And even when you find them,
It's wise and kind to be somewhat blind,
And search for the light behind them."

29. What is it to love God with all my heart, and mind, and soul, and strength?

It is to take real delight in prayer, in worship and in meditating upon his word, also to find my highest pleasure and success in life in living in harmony with his will.

Jno. 14: 15; 119: 97; Jno. 4: 24.

Meditation.—To please Him.

30. What is it to bring my heart and mind and soul and strength into harmony with his will?

It is to have only such affections as are pure and holy; to think only such thoughts as are clean and helpful; to desire only such ends in life as are noble and honest; and so to use my body as to preserve vigorous health and strength.

Jno. 14: 23; Mtt. 7: 7; Rom. 12: 1-2.

Commit.—Psalm 119: 33-40.

31. What is it for me to love myself?

To love myself is to think of myself as made in the image of God and to strive to be like Him; to try to be worthy of the best things in life; to develop in my work the highest possible efficiency; to do only such things as are positive and helpful in their effect upon me; and to keep myself in such purity of heart that divine truth may flow through me.

Mtt. 5: 48; Deut. 18: 13; Gen. 1: 27; Prov. 22: 29.

Meditation.—Am I in body, mind, and soul, the person I ought to be? Am I trying to be?

32. What is it for me to love my neighbor as Christ has here commanded?

It is to feel and act toward him in the spirit of the Golden Rule; to help him to live and love according to Christ's example and command; to feel so bound to him that his joys and sorrows become my joys and sorrows; and, so far as I

am able, to seek to minister to his temporal welfare and eternal salvation.

Mtt. 7: 12; 25: 34-40; Jno. 15: 12-13, 27; Lk. 10: 33-35.

Meditation.—

“O to be more like Jesus, O to have more of His love,
Deep in my heart, filling my soul, from the great heart above;
Jesus came loving and cheering, giving the hungry food,
Helping the poor and the needy, Jesus was kind and good.”

33. What is the teaching of St. Paul on the qualities of love?

In 1 Cor. 13: 4-8, he says: “Love suffereth long and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not provoked, taketh not account of evil; rejoiceth not in unrighteousness, but rejoiceth with the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. Love never faileth.”

Mtt. 6: 43-48.

Study.—Henry Drummond sums up these thoughts in these words: “Patience, kindness, generosity, humility, courtesy, unselfishness, good temper, guilelessness and sincerity.”

How do I measure up to this standard of love?

IV. OF SIN, REPENTANCE AND FORGIVENESS.

34. What is sin?

Sin is any act or disposition on my part which is contrary to God's will for me.

Mtt. 5: 21-37; 15: 18-20; 1 Jno. 3: 4.

Meditation.—Do I ever refuse to follow the higher and better voice of my soul, calling me towards a richer and more abundant life? Why?

35. What is repentance?

Repentance is the expression of the motive on my part to turn from and despise every act and disposition not in harmony with God's law of love, and at the same time definitely to turn toward Him and seek to do his will with my whole heart.

Mtt. 7: 21-23; Mk. 1: 15; 10: 21; 2 Cor. 7: 10; Psal. 51: 1-7.

Prayer.—Lord show me myself; Lord show me Thyself, and help me to want to become like Thee.

36. What is the forgiveness of sins?

The forgiveness of sins is that act of God's free grace, following my repentance, which removes from me the burden of the sense of guilt and separation and restores me again to a harmonious union with my Father.

Mtt. 21: 28-32; Lk. 8: 47-48; Mtt. 9: 5-6; Jno. 8: 11.

Commit.—Psa. 103: 1-5.

37. When may I know that I am forgiven?

When I have ceased to do, and learned to loathe, that which I know to be sinful; when I earnestly seek in all things to serve God and when I am able through love to manifest the forgiving disposition toward my fellow men.

Mtt. 6: 14-15; Psa. 51: 17; 119: 9-16.

Study.—Luke 15: 11-32, and note the various stages and the corresponding results in the story of this young man.

38. What is it to forgive others?

It is an act of our wills, prompted by the grace of God in our hearts, to pass by and overlook offences; in no wise to harbor the spirit of hate, ill-will, or the desire for revenge, against the person who has offended; and if possible to reunite in the joys of Christian fellowship.

Mtt. 18: 15-17, 21-22; Eph. 4: 32; Mtt. 5: 44-45.

Commit.—

"Blest be the tie that binds
Our hearts in Christian love;
The fellowship of kindred minds
Is like to that above."

V. OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

39. For what purpose is the Christian Church maintained?

The Christian Church is maintained, through the spirit of God's presence, to develop and extend all those holy truths which entered into the mission of Jesus.

Jno. 20: 21; 21: 15-17; Mtt. 28: 19-20.

Commit.—

“Elect from every nation,
 Yet one o’er all the earth,
 Her charter of salvation
 One Lord, one faith, one birth;
 One holy name she blesses,
 Partakes one holy food
 And to one hope she presses,
 With every grace endued.”

40. Why should I unite with the Church?

That I may more fully enjoy the blessings of salvation and so put on the mind of Christ as to grow into his image and likeness; that I may become able to go about doing good and thus add to the joy of the world and the coming of the kingdom of God; that I may publicly worship the Lord, my God, and learn his will to do; and that I may assist in supporting all the works and institutions which the Church maintains.

Mk. 1: 17; Luke 6: 38; Jno. 21: 15–17.

Commit.—

“I love Thy Church, O God!
 Her walls before Thee stand,
 Dear as the apple of Thine eye
 And graven on Thy hand.
 For her my tears shall fall;
 For her my prayers ascend;
 To her my cares and toils be given,
 Till toils and cares shall end.”

41. When should I unite formally with the Church?

Preferably in my youth before I may be overtaken by the force of evil desire and that I may have the benefit of the uplifting influence of the Church in the formation of my character; also that I may enjoy the blessings of salvation and do the will of God throughout my whole life.

Lk. 2: 41–42; Mtt. 19: 14; Isa. 55: 6–7; Rev. 22: 17; Eccl. 12: 1.

Prayer.—Almighty God, unto whom all hearts are open, all desires known, and from whom no secrets are hid; cleanse the thoughts of our minds, we beseech Thee, by the inspiration

of Thy Holy Spirit, that, being delivered from every unholy motion of the flesh and spirit, we may perfectly love Thee, with a pure heart and sanctified lips worship Thee, and worthily magnify Thy holy name: through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

42. What is further expected of me as a member of the Christian Church?

As a member I am expected to conform in doctrine and duty to the constitution, sacraments, rights and ceremonies of the denomination. It is also expected that I attend and take part in the services regularly and that as God has prospered me I contribute of my income for the support of the Church and for all its benevolences.

Psa. 1: 1-3; 107: 8; 1 Cor. 16: 1, 2.

Commit.—

“But drops of grief can ne’er repay
The debt of love I owe;
Here, Lord, I give myself away,
’Tis all that I can do.”

VI. OF THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT.

43. What is it to be filled with the Spirit?

It is to live a positive, godly and useful life, guided in all things by a holy, unselfish motive.

Jno. 4: 24; 6: 63; 14: 16-17; Gal. 5: 5.

Commit.—

“The night has a thousand eyes,
And the day but one;
Yet the light of the whole world dies
With the setting of the sun.
The mind has a thousand eyes,
And the heart but one;
But the light of a whole life dies
When love is done.”

44. How may I know that I am filled with the Spirit?

By the development of such habits and character as are in harmony with what St. Paul says are the fruits of the Spirit, namely: Love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness and temperance.

Jno. 15: 13-14; 1 Jno. 3: 10, 18-19; 4: 12.

Study.—Make a comparative study of the fruits of the Spirit as here given and the qualities of love as given in 1 Cor. 13.

45. What are some of the fruits of a life that is not Spirit-filled but is impelled by selfish motives.

According to St. Paul they are: Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, hatred, wrath, strife, envyings, drunkenness, murders, revellings and such like.

Mtt. 25: 41-45; 5: 27-28; Jas. 1: 13-15; 1 Jno. 2: 15-17.

Study.—Note that the fruits of the Spirit are all positive and the others all negative. Compare the value of these two sets of qualities not only as they would affect the religious life, but also the social and vocational.

46. If I find in myself these selfish and negative tendencies how may I destroy them and obtain the corresponding positive fruits of the Spirit?

I can only truly correct weakness, vices, and all undesirable ends, by building up with the help of God, through definite study, prayer and decision, good habits, virtues and all desirable ends.

Mtt. 12: 33; Rom. 12: 21; 1 Jno. 5: 4.

Study.—Analyze your bodily and mental tendencies somewhat as follows:

BODILY.

Positive. (To be sought.)	Negative. (To be avoided.)
Health	Sickness.
Strong	Weak.
Clean	Unclean.
Neat	Untidy.

MENTAL.

Remember	Forget.
Attentive	Listless.
Reasonable	Unreasonable.
Good judgment	Poor judgment.
Educated	Ignorant.

Etc.

47. Name some additional Christlike qualities that I should seek to acquire.

As a Christian it becomes me to have for my body cleanliness, strength and vigorous health; also the mental and moral qualities of intelligence, industry, cheerfulness, sympathy, enthusiasm, honesty, courage, reverence, generosity, decision, perseverance and many such like.

Rom. 12: 1; Mtt. 8: 2-3; Jas. 1: 8; Jno. 5: 6, 14.

Study.—Continue the last study:

SOUL QUALITIES.

Faith	Doubt.
Hope	Despair.
Love	Hate, selfishness.
Cheerful	Gloomy.
Courage	Fear.
Reverent	Profane.
Worship	Ungodliness.

WILL QUALITIES.

Decision	Indecision.
Despatch	Procrastinate.
Persevere	Abandon.
Diligent	Slothful.

Etc.

48. How may I come more completely into possession of these desirable qualities?

I must not only desire and strive for the ends which I want to attain unto, but I must begin to think that I have them and that God will give them to me more fully as fast as I am worthy to receive them.

Prov. 23: 7; Mtt. 7: 7, 8; Mk. 11: 24; 1 Cor. 12: 31.

Study.—Try to learn something about the law of suggestion. But above everything else *pray earnestly* and without ceasing for every need and God, who heareth in secret, will reward you openly.

VII. OF PRAYER.

49. What is prayer?

Prayer is the development and the expression of that mental

and spiritual attitude whereby the soul of man reaches out after and is kept in touch with God.

Psa. 42: 1; 84: 2; 90: 14; Jno. 17: 20-21.

Commit.—

“Prayer is the soul’s sincere desire,
Uttered or unexpressed;
The motion of a hidden fire,
That trembles within the breast.”

50. How did Jesus teach his disciples to pray?

By his prayerful attitude and habit and teaching them to pray, saying: “Our Father, who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil; for thine is the kingdom and the power, and the glory, for ever. Amen.”

Mtt. 6: 5-13; 14: 23; 26: 39; 26: 41; Mk. 6: 46.

Commit.—

“More things are wrought by prayer
Than this world dreams of.
Wherefore let thy voice
Rise like a fountain for me night and day;
For what are men better than sheep or goats
That nourish a blind life within the brain
If, knowing God, they lift not up hands in prayer,
Both for themselves and those who call them friend?
For so the whole round world is every way
Bound with gold chains about the feet of God.”

51. When shall I pray?

As a true child of my Father it is my privilege to be in such frame of mind and soul that I may at any time and in any place enter into communion and fellowship with Him. But beyond this I should set apart a time for faithful and regular morning and evening devotions.

1 Tim. 2: 8; Mk. 1: 35; Mtt. 26: 36; 1 Th. 5: 17.

Meditation.—Do I want my Father in heaven to understand and by his presence strengthen me as does my earthly father? Shall I not then make it my daily practice to speak to Him and commune with Him in prayer.

52. May I assist in obtaining an answer to my prayers?

Yes, by striving to be and become in my thoughts, desires and acts all that I ask in my prayers; also by increasing my faith in the nearness and helpfulness of God.

Mtt. 9: 29; Phil. 4: 19; 1 Jno. 5: 14.

Meditation.—Am I trying to live up to the standard of my highest and holiest aims?

Have I any right to claim God's blessing if I do less than I ought or can do?

CONCLUSION.

53. What shall I do if having striven, I am still overcome by the force of my temptations and fall?

Grasp the hand of God in prayer and determination, rise up, and go right on striving with renewed consecration, to do his will and to become fitted to enjoy his grace forever.

Lk. 15: 18-20; Mtt. 24: 13.

Meditations.—"Where there's a will there's a way."

"Unless above himself man can erect himself, how poor a thing is man."

"Our wills are ours, we know not how."

"Our wills are ours to make them thine."

54. What is it to enjoy the grace of God forever?

It is to have fought the good fight, finished the course and kept the faith in such manner that I may stand approved in the presence of almighty God.

Rev. 2: 10; Gen. 18: 25; 1 Cor. 15: 10; 2 Cor. 12: 9; Jno. 14: 2; 2 Tim. 4: 7-8.

Meditation.—

"The very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen."

RIEGELSVILLE, PA.

V.

PEDAGOGIC APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.

W. WILBERFORCE DEATRICK.

Concerning the helpfulness of psychology to the teacher, secular or religious, there is difference of opinion. A noted psychologist was reported some years ago to have asserted that the study of psychology is of no benefit to teachers. The statement, if correctly reported, seems a strange one for a teacher of psychology to make. It is, certainly, contrary to the generally accepted notion. The assumption, on the part of most folks, has been that teachers should study psychology. By making this science one of the required branches in the curriculum of its normal schools and by recognizing its pursuit as one of the conditions for receiving a weekly stipend from the treasury of the commonwealth, the state of Pennsylvania is practically paying a bonus for the study of psychology by such as are preparing to teach in its public schools. Certainly it does not appear illogical to demand that teachers should know the learning child, should be cognizant of the phenomena and laws of functioning of the minds they train as well as be familiar with subject matter of instruction and with methods of instruction. *However this may be, teachers, for years past, have been studying psychology, and have been listening to lectures, at institutes, on various phases of a subject which is supposed to be so essential to the pedagogue's success.*

The net result of all this study and more or less interested listening is, nevertheless, it must be confessed, hardly equal to the expectation of authors and instructors on the one hand or of students and listeners on the other. One trouble has been, doubtless, that too much was expected by both parties from the

study of this science of the mind. That prince of psychologists and masterful teacher, lately passed away, Professor William James, in his splendid "Talks to Teachers on Psychology and Life's Ideals," warns teachers against expecting too much from the study of his favorite science. He says:

"I am not sure that you may not be indulging fancies that are just a shade exaggerated. That would not be altogether astonishing, for we have been having something like a 'boom' in psychology in this country. Laboratories and professorships have been founded, and reviews established. . . . The editors of educational journals and the arrangers of conventions have had to show themselves enterprising and on a level with the novelties of the day. Some of the professors have not been unwilling to cooperate, and I am not sure even that the publishers have been entirely inert. 'The new psychology' has thus become a term to conjure up portentous ideas withal; and you teachers, docile and receptive and aspiring as many of you are, have been plunged in an atmosphere of vague talk about our science, which to a great extent has been more mystifying than enlightening."

This reads as though the genial professor were indulging in humor or possibly felt the necessity of getting into the good graces of those to whom he was to deliver the series of lectures, for the book is made up of chapters which, originally, were lectures delivered to teachers in Cambridge, Mass. How much of positive benefit these teachers derived from Dr. James' lectures we have never heard.

Even hard and earnest study of a text-book has not always brought expected results. The school superintendent of a great city is reported to have said that his teachers had studied Sully's *Handbook of Psychology* so diligently and devotedly that he had no doubt that were every copy of that scientific classic destroyed, the book could be reproduced verbatim from the memory of these teachers, so thoroughly had they conned its contents. Nevertheless, so little evidence of its influence upon their teaching was manifest when he visited their schools,

that from their practise he might have been justified in doubting whether they had ever so much as heard of a science called psychology.

Yet, notwithstanding this playful warning of the Cambridge professor and the pessimistic utterance of the metropolitan superintendent, it must be remembered that, after his warning against false expectations, Dr. James proceeded with his lectures and put his talks into book form, most likely in the hope that his printed words might influence many more than his voice could reach, giving to the world one of the few volumes which are genuine literature as well as exceedingly sound, straight-forward science, a book which has been, most certainly, of exceeding helpfulness and inspiration to a multitude of earnest teachers. It may be noted, too, in this connection, that, lately, that other professor who was spoken above as decrying the usefulness of this science to the pedagogue, has turned about and has taught and lectured and written as though he were now firmly convinced that psychology is of value and of exceeding helpfulness to teachers.

We are compelled, then, to admit that, after all, the teacher should study psychology, that he ought to know the phenomena and laws of activity of mind and of the organs of mind. But his knowledge must not be mere acquaintance with facts and formulas of the science as given in books. Knowledge that is mere information is insufficient; the teacher, to profit from study of psychology, old or new, must go on to wisdom, which has been defined as "the right use of knowledge." The teacher must study psychology, must study it thoroughly, not to know what psychologists teach but to apply the principles of psychology, so far as they may be applied, to the work which he has to do, this supremely important work of developing immortal minds.

Teaching is, undeniably, a most important work. Rightly considered, it is far more important than any other work in which one can engage in service of his fellows, save possibly that of the Christian minister, and the work of the latter, we

must not forget, is largely that of teaching. One reason for this estimate of the educator's vocation is that the value, the capabilities, of the material on which teachers work far transcends that of the material wrought upon by any other workers. Some work in clay, others in wood or stone or metal, and from these raw materials elaborate vessels and articles of great utility or of transcendent delicacy and grace. But the material upon which teachers labor is stuff far more precious than any of these, even as the products of the effort may be of infinitely greater beauty and excellence.

The most wonderful, the most delicate of all things in the material universe, so far as we know the same, upon which as unformed stuff the skill of workers may be employed is the plastic, highly organized brain of a little child. And to the mind, of which that brain is but the physical, perishable organ, considered as material upon which to bestow labor that may be most truly profitable as well as most richly compensative, how incomparable, how insignificant, are the costliest, the most highly prized of the materials upon which those who are known as artists bestow their labor! What are canvas and pigments, clay or marble or granite, what are even silver and gold and gems, compared to brain and mind as stuff whereon to exercise one's abilities as artificer? Men call him an artist who realizes in an unusual measure the capabilities of materials such as have been enumerated, shall we not esteem as artists also those who skilfully teach children, who by wisely directed culture develop to the utmost of efficiency the native capabilities of brain and mind? Such a teacher is, assuredly, a greater artist than the architect who works in granite or the sculptor who casts his ideals in bronze, greater than the painter who mixes colors marvelously and paints his pictures on cathedral walls, greater than artists in words, poets or orators, greater, moreover, than artists in sounds melodious, singers or skilful players on instruments of music which ingenious sons of Jubal have fashioned for the delectation of human ears. There are many delicate instruments on which

none but most skilful artists may attempt performance, but no instrument of man's contrivance is in any way comparable in complexity and in delicacy to the instruments, the brains and the minds of children, on which teachers play. Yet how few know their instruments other than most imperfectly. Surely, if we teachers would realize our responsibility and our opportunity we would be readier than most of us are to learn the utmost that may be known of the raw material of our art, the instruments on which we essay performance, the most wonderful stuff for the worker in all of God's wonderful creation—the brain and the regnant mind of a boy or a girl. And psychology, especially the new psychology, may help greatly to give teachers the knowledge needed to enable them to become the greatest artists in the world.

A noted educator, addressing a body of Pennsylvania teachers, once remarked that recent successive centuries have each given to the world the master artist in one or another of the fine arts. One century gave the master poet, another the master painter, or sculptor, or architect, and yet another, the last one, the master musician. To this assertion he added a second, that signs were to be noted which led him to hope that this twentieth century is destined to produce the greatest artist of them all, the master artist-teacher. May his hopes be realized! If the art of teaching is to prove the supreme art in this century then teachers, the same as other artists, must study diligently, study their art, its technique and its materials, in order to realize the sublimest results from the use and manipulation of the material ready to their hands. And in such study, without a doubt, they shall find psychology, the new psychology, of inestimable benefit.

What is psychology and what is the new psychology? Psychology is the science of mind. Psychology is the science of the phenomena of consciousness. The new psychology may be defined as the science of mind developing in, or associated with, a living, developing, wonderfully complex, marvellously organized, and admirably adapted organ or instrument of mind.

How does it differ from the old psychology? In some respects the difference is inconsiderable but in other ways the two differ materially. The new psychology is, indeed, in one sense only the old studied in a new way, viewed from a new standpoint, supplemented by and materially affected by knowledge of closely related things. Psychology, as studied now-a-days, is not merely introspective, philosophic discourse on consciousness, the closely circumscribed "mental philosophy" of the olden time. Now, to know psychology, one must know not only a little but much of what was formerly thought to be remotely, if at all, connected with the science of mind. The new psychology is biological, physiological, experimental, comparative, and genetic or evolutionary, as well as merely rational and introspective. Now, to know mind, one must study many other things—biology, physiology, anthropology, philology, and other branches of science once deemed quite unrelated to knowledge of mind. Yet all this is not altogether new, for sixty years ago the learned Dr. F. A. Rauch, first president of Marshall College, issued his book, *Anthropology and Psychology*, which, as one reads it now, is seen to be, in many respects, based upon this modern conception of the propriety of studying mind in its relation to other things in the cosmos, especially to those with which it is most intimately related, as is indeed clearly set forth in the author's preface to the volume.

In our study of psychology as the science of mental life we must remember that our mental life, at least in this state of existence, is so bound up with our bodily life that, as we see now and as Dr. Rauch pointed out so long ago, the one cannot be properly or fully understood without exact knowledge of the other. One of America's most noted psychologists, a teacher most stimulating, most helpful to other teachers, tells how years ago he went to Germany to continue his study of human mind. Arriving at his destination and making his desires known to the master he had chosen, he was surprised to be told to study the muscles of a frog's leg. Protesting that he had come to study psychology and not anatomy or biology, he was answered

by a repetition of the command. Then, considering it to be the part of wisdom to follow the directions of one's teacher, he applied himself to diligent study of the preparation under the microscope. Studying it, and other muscles, for days and weeks, even months, he rose at last from the microscope satisfied with the result, for he tells us: "I know, as the result of that study, more of muscle, and of mind, and of God, than I had hoped ever to know."

The scalpel and the microscope, the esthesiometer, the microphone, the ergograph, the plethysmograph, the chronograph, and other instruments of precision are necessary implements of the professional psychologist of to-day. The psychologist of the laboratory as well as his brother of the study has many a message of helpfulness and of cheer to the weary, burdened, and yet earnest and aspiring worker in the school. But that the latter may receive the message of the former there must be, in most cases, middlemen in the form of books and instructors. Of these middlemen, there are now-a-days, fortunately or unfortunately, not a few, of which some are excellent but some, alas, are not so good.

There are books and instructors attempting to set forth the new psychology that are far from being a real help to the inquiring teacher. Some of these over-emphasize the physiological, the material side, some are setters-forth of a "psychology without a soul." Some, undertaking to translate the language of the laboratory into that of the teacher unversed in scientific lore or the details of experimentation, make a sorry mess of their undertaking. The deliverances of authors and lecturers are diverse. What one affirms another denies, what one commends another condemns. How is the uncritical teacher to distinguish between the one and the other, how determine which is to be accepted as the reliable, authoritative pronouncement on mind and how to deal with it? Books on methods of teaching claim to base their conclusions on psychology truth and yet the methods inculcated are often as diverse as is the personality of one author from that of another. How

is the bewildered teacher, confronted with contradictory advice, to distinguish between the bad and the good, the false and the true? Why not give up the study of methods and of psychology altogether and learn how to teach by experience, trusting to intuition and to observation of others who succeed until experience has shown the excellent way?

Nevertheless there is a better way than tedious experimentation. In one of his thoughtful little books on matters educational, Bishop Spalding has pithily formulated a statement of the relation of methodology and the sciences upon which it is dependent. By this formula pedagogy and psychology may be tested. "Biology interprets the problems of psychology and psychology provides methods for pedagogy." The teacher dismayed by the multiplicity of suggested methods, bewildered by the contradictory claims for one or another procedure in teaching, may avoid much fruitless experimentation, may stand unmoved by varying winds of doctrine, if he will but test diverse claims by this simple formula of the distinguished prelate.

What is the meaning of this formula or dictum? It is this. No method is excellent, or even good, which seeks to develop mind contrary to any discovered law of structure, organization, or functioning of the wonderful material organ of the mind; no process of education can be deemed legitimate or worth experimenting with which is in plain violation of known facts of structure and natural mode of activity of brain or any organ of the body which serves directly as the instrument of mind. Biology is the science which gives knowledge of the phenomena and the laws of development and functioning of the bodily organs of the soul, and by this knowledge the psychologist must test his psychology and the teacher may judge of the propriety and value of his methods.

Space is lacking to go into details or into extended enumeration of the numerous ways in which the new psychology, interpreted by biology, provides, without need of wasteful experimentation, methods for the artist teacher. For this a volume

would scarcely be sufficient. Years ago at a round table conference at a meeting of the National Educational Association the question: "What has physiological psychology accomplished for education?" was discussed. The discussion was disappointing. There was little demonstration of any accomplishment. Whether that was because the new psychology was then so very new or because of lack of information on part of the scholars who undertook the discussion is uncertain. However that may be, there can be no question now as to the great indebtedness of the pedagogy of the present to the new psychology, which is not only physiological but much besides. In recent years interest has steadily grown and now when scholars who have made it their life work to investigate the phenomena of mental life and its physical correlate or substrate and to formulate the laws of the same appear before the assembled teachers of the land, their exposition of their discoveries is listened to with breathless attention by hundreds of earnest teachers who are fully convinced that psychology has numerous and most valuable applications to practical work in schools.

Much remains to be discovered but much has already been established. On some problems of the teacher great light has been cast. His way in many places has been made clearer, the proper method of procedure has been indicated for him. In spite of the fact that, as progress has been made, new difficulties have arisen and new problems opened up, and notwithstanding that very much is yet uncertain, nevertheless very considerable advance has been made in knowledge of facts and laws of the psycho-physical organism which is of real practical benefit to teachers.

Prominent among the discoveries or demonstrations contributing to this advance is the new conception, long combated but now conceded by practically all neurologists, of the structure and organization of the nervous system, the brain and spinal cord, the sense and motor organs, all immediate instruments of mind, in regard to which physical substrate, even the few years ago when most of us were in school, the utmost ignor-

ance prevailed. Now we know, a thing of essential importance in education, that the nervous system is far more complex than it was supposed to be, that it is made up of multitudinous, separate elements, neurons they are called (nine billions of them, on an average, in the brain and some four billions more in the rest of the body), as distinct anatomically and structurally from one another as are the trees in a forest. We know, too, that each of these has its separate function, and that each becomes, or is susceptible of becoming, "organized" with other elements. We have learned, further, that the number differs in different individuals. Some children are born "short," as William Hawley Smith describes those children who are natively deficient or defective. Others may be said to be born long. They are abnormal in that they have an unusually large native equipment of neuroblasts, cells capable of developing into functioning neurons. These items of knowledge, if there were no others, should be sufficient to convince school folks of the futility of attempting to make the school a proctean bed for pupils of diverse intellectual stature.

It has been demonstrated, further, that no amount of educative drill can increase the quantity of the equipment. Other cells of the body can be made, through wisely directed exercise, to increase by multiplication, but the number of these "most noble cells," the most direct instruments of the mind, cannot be increased by any manner of exercise or training, while, recently, it has been demonstrated to a practical certainty, that the general native quality of endowment is, likewise, not susceptible of improvement. On the other hand, it has been discovered that because of lack of wisely directed exercise or by reason of neglect of use or of timely stimulation, many neuroblasts may fail of development or, having matured, may become atrophied and die because of injury, or improper exercise, or as a result of disuse.

All this seems fatalistic, but it is not truly so, as we may see. If this were all the truth there would be merely greater responsibility laid on the teacher to discover, if possible, how

not to allow such atrophy, such marring of the wonderful instrument of mind by inexpert manipulation of it, how not to permit diminution of precious endowment. But there is a brighter side. If educative processes are ineffective to effect, except injuriously, native equipment as to number and quality of the neurons, it is clearly established that education may have almost unlimited influence, for bad or good, on the development and organization of the noblest cells with the growth, development, and functioning of which the mind is so intimately connected. It is certain, from what is now known of brain and nerves, that it is possible for school and teacher to take a boy "born short" and so develop and organize his brain by wisely directed educative processes that the utmost of the possibilities of his being are realized, to such an extent, indeed, that he may even surpass his originally more fortunate brother who, though having superior endowment, has failed to realize the potentialities of that possession. The full truth is, then, that education cannot influence, at least not beneficially, native endowment of nerve and brain and mind, but it can affect infinitely, both for bad and good, the development and the organization of nerve and brain and mind.

The applications of this and other truths are far-reaching in their consequences. Speaking several years ago of recently demonstrated truths as to the structure and organization of the nervous system, at an international gathering of scientists, one of the greatest of living physiologists, one of the foremost medical men of the times, declared that the new knowledge is destined within twenty-five years to revolutionize the entire system and practise of medicine. The accuracy of his prophecy is already apparent. Great as is the effect of the discoveries referred to upon medical system and practise, their influence must not be less potent to change materially much that is currently accepted as reliable psychology and authoritative pedagogy at the present time. The effect upon the teacher's art as well as upon his science, will, or should be, soon apparent.

It is difficult in the limits of available space to discuss the numerous and significant implications which are suggested at this point. Taken as but one of many, this thing called "organization," the formation of "tracts" and groups of neurons working together as organs of mind for the performance of one or another of the mental functions, is a matter very greatly under the control of the educator. If, however, he would be an artist in brains and minds, the teacher must learn as much as he can of the phenomena and laws of cerebral organization. Unless he has accurate knowledge he will be but a blundering bungler: he will mar rather than mend his precious material. When the phenomena of organization are understood and the laws of the same are comprehended it becomes apparent that much pedagogic practise is in direct violation of these laws of development and functioning. A noted educationist once wrote an article on "The Artificial Production of Stupidity in the Schools." He was not in error as to his main contention. The new psychology lets us know wherein the blundering complained of consists.

One law of organization and of functioning is: "First the fundamental, then the accessory." First to be developed, to be organized, are the tracts which the mind needs to do fundamental, at-first-most-necessary things. Later are developed, organized, the tracts which the mind uses for its higher, more particular, and discriminating activities. Organization and accompanying movements are first massive, later finer and more varied. Recognition of this truth has already greatly changed the character of the kindergarten occupations, nevertheless it must be affirmed that very much of the practise in the schools has been, at least until very lately, in direct contravention of this law.

At birth, except for the parts of the nervous system necessary for the performance of vital and vegetative functions, there is little organization. But soon the organization for higher functions begins and by the time the child reaches the school the organization for many activities has advanced very consider-

ably. During the schooling period the teacher should keep in mind another law, and before the child is sent to the teacher parents should be informed of the law, lest irreparable damage be unwittingly done to the instrument of mind and to mind itself. The law now referred to is: "Natural organization must not be interfered with unless that organization is known to be perniciously abnormal." A noted neurologist, one who has examined possibly more thousands of school children than any other student of child life, was only stating this law in less technical and so more easily understood phraseology when he warned parents and teachers of imminent danger in these significant words: "Do not stop a child's movements unless you know why you do so." The necessity for warning those who have the care of children not to interfere with spontaneous movements unless there are good reasons for such interference is evident when one considers how constantly children are repressed, how often without reason other than the convenience, whim, or untested theory of parent or teacher, they are forbidden to do one or another thing, innocent in itself, which their developing organization impels them to attempt.

Many illustrations of harm affected by such ignorant, meddlesome interference with natural impulses might be given. One is ventured upon as an example of the many. A considerable number of children are born lefthanded. Now the common notion, quite unwarranted in fact, as has been clearly shown by thoughtful students of the subject as Wilson, Warner, Cattell, J. Mark Baldwin, and, latest of all, Dr. George M. Gould (in his excellent and exhaustive book *Righthandedness and Lefthandedness*), is that lefthandedness is a defect, an abnormality, to be regretted and so to be corrected. Fashion, not reason, is against using the left hand for certain activities, particularly that of writing. So when the child begins to write and doing so uses his left hand, the teacher thinks it is incumbent on him to prevent this dreadful (?) thing. Indeed it is not unlikely that many a child has been "broken" of lefthandedness by parents, ignorant of the seriousness of what

they were doing, before he left the home for the school. But it is a serious error to attempt to make a lefthanded child righthanded whether in school or earlier in life. It is interfering with action without sufficient knowledge or reason. It is destroying organization already well advanced, as is now clearly understood and taught by competent neurologists and alienists.

One of the discoveries of comparatively recent times is that the cerebral organ of speech is located in the left hemisphere of the brain in righthanded persons. The converse of this, that the speech area in lefthanded individuals is in the right hemisphere, while not absolutely proved, has greatly preponderating evidence in its favor. Why this should be so no one can tell, but that it is so few now dispute. The organization of brain in a lefthanded child is different from that in a righthanded one. To make a naturally lefthanded child, especially one who has begun to speak, righthanded in practise, particularly in writing, which has to do with words, is to break up organization already established and to stimulate new and unnatural organization. Such substitution can be made, with more or less of difficulty both to erring parent or teacher and to youthful victim, but it is a substitution which is unnecessary and one accompanied with serious cerebral and mental injury. It should never be attempted, never at least until it has been determined beyond doubt that the lefthandedness is not congenital but, as sometimes happens, is acquired.

Lest the foregoing positive assertion be considered as merely the dictum of one unqualified, perchance, to speak, it may be advisable to quote the utterances of one who certainly has a right to be listened to.

"Let the lefthanded child alone! Nature is quite as wise as the ignorant intermeddlers. . . . To will and compel righthandedness in the naturally lefthanded is a crime. . . . In every case [of transfer of task to the opposite organs] there is a crippling, and a lessening of productive capacity, a disadvantaging in the struggle. . . . Whenever a center or con-

gress of centers is developed in one half-brain, disuse and transfer to the other half is, according to age, either impossible, faulty, handicapping, or disease-producing. . . . *Let no one attempt it.* Pathology follows almost inevitably any interference with Nature's institution of handedness, right or left, however early it may have begun" (Gould, *Righthandedness and Lefthandedness*, pp. 39, 44, 52, 90, 110).

There are some who have advocated the development of ambidexterity, especially in case of those naturally lefthanded. Consulted as to this suggestion an eminent psychologist, whom no one could accuse of materialism, the late lamented Commissioner of Education of the United States, Dr. William Torrey Harris, strongly advised against the attempt. Dr. Gould is even more emphatic. He says (in the volume above quoted, pp. 101, 124, 185):

"'Ambidexterity'-mongering is the most absurd silliness. . . . The 'ambidextral' societies, the mothers and school teachers, who would martyrize children naturally lefthanded by compelling them to learn an equal expertness of the right hand, are the most blunderful of stupid persons. . . . There never was an ambidextrous person, but there has been produced much misery by the foolish attempt to create ambidexterity."

For details as to the danger and the frequently resultant disease arising from disarrangement of cerebral organization, the interested reader must be referred to the thought-provoking little volume of the last quoted author.

This one very common instance of violation of a pedagogic-psychologic-biologic law has been dwelt on thus at length to illustrate how the new psychology may be of very practical assistance to the artist teacher. The one instance, however, is merely a type of many. Even to enumerate the contributions of this sort made by the new psychology to pedagogy would require much more time and space than is here available. "*Ab uno disce omnes*," as Vergil wrote.

Biologic facts and laws should be known and kept in mind by teachers. The best results are always attained by taking

nature into partnership; the fullest success is gained when nature's forces working normally are invoked. That is the meaning of Emerson's phrase, "Hitch your wagon to a star." Seeking to teach with these facts and laws constantly in mind, teachers will be "working together" with God, if we apply in this connection, as we think we may, the thought of St. Paul.

Dr. James, in the volume earlier quoted, says: "*The great thing in education is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy.*" This is not only good biology and good pedagogy but also good theology, for St. Paul (I. Cor. 15: 46) says: "Howbeit that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; then that which is spiritual." The brain and the mind grow into the modes in which they are exercised. The primary object of discipline in the family and in the school, should be to help children gain control of mind and soul through control of body, to attain to mastery of the self through mastery of the body. Our processes of education must not be contrary to the laws of developing child life. As teachers we may, and should, study these laws, familiarize ourselves with the operation of the forces of nature working normally. Then, and then only, shall we be able most truly to aid our pupils in the accomplishment of the most important thing—formation of right character. Then, moreover, when brain and brawn shall have subserved their present purpose, the soul, having "learned itself" (Tennyson in "In Memoriam"), shall enter fully prepared into life, that other fuller, freer, higher life, in which, as the poet Browning suggests ("Christmas Eve and Easter Day"), it may come perchance into possession of a

"Brow

With its new palace-brain where dwells
Superb the soul, unvext by cells
That crumbled with the transient clay!"

KEYSTONE STATE NORMAL SCHOOL,
KUTZTOWN, PA.,
December 8, 1910.

VI.

THE DEACONESS AND THE TRAINED NURSE.¹

A careful distinction of the meaning of each of these terms is necessary in order to realize their difference. As regards the first we adopt the language of Rector Jordan, of Halle, when he says: "A Deaconess is a servant of the Lord Jesus Christ and His Church; one who is free from all other obligations, willing and able to devote all her time and her strength, in the power of faith and love, to Jesus Christ and her fellow-men."

She realizes it as her mission through her modest and quiet life devoted to good works, to serve Him who has redeemed her.

In our definition of the other word, that of the trained nurse, we adopt the language of a distinguished surgeon when he says: "The most important matter in the nursing of the sick is to have a sufficient number of well qualified nurses who will carry out the directions of the physician, who will look to him and to him only, as their leader and adviser."

Florence Nightengale, whose lofty ideal of the nursing of the sick no one will call into question, answered the question, "What is accomplishment?" in these words: "Accomplishment is to teach a nurse to help the patient back to life."

Both views considered from their own standpoint are right.

Of a deaconess as a trained nurse both characteristics must be present; while a professional nurse lays no claim to the characteristics of the deaconess.

The deaconess possesses a biblical office, an office in the congregation; the trained nurse has only an ordinary calling.

¹This article appeared in the Bethesda *Diakonissen Freund* of Cleveland, Ohio, for February and March, 1903. Rev. A. B. Koplin, D.D., of Hellertown, Pa., translated and read it before the North Penn Ministerial Association, October 17, 1910.

The former is prompted by love, the latter works for a living. In the first we see a service of love towards all men, in the second a daily service and unquestioning obedience to the physician and the surgeon.

The deaconess nurses the body that she may win the soul. Her work has to do with eternity. The trained nurse, like the professional man, is contented when her work is done, her wages earned.

The deaconess' office is as old as the Christian Church. The calling of the trained nurse is the product of the last sixty years and is only a part of the work of the deaconess.

It is not necessary here to repeat the historical facts which led to the introduction and recognition of the deaconess as an ecclesiastical office, but rather the development of "deaconess work," in the first centuries, its discontinuance in later periods, and its restoration in modern times.

History teems with those who consecrated their possessions and their strength to the service of the Church; and among the martyrs appear the names of many deaconesses who valued their own lives but little, and willingly offered themselves at the martyr's stake, out of pure love for suffering humanity.

Among the leading works of Christian charity, that of caring for the sick, occupies the first rank. As far back as 385 of the Christian era, there were hospitals for the sick, and among the poor and forsaken, the nursing of the leprous and the incurables, called for hard service, untiring endurance and self-sacrifice in the first congregations and members of the Church. It was an emulation of Christian sympathy through which the Church might manifest her love to Christ in no way more beautifully.

The paid trained nurse is, as we have seen, a physician's assistant of modern date.

In the Administration Building of New York Hospital appears the portrait of Dr. Valentine Leaman, with this inscription: "In the year 1798 he organized in this hospital the first regular training school for nurses of the sick; out of which

other schools have grown, which carry with them their blessing over the entire land." This was thirty years before Elizabeth Fry began to give instructions on the nursing of the sick in Guy's Hospital in London, and thirty-eight years before Rev. Fledeners' "Mother's House" and Deaconess Hospital in Keiserworth opened its doors.

Be this as it may, the English Periodical *Hospital* concedes that to the principles of Rev. Fledeners and his training school for deaconesses must be given the distinguished honor of the achievement of a new and noble work; but that the rapid increase of deaconesses and their spread must, without doubt, be accorded to the example of Florence Nightengale.

Although it must be conceded that since 1860, the opening of Florence Nightengale's Home in connection with St. Thomas Hospital in London, the work of the trained nurse increased greatly, yet it remains true that Elizabeth Fry, who in 1840, through the advice of Dr. Gooch and Robert Tonthey, who were so favorably impressed by a visit to Florence Nightengale's Mother House in London, where both Florence Nightengale and many other pioneer nurses had received their training, founded the first training school in Asneburg Square.

It was in the year 1848 that Bloomfield, Bishop of London, founded St. John's House as a purely religious institution for the training of poor sisters.

In the year 1878 sister Helena founded a training school in the United States in modern Bellevue Hospital in New York City.

In 1884 Miss Florence Fisher withdrew from the Nightengale School and came to Philadelphia and founded a training school in the Blockley Buildings. Through the disciples of Miss Florence Fisher her teachings have spread over the entire land. The large training schools of the East are the fruit of what had gone before—Blackwell's Island, in 1875; Mt. Lincie, in 1881; German Hospital, in 1885; St. Luke's, 1888; the Presbyterian and the St. Vincent, in 1892, and Roosevelt, in 1896.

Historically considered the evolution of the modern nurse must be accredited to Keiserworth. The professional nurse must trace her origin back to the Christian Ideal Deaconess Mother House, or the ecclesiastical sisterhood of Keiserworth.

The triennial report of the Keiserworth General Conference of the various "mother houses" sets forth great results as proof of the distinguished works of mercy of more than 13,500 deaconesses.

There is indeed no form of human suffering which is not benefited by their ministrations. The sick of every kind, the epileptic, the leper, the erring, the forsaken and the homeless children, the prisoner, the orphan and a great host of other unfortunates, besides thousands of all classes receive the blessing of loving hearts, cheerful countenances and helping hands. These deaconess sisters are welcomed in every land. Everywhere their work wins favorable recognition and support.

The deaconess is, as we have seen, not necessarily a nurse of the sick. In fact, there are many who have not been educated and trained for that work, neither will they ever become active and professional nurses. Yet, whether a trained nurse or not, she is nevertheless a deaconess.

To be reasonably well trained in the art of nursing the sick, as is commonly the case, will add all the more to her efficiency as a deaconess. All ordinary and extraordinary qualifications are useful in her calling because the calls upon deaconesses are as varied in their character as the distinctive characteristics of each deaconess can be.

And indeed, one of the redeeming features of this calling consists in the fact that a monotony of service may be avoided by the widening of the field of activity, and calling into requisition the various talents of the deaconess, as much and as often as occasion offers. To find the proper field for each sister, and the right sister for each peculiar field of usefulness is one of the most difficult tasks of the deaconess house.

With their wide and inviting field of usefulness in the works of mercy that of the professional nurse is in broad contrast.

For the professional nurse the hospital and the sick room are her only home and place of service.

If she is qualified for her work all is well and good. If these are in any degree wanting, her mission in life is crippled. All success in her work must be but temporary. The care of the sick is a severe tax upon the nurse, and very often her solitude, when she is not employed, is more trying than her work. Waiting for a call for service has brought many a nurse well nigh to despondency. However desirable her calling may appear from without, and however enticing her remuneration may be yet her calling is not as glittering in fact as it would appear. The mission of the trained nurse is a work which belongs to the strength and buoyancy of youth. What follows when these years have passed away, and strength fails and old age comes on?

With the deaconess it is otherwise, for while she receives no remuneration for her work, and is active in her calling to the full extent of her ability, she is free from all solicitude regarding her future. Viewed in this light the calling of the trained nurse is disheartening, dreary and pitiful.

Far be it from us to ignore the office of the trained nurse, or discourage her in her work. By no means. Hers is a high and cherished calling. In the beautiful language of Florence Nightingale, which has so often inspired the professional nurse with devotion and a spirit of self sacrifice, we would say: "Nursing is an art, and in order to make it such a full consecration, which demands as much preparation as any painter's or sculptor's work, is necessary. As these have to do with lifeless stuff or cold mortar. She is called to minister to living bodies fashioned after the image of God. The nursing of the sick is one of the finest of the fine arts; yea, we might say: The choicest of the fine arts."

It may be said of many a professional nurse that her work bears witness to the truth of these words; but when we listen to the words of warning spoken at the commencements of the schools and note the utterances of the daily press, it can not

but be admitted that the nurse and her work are threatened with great danger. Self-interest and craving for high wages, the courting of the rich and the neglect of the poor, satisfaction with a spirit of the world instead of Christian integrity, which is so often found to be the case, prevent the forces of her cherished womanhood to have full sway and at the same time weaken and rob the nurse of her moral strength which she so much needs to make her a useful member of society and a confessor of her Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

A broad distinction between the deaconess and the professional nurse lies in the fact that the latter stands alone, while the former belongs to an organization. It may be that the want of a proper recognition of the system of deaconesses in its best form is the cause of the slow growth of the deaconess sisterhood in this country.

The distinction between the deaconess and the professional nurse is self-evident. When true to their high ideal, the schools for the training of nurses, prepare "workers" instead of co-"workers." Her life may bear witness of noble consecration, and may abound in works of love and devotion to humankind; but that work is limited to, and ends with her own person. This exclusiveness and loneliness of the professional nurse cannot well be concealed. Robert W. Taylor in his address to a graduating class in a New York training school said: "With your diplomas you enter an important sphere; perhaps the most important sphere of your life. From this time on you must fight life's battles, and you must fight alone, and that without any outside help. You will stand or fall as the result of the manner in which you will demean yourselves in the performance of the duties of your weighty calling. As scholars you were sheltered by the protecting arms of this large institute; but this is now at an end."

It is true that efforts are being made to unite the training schools, and to pension disabled nurses, and England has a fund entitled the "Royal National Fund for Nurses," with a capital of \$250,000, together with an annual income of \$31,000. Yet

all in all the efforts in this laudable work have thus far been without encouraging results. The emulation of the schools, the self interest of the nurse, together with the fact that nursing only too often turns out to be only a temporary employment and a stepping stone to something better, has kept the profession unorganized, and thus leaves each one to stand alone.

Each nurse seeks to look out well for the present, while she closes her eyes to the prospect of the future, which, alas! too often threatens nothing better than a humiliating dependence, or an old age which must be endured in obscurity and without due recognition and regard.

When, on the other hand, a young lady enters a deaconess house, and thus becomes separated from the parental roof, she enters a household which ever becomes to her more satisfactory and more dear. In the midst of those who are of like mind with herself she is never left alone. The strength born of this fellowship is everywhere and always her strength. The "mother house" is the home of the sisters. This must be so from the very nature of things.

A stranger once asked a deaconess: "Where is your home?" "I have no home beside the mother house" was her answer. She spoke the truth, for she was an orphan. This condition will sooner or later come to all. Parents go to their reward, and brothers and sisters become separated, and the "old home" is forever broken up, but the "mother house" ever has open doors for the sisterhood of deaconess. Here is her home in sickness and in health; and when tired of her work in private nursing or wearied and worn from the service of an entire year, she wends her way to the "mother house" where the doors are ever open, and where she is ever welcomed, cared for and loved.

It is her home where she lived and labored, and helped in her youthful and better days, and where she now, in the evening of her days, abides without consuming care, and peacefully awaits her summons to the heavenly home. This fellowship or sisterhood is not limited to the "mother house" to

which she belongs. Rather she belongs to a union which embraces all "mother houses," and this fact makes each individual deaconess feel that she is a part, even though it may be ever so humble, of a great army. She knows that she is not forgotten, and that when far away from her own sisterhood, she is everywhere recognized and sheltered in the same spirit of Christian love by the deaconess in Germany, in Jerusalem, Constantinople, Alexandria and indeed throughout the entire Christian world, as she is in the "mother house" to which she distinctively belongs.

The bond which unites the deaconess is not broken by country, descent or language. They are one in their office and occupation, effort and work; one in receiving and giving; one in their faith in Christ, who has redeemed them, whom they seek to serve in thankfulness and love.

What exalted characteristics distinguish the office and work of the deaconess from those of the professional nurse?

VII.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

A. V. HIESTER.

The theory of a social compact as the historic basis of civil society and the moral justification of civil government was not original with Rousseau. Its essential features were largely borrowed by him from earlier writers. The later Greek philosophy was more or less familiar with it. Traces of it may be found in Plato's *Crito* and *Republic*; and it goes back at least as far as the Sophists. It was likewise a familiar conception to Roman jurisprudence; for the Roman jurists universally rested the power of the Emperor either upon an original explicit or subsequent implicit consent of the populace. It was mainly through the study of Roman jurisprudence that the theory of the social compact was introduced into the political thinking of medieval and modern Europe.

Supplementing Roman jurisprudence there were at least two other influences which deserve to be mentioned. The one was feudalism. According to Sir Henry Maine the feudal system was completely saturated with ideas of contract. "The earliest feudal communities," he says, "were neither bound together by mere sentiment nor recruited by a fiction. The tie which united them was a contract, and they obtained new associates by contracting with them. The relation of the lord to the vassals had originally been settled by express engagement, and a person wishing to engraft himself in the brotherhood by commendation or infeudation came to a distinct understanding as to the conditions on which he was to be admitted. It is, therefore, the sphere occupied in them by contract which principally distinguishes the feudal institutions from the unadulterated usages of primitive races. The

lord had many of the characteristics of a patriarchal chieftain; but his prerogative was limited by a variety of settled customs traceable to the express conditions which had been agreed upon when the infeudation took place."

The other influence which favored the development of contract ideas was the medieval Church. The early Church had held the doctrine that civil government was the outcome of sin and that it was the duty, therefore, of the Christian to submit to the rule of temporal princes as a part of his abnegation of self. But during the Middle Ages, owing to the controversy over the rival claims of the Empire and the Papacy, the Church set up a new theory. To bolster up the claims of the Papacy and limit the authority of the secular rulers the later medieval theologians laid down the principle that all kings and princes, including the Emperor, held their offices under God's sanction by reason of a covenant with the people; and as an instance of such a covenant they pointed to the one entered into by King David with the Elders of Israel. To the necessities of the medieval Papacy, therefore, combined with the essential principle of feudalism, the speculations of Greek philosophy, and the dicta of Roman jurisprudence, must be credited the rise of the doctrine of contract in medieval Europe.

But it was a special form of the compact theory which was thus introduced into medieval thought. It postulated a compact, not between the members of a particular community, but between the people on the one side and a king on the other. To this form of compact the name of governmental compact has been given, to distinguish it from that other compact which is specifically known as the social compact. A sharp distinction needs to be made between these two compacts. They differ fundamentally in scope and character. While the governmental compact is an agreement between rulers and subjects, according to which the power to rule over a community is by the members of that community formally vested in a particular person or group of persons, the social compact

is an agreement between the members of a community, by virtue of which a body politic is created out of an unorganized aggregate of men. The effect of the social compact is to create the state. The effect of the governmental compact is to set up and legitimize a particular government, after the state has been called into being.

The governmental compact is much the older theory. It is the one which was familiar to Greek philosophy and Roman jurisprudence, which ramified through the whole of the feudal system, and which was set up by the medieval Church in its conflict with the civil power. But the theory is something more than a piece of metaphysical speculation; it is also an historical fact. The covenant between King David and the Elders of Israel was such a compact. Another instance is afforded by the former kingdom of Arragon, where, when the nobles elected a king, they employed the following formula: "We, who are as good as you, choose you for our king and lord, provided that you observe our laws and privileges; and if not, not." The theory of the governmental compact is frequently in evidence in the medieval contests over investitures; and the history of Germany affords numerous instances of compacts between the several estates. That the governmental compact has been something more than a mere theory, even in the eyes of kings, may be seen from the speech of James I of England to Parliament in 1609. "Every just king in a settled kingdom," he declared, "is bound to observe that paction made to his people by his laws in framing his government agreeable thereunto." In 1688 we have another clear recognition of the theory of the governmental compact, this time on the part of the people, in the declaration of the Convention-Parliament to the effect that James II, "having endeavored to subvert the constitution by breaking the original contract between king and people," had rendered the throne vacant. A final instance of governmental compact, and one which is frequently cited, is the famous Mayflower covenant which was unquestionably a governmental compact, although

a literal interpretation of its language might seem to point to a social compact.

An historical examination of the theory of the governmental compact will show that it has not always been held in the same way. While its advocates are agreed among themselves in postulating an original sovereign capacity on the part of the people, they differ with respect to the particular manner in which this sovereign power was transferred from people to rulers. On this point two schools have arisen. The one has held that the surrender by the people of their sovereign power was complete, involving a total and irrevocable alienation of their political rights. This was the view taken by the Roman jurists, by Suarez and other Jesuit writers, and later by Grotius the father of modern international law. The other school maintained on the contrary that the surrender was only a limited delegation of power, that this power was to be used by the rulers only for the specific purpose for which it was granted, and that it was subject to recall if abused.

But whether the theory of a governmental compact was held in an absolutist or a non-absolutist sense, its fundamental principle was its concession to the people of an original sovereign power. Even the most extreme absolutists among its exponents were compelled to admit this. For it is clear that a community must first possess what it is conceived as granting away. Furthermore, such a surrender of power as is postulated by the theory of the governmental compact cannot be conceived as being performed by a loose aggregation of persons without form or organization. There must be first a community acting in a corporate capacity. Hence the theory of the governmental compact logically requires the existence of a body politic as distinguished from an arithmetical sum of persons. It thus became necessary to account for the particular process by which a loose aggregation of men was transformed into a body politic. The result was the theory of the social compact.

The original significance of the theory of the social compact

was two-fold. It not only recognized in the social compact a prerequisite to the governmental compact, but it also offered a plausible explanation of the origin and meaning of civil society at a time when medieval beliefs and modes of thought were declining, and when men were becoming conscious of some other justification of the authority of the state than that afforded by ideas of feudal tenure or the explanations of medieval theology. Down to the sixteenth century the Church continued to regard civil society, either as a direct divine creation like man himself, or as something of which God was the remote, and nature, or the "instinctive sociability" of man, the proximate, cause. But with the decline of medieval beliefs this conception of the state rapidly lost its hold on men; and the consequence was that when the theory of the social compact made its appearance it became immediately popular.

What was in all probability the first definite statement of the theory of the social compact dates from the last decade of the sixteenth century. Its author is Richard Hooker, the English theologian, whose *Ecclesiastical Polity* was published in 1594. The first continental writer to formulate the theory was Johannes Althusius, a German, who wrote at the beginning of the seventeenth century. But the man who first gave it the stamp of a great authority was Hugo Grotius, the Dutch publicist, who embodied it in his epoch-making work, *De jure belli et pacis* (1625). Half a century later it was adopted by Samuel von Pufendorf, an eminent writer on international law, in his work, *De jure natural et gentium* (1672). The latter not only recognized in the social compact a necessary antecedent to the governmental compact, but he also interpolated between them still another compact by which the form of government, whether monarchic, aristocratic or democratic, was determined. But by none of these writers, neither by Hooker, Althusius, Grotius, nor Pufendorf, was any attempt made to follow the theory of the social compact to its logical conclusions. This was first done by Hobbes and later by Locke and Rousseau.

It will be seen, therefore, that at the time Rousseau wrote the *Contrat Social* the theory of the social compact had been a more or less familiar conception among scholars and publicists for more than a century and a half, while that modification of it known as the governmental compact was not less than two thousand years old. That he was influenced by various writers from Plato down to his own time, particularly by Hobbes and Locke, is undisputed. But if Rousseau owes much to others he follows none slavishly. He frequently differs from both Hobbes and Locke, and treats the whole conception of the social compact with a momentous and far-reaching originality.

While Rousseau agrees with Hobbes in regarding the social compact as an agreement between the members of the community, by which each surrenders to his fellows the whole of his natural rights and puts himself under some common authority, and to which the king is not an original party, he reaches diametrically opposite conclusions with respect to the implications of such a compact. From the fact that the king was not an original party to the compact Hobbes reasons that he can do nothing to violate its terms, and if his rule prove tyrannical or corrupt the people have no remedy. Having alienated to the king beyond the power of recall that sovereignty, which sprang into existence by virtue of the compact that created the state, the people are helpless. The king is, therefore, absolute. But for Rousseau sovereignty is something which is in its very nature inalienable and indivisible. It follows, then, that the body politic created by the social compact could not have alienated to a king its powers of sovereignty. All that it could do, and what as a matter of fact it did do, was to transfer to a king certain powers of government which might be recalled at any time if abused; so that the king holds his office only at the pleasure of the general will. Thus starting from the same point, the assumption that the king was not an original party to the compact, Hobbes and Rousseau reach the opposite principles of political absolutism and popular sovereignty.

On this point Locke differs from both Hobbes and Rousseau. His argument is that in abandoning the state of nature, and submitting themselves to the restraints of civil society, men not only entered into a compact with one another, but made at the same time a contract with a monarch and thereby established his right to rule over them. Thus Locke recognizes both the governmental and the social compact. In the former he makes the king a party to the agreement. Hence the king can violate its terms; but if he does so, he dissolves the compact, and the community is absolved from all obedience to his authority. In Locke's hands, therefore, the compact theory is made the basis and justification of a system of limited monarchy. He was the apologist of the English Revolution of 1688, just as Hobbes a generation before had been the champion of the absolutist claims of the Stuarts, and as Rousseau three quarters of a century later became the exponent of the principle of democracy.

Rousseau differed again from Locke, as Locke differed from Hobbes, with respect to the character of the state of nature, which preceded the creation of the state and the establishment of civil government, and the particular manner in which the state of nature was exchanged for the civil state. Unlike Hobbes, who regarded the state of nature as a state of universal war which the law of self-preservation compelled men to give up, Locke held that it was a state of natural equality and freedom, since all men are by nature endowed with certain rights of property and person. But Locke was compelled to admit that these advantages were seldom realized in the state of nature for the reason that the law of nature was obscured. This obscuration was due to three things: first, the biasing of men's minds by their interests; secondly, their ignorance of the law of nature; and thirdly, the absence of a "known and indifferent judge" to punish those who contravened the law of nature. Hence the state of nature, although it was by no means a state of universal war, proved so inconvenient and unsatisfactory that men were led to abandon its freedom and

equality and submit themselves to the restraints of civil society. In this abandonment of the state of nature each one voluntarily surrendered into the hands of a general authority certain of his natural rights and liberties, but only so many as were necessary to secure the benefits of civil society. The rights and liberties not thus surrendered the individual took with him into the civil state, where they had the same validity and binding force which they had in the state of nature. The state is conceived, therefore, by Locke as something created for the protection of rights already in existence, which it may not contravene.

All this differs fundamentally from the conclusions of Hobbes, who maintained that in abandoning the condition of universal war, which was inseparable from the state of nature, men surrendered to a monarch, a king, a government, completely and irrevocably, all the rights they had ever had. In his recognition of the limited, representative, fiduciary character of government Locke marks a great advance over Hobbes, for he foreshadows, if he does not reach, the full distinction between state and government, the most fundamental concept of modern political science. But if Locke recognized, though faintly, the modern distinction between state and government he failed utterly to distinguish between the community as a social aggregate and the community as a body politic, that is, between state and society; and as a matter of course he also failed to see that sovereignty is an attribute of the state and not of society. He clearly recognized that government is only an agent, but he failed to recognize the principal.

While Hobbes regarded the state of nature as a state of universal war, in which the life of man was "solitary, poor, nasty and short," and which the law of self-preservation compelled him to give up, and while Locke regarded it as something that was merely inconvenient and unsatisfactory but not necessarily intolerable, Rousseau, differing from both, conceived it in his earlier writings as a state of almost idyllic felicity. In his later writings, however, he does not speak

with so much confidence on this point. For he makes the admission that however desirable and advantageous the state of nature may have been at first when population was sparse, it became increasingly difficult, with the growth of the race in numbers and density, for each one to maintain himself. This is substantially the position of Locke.

With respect to the manner in which the transition from the natural to the civil state was accomplished Rousseau agreed with Hobbes in holding that in entering into the social compact each one surrendered not a part only of his natural rights, as Locke maintained, but all of them. With both, too, the surrender was absolute. They differ, however, with respect to the beneficiary of this act of surrender. Rousseau held that each surrendered his natural rights to all, that is, to the collectivity, whereas, according to Hobbes, the surrender is to a single person, or at most to a small body of persons, that is, to a king, a prince, a government. Thus Rousseau clearly distinguishes between state and government. It is the state, and not the government, that is sovereign; and it is only to the state that the individual surrenders his natural rights. On the other hand Hobbes recognizes no distinction between state and government, holding, or at least implying, that the creation of civil society, and the complete and irrevocable surrender of its sovereign powers to a government, were one and the same act.

While this distinction between state and government indicates a material advance over both Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau is not yet on modern ground. For he not only gives to government too narrow a meaning, but he fails, just as Locke did before him, to distinguish between state and society. He identifies government with administration, and completely subordinates it to the legislative power which is vested in the collectivity; so that when the people are assembled in a sovereign body they assume, and for the time being exercise, all the powers of administration in addition to those of legislation, which are never exercised in any other way than by the collectivity. Thus government is not only periodically anni-

hilated, what there is of it, but at no time is it permitted to express the will of the state. The will of the state can be expressed in no other way than through the collective acts of the people, who, by virtue of their direct participation in the making of all laws, retain in their own hands those powers of sovereignty which were acquired by them when the social compact was made. Thus the collective will and the political sovereignty, or the will of the state, are by Rousseau completely identified; and the doctrine of popular sovereignty is carried so far that the existence of a true state is made a practical impossibility. This differs fundamentally from the view of Locke, who conceded a legal validity to the acts of government so long as they did not contravene the recognized rights of the individual, and who regarded sovereignty as a power to be held in reserve by the people and to be exercised by them only on extraordinary occasions.

From this comparison of his views with those of Hobbes and Locke, to whom he owed much more than to any one else, it will be seen that Rousseau was no servile follower. His originality is in evidence at every step. In his conceptions of society, state and government he represents a material advance over both Hobbes and Locke. In several instances he reaches, and where he does not reach he often foreshadows, modern views. But his chief claim to originality rests on the momentous fact that he deduced from the theory of the social compact what had never been deduced from it before, namely, the doctrine of popular sovereignty, which is commonplace enough to-day but which at the time it was enunciated was regarded as the wild utterance of a social incendiary, the product of a disordered brain. Thus Rousseau breathed into the social compact a new spirit and gave it a new direction. This is the first ingredient of its two-fold significance. The other is the fact that he popularized the theory of the social compact, that he carried its doctrines, as has been so aptly said, from the study to the street. In his hands the social compact was no longer an academic theory or a piece of

metaphysical speculation, but a popular program which fascinated the minds and imaginations of men, a new social gospel which thrilled with life and stirred the multitude with new hopes and aspirations.

But if the full significance of the *Contrat Social* is to be comprehended, it is necessary to look to external circumstances, to the political and economic conditions of France in the eighteenth century, rather than to the intrinsic merits of the work. Probably no single piece of writing ever owed so little of its power and influence to itself and so much to a favorable conjunction of circumstances. It abounds with all sorts of defects. A fundamental one is that it has no foundation in fact, for civil society did not originate as Rousseau asserts it did; nor did it follow once originated the course which he marked out with so much assurance. The state of nature which he made antecedent to civil society is a figment of the imagination; and consequently civil society could not possibly have been established by means of a contract. No body of savages was ever known to have lived in a state of nature such as Rousseau postulates; and no genuine instance of a social contract has ever been found. The whole thing is an impossibility. For it involves the absurdity that a lot of savages invented government, and that they not only foresaw the political needs of future generations but absolutely bound the remotest of those generations by their covenant. The truth of the matter is that from the first men lived in rudimentary associations, from which by a process of evolution modern civil society has been slowly developed.

The act of the Pilgrims in "covenanting and combining themselves together into a civil body politic for their better ordering and governing" is frequently cited as a confirmation of the theory of the social compact. But it was nothing of the kind. It did not create a state for the first time. It did not invent government. It was merely the establishment of a government by persons who had always lived in a state of civil society, and who were, therefore, accustomed to its rights and duties.

It has been urged again in behalf of the theory of the social compact, that while it does not rest on any historical basis, it may yet be accepted as a proper interpretation of the relations subsisting between the individual and the state, and as constituting, therefore, a rational justification of civil government. But this view is no more tenable than the other. For the individual is not joined to the state by a voluntary agreement. He is born into the state, and is part of it as the hand is part of the body. He is in the state and the state is in him. Hence the relation between the individual and the state is not a voluntary but a compulsory one. Nor are his social obligations measured by the benefits which he receives from the state, as the theory of the social compact clearly implies. There is no government in the world to-day that is administered on a *quid pro quo* principle. And what is still more to the point, there never has been such a government. The adjustment of the burdens of government to its benefits is not even an impossible ideal. It is not an ideal at all, but a glaring injustice.

Both from the standpoint of history and reason, then, the theory of the social compact has failed to justify itself. It is unhistorical and illogical; and it has now been given up almost universally.

Another criticism, which is less fundamental perhaps than the other, and which is more applicable to Rousseau's presentation of the theory of the social compact than to the theory itself, is that the *Contrat Social* is full of paradoxes and contradictions. It contains many things which appear to have been put in for no other reason than that they happened to cross the author's mind at the time. For not only do they have no connection with their immediate context, but they are also out of harmony with the general spirit of the work. At times the social compact is to Rousseau a mere supposition; at other times he appears to believe fully in its historical reality. At one place the applicability of its principles is expressly limited to small cities like Berne and Geneva; at another, all men are declared to have become so corrupted by society as to be un-

worthy of the *Contrat Social*. At one time, again, the argument is made to rest on a basis of pure fancy; at another, on pretended observation. Because of these numerous inconsistencies and contradictions the *Contrat Social* has been called the most obscure and chaotic of all Rousseau's writings; and this appears all the more strange when it is remembered that it was the only one of his works, which was the outcome of some critical circumstance in his life, and which was not conceived and written in a moment of passion.

But with Rousseau's contemporaries all these defects which are so patent to us counted for nothing. The masses did not see his faults of logic; but they caught his meaning and they were moved by his eloquence. They neither knew nor cared that Rousseau's history was all wrong, that his premises were mere assumptions, that he made the facts fit his theories, that his inferences were fantastic; they only knew that he denounced tyranny and privilege and the inequitable distribution of wealth and the exploitation of the many by the few. They did not see that the *Contrat Social* was an impossible scheme of social regeneration; they only knew that it preached a gospel of hope and justice and liberty to an absolutist age.

That France lagged far in the rear of its insular neighbor in its political development is unquestioned. Since the revolution of 1688 the doctrine of the divine right of kings was no longer heard in England. But in France kings were still sacred things, as Bossuet declared; and even if they behaved like wolves it was the duty of Christian subjects to be as sheep. It is true, however, that at the time the *Contrat Social* appeared there were not wanting signs of a growing unrest throughout France. Since the middle of the century there had been a rapidly increasing interest on the part of serious-minded people, and even of the fashionable classes, in the first principles of government. So much is indicated by the character of the books read by the upper and middle classes and the most popular subjects of conversation in the *salons*. But this interest in political matters had not yet spread to the masses.

It was Rousseau who first taught them to think politically. A traveler, who at the beginning of the reign of Louis XVI returned to France after an absence of some years, was asked what change he had noticed in the nation. "None," he replied, "except that what used to be talked about in the drawing room is repeated in the streets."

By carrying the new doctrines from the study and the drawing room to the street Rousseau profoundly influenced the destinies of the modern world. "The world has not seen more than once or twice in all the course of history," says Maine, "a literature which has exercised such prodigious influence over the minds of men, over every cast and shade of intellect, as that which emanated from Rousseau between 1749 and 1762." It is perhaps too much to say that Rousseau's writings, that the *Contrat Social* more particularly, caused the French Revolution. To the historian and the sociologist it is a mere truism to say that a great social movement is always the result of a complex of causes. And yet Napoleon once declared that but for Rousseau France would have had no revolution. However this may be, it is certain that Rousseau counted immensely as a revolutionary force. At every stage, indeed, of that terrible upheaval his influence can be traced. "That which distinguishes the French Revolution from other political movements," declares Lecky, "is that it was directed by men who had adopted certain speculative *a priori* conceptions of political right with the fanaticism and the proselyting zeal of a religious belief. . . . and the Bible of their creed was the *Contrat Social*." Mallet du Pan, a contemporary of the French Revolution, asserts that Rousseau alone inoculated the French nation with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people and with its extremest consequences, that he had a hundred times more readers among the middle and lower classes than Voltaire, and that it would be difficult to find a single revolutionist of the days of '89, '90 and '91 who was not transported by his theories and did not burn with ardor to realize them. The debates in the revolutionary assemblies abound with references

to Rousseau's writings; and the several paper constitutions of the Revolution were directly based on his doctrine of the sovereignty of the people.

With the masses Rousseau's doctrines were no less popular than with the leaders of the Revolution. Mallet du Pan declares that as early as 1788 he heard Marat reading and commenting upon the *Contrat Social* in a public promenade amid the applause of an enthusiastic audience. In the early stages of the Revolution veneration for his memory was unbounded. His remains were borne in triumph to the Pantheon. He was everywhere idolized as the friend of virtue and liberty, and the enemy of tyrants. Public fêtes were held in his name. Statues were erected to him, and his portrait was conspicuous in public places.

In saying that Rousseau's writings counted immensely as a revolutionary force it is not meant that he counseled violence as the proper remedy for social evils. With rare prescience he realized that the world was on the eve of a terrible cataclysm. "We are approaching," he wrote, "a crisis and a century of revolutions. . . . I hold it impossible for the great monarchies of Europe to last much longer." He foresaw the impending changes, but he neither desired nor instigated them. His was not the spirit of a revolutionist. He had an instinctive dread of blood and violence, and he nowhere teaches revolution. There is a measure of truth, therefore, in the contention of George Sand that the *Contrat Social* was no more responsible for the brutalities of the Revolution than was the Gospel for the massacre of St. Bartholomew. But this is not the whole truth of the matter, for the effects of an act are not ordinarily limited by the purposes of its author. In the irony of human affairs it frequently happens that the incidental effects of a man's teaching are altogether at variance, not only with his spirit and purpose, but with the distinctive principles of that teaching; and it is not possible, therefore, to limit responsibility to the purposed and direct effects and exclude the incidental ones.

But the effects of Rousseau's teachings, whether direct or incidental, are not to be limited to the French Revolution, or to his own nation, or even to his own generation. In the political philosophy of America his influence is traceable at many points. The Declaration of Independence clearly recognizes the theory of the social compact when it asserts "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." All this is conceived in the spirit of Rousseau and clearly indicates the strong influence which his teachings had on the author of the Declaration. In his private writings Jefferson went so far in his advocacy of the compact theory that he denied the right of one generation to bind another, and asserted that every constitution and every law ought to expire automatically at the end of thirty-four years, the average life of a generation. Others among the leaders of the American Revolution did not hold the compact theory in so extreme a form as Jefferson. Thus Madison laid down the principle that constitutions and laws were to be regarded as valid so long as they were not explicitly revoked.

The influence of Rousseau can be traced also in the constitutions of many of the American commonwealths. That of New Hampshire declares that "all men are born equally free and independent. Therefore all government of right originates from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good." "The body politic," says the constitution of Massachusetts, "is founded by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the

whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the general good."

Still another place where Rousseau's influence may be easily traced is the modern socialistic movement. He has been called the father of modern socialism from the fact that the principles which he laid down a century and a half ago have been the fountain source of all revolutionary, communistic and socialistic literature ever since. To Rousseau modern socialism undoubtedly owes its deepest and most fundamental principle. In the tremendous emphasis which it places on equality it stands on common ground with him. In all his political writings, as he gives to equality the place of first importance, so he regards inequality as the greatest of all social ills. Inequality is defined by him as the "enjoyment by some of the privileges of wealth, honor, power, rule, to the prejudice of others." Wherever there is inequality it is because the state has failed to attain the ends for which it was instituted; for Rousseau concedes to the state no other right to exist than that which rests on its substitution of moral and legal equality for the inequalities imposed by nature. He loved to call himself *l'amî de l'égalité*; and his ideal state was one in which "no citizen should be rich enough to be able to buy another and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself." The great emphasis which Rousseau placed on equality, its supreme importance in his ideal state, his deliberate sacrifice of liberty in its interest, his disbelief in the beneficent tendencies of the unrestricted play of private interest, have found an echo in all socialistic literature; for they logically require the equalization of wealth, the *sine qua non* of modern theoretical socialism.

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VIII.

CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

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JESUS' CONTRIBUTION TO MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

Religion is one of the primary instincts of human nature. If not a quite universal fact among men, religion is absent only among the most primitive and undeveloped savages of the race. This practical universality of religion witnesses to a correspondingly general belief in the existence of God, and to some sort of a conception as to God's nature and character. The belief in its earliest discoverable aspects may be hardly more than a vague feeling, and the conception only a dim intellectual and moral intimation. Still it remains true, and in the very face of pretended atheism and vaunted agnosticism, that the human spirit by the qualities inherent in its constitution is required, consciously or unconsciously, to assume that there is a God.

The development of these primary instincts and intuitions of God, and the progress in human knowledge with reference to His nature and character, can be traced in the upward struggles of mankind. No sooner did men begin to think about themselves and their natural surroundings, than theistic theories of some kind were suggested to their minds and reflected in their lives. As they went on thinking, they were driven by many considerations to the recognition of a divine Personality. They were driven to this conviction by the necessity of finding for persons and things a "Cause" beyond the natural forces which are powerless to work themselves. They were driven to it, again, in attempting to account for the consciousness of self which was theirs, and which no scientific

alchemy has ever been able to derive from matter. They were driven to it, moreover, when searching for the origin of conscience with its mysterious whisperings of duty and responsibility and with its terrifying tempests of remorse, which no naturalistic slight-of-hand can ever trace back to materialistic forces. And they were likewise compelled to adopt the same conclusion by contemplating matter with its mysteries of obedience to invariable law, and by life with its mysteries of thought and of the moral imperative.

Negative philosophy, as advocated by skeptic and unbelieving thinkers, has denied personality to the so-called Absolute as being a limitation of it, and consequently a self-contradiction. But no philosophy of the Absolute has ever succeeded in escaping from the charge of abounding in contradictions. The illustrations given by Sir William Hamilton of some of them make this perfectly clear, and should be sufficient to show that the demands of skeptics for logical consistency in this dim and awful region are entirely negligible. What every thoughtful man may be sure about, if certainty is anywhere, is his own consciousness and its affirmations. There he finds intelligence, a sense of righteousness and truth, of love and duty, all of which must have originated in an adequate cause, and this final Cause or Creator of them must Himself be the Personal Possessor of them. Fairly interrogated or interpreted, therefore, the human consciousness requires us to see in the supreme Cause those properties which we include in our definition of personality. These facts lie at the basis of Theism, and their challenge never has been, never can be, successfully controverted.

When the question is asked, whether the God whose existence and personality are thus assumed and justified is able to reveal Himself to men, the immediate answer given by the history of religion is an unqualified and unequivocal affirmative. Students of religion and its historical development, it is pointed out by Professor Gwatkin in his monumental work on

The Knowledge of God,¹ need not go on very far before discovering that "every argument which goes to verify the natural assumption as regards the bare existence of a personal God, goes equally to prove that He is a God of a certain character, and so compels men to say something definite about Him." This is one of the most significant facts with which inquirers into religion and its history have to deal, and an unprejudiced interpretation of the fact necessarily carries the conviction of Divine revelation as a possibility and reality. "If God is the final Cause of all causes, He must have the power of a sufficient Cause. If He is the ultimate origin of life and personality, He must have life and personality in Himself. If He has given us a moral sense, He must Himself be its concrete embodiment. If He has planted in us the desire of knowing Him, He must be able to reveal Himself for the satisfying of that desire. In fact, the personal embodiment of the perfectly moral in God implies a required revelation of Himself to the human order of created intelligence. Revelation is not hindered by any want of willingness or power on God's part to give it, nor is it hindered by any want of power on man's part to receive it."

This possible and actual revelation of God to man, it should be observed, however, is, on account of man's intellectual and moral limitations, a process from what is less to what is more. It is always given by God in accordance with the intellectual and moral development and the spiritual attainments of men. In other words, it is a moral and spiritual revelation, not the result of an outward, mechanical arrangement or arbitrary process. Consistent with the nature of God as a moral and spiritual being, the act of revelation must accommodate itself to the divinely implanted and preëstablished psychological and moral laws that rule in man's nature. It must be made through moral and spiritual personalities that are more or less akin to God. It cannot be written outwardly in letters of light

¹ *The Knowledge of God and Its Historical Development*, by Henry Melvill Gwatkin, M.A., 2 vols., 642 pages, price \$3.75, T. & T. Clark.

upon the skies for man's information and instruction; instead, it must be made, in the first instance, an inward possession or achievement of particular individuals, and through their influence and leadership communicated to the knowledge of others.

In this regard the acquisition of the knowledge of God is analogous to man's enlarging attainments of knowledge in other realms. It is chiefly through the influence of great personalities that we can explain the progress that has been made and the higher ideals that prevail in the realms of science and art, of civics and philosophy, of individual and social morality. In every sphere of human activity, it is the individual personality, endowed with genius, that supplies the historical cause for the uplift and advance of mankind. The truth of this may be illustrated by reference to the names of Plato, Kant and Hegel in philosophy, of Kepler, Newton and Darwin in science, of Caesar, Cromwell and Lincoln in civil life, of Shakespeare and Milton, Browning and Tennyson in poetry, and of Savonarola, Luther and Calvin in morals. All these in their respective spheres originated new ideas and ideals, which transformed and enforced older ones, thus making them potent and effective, in connection with the new, in the lives of others brought in contact with them. All of them were centres of personal power from which radiated influences starting movements resulting in the so-called general tendencies of their times. No such movements have ever arisen until the originating, creative personality appeared, the discoverer, the leader, the revealer.

Preëminently true is this in the realm of religion in which man's deepest and highest life comes to expression. Everything that is vital, enduring, universal in religion has irradiated from great, inspired and inspiring personalities, and their abiding influence is found, upon inquiry, to lie in their personal grasp of eternal and universal truths which they made vital in their own being. By so doing they forced them upon the attention, and won for them the acceptance, of others, the process amounting to a revelation. The soundness of this contention could be readily established by examining the

origin, the doctrines and the history of all the great world-religions. But for our present purpose it is sufficient to show its validity particularly as regards the Jewish and the Christian faiths.

Of the former, Abraham and Moses may be said to have been the founders. Through their conceptions of Jehovah as the One Sovereign God, a new era in religious history was made possible. After them came the long line of Hebrew prophets, each one with his own contribution to the growing body of revealed truth concerning God. Without such a succession of religious seers, confirming and enlarging the ideas of their predecessors, that of which we have a record in the sacred writings of the Jews could not have been evolved. Through them the original conceptions of God were largely developed, ethically deepened, and spiritually purified. To the fact and method of this gradually unfolding process of revelation recorded in the Old Testament, one of the New Testament writers alludes at the beginning of his Epistle to the Hebrews. "God," that unknown writer there tells us, "in times past spake unto the fathers, through the prophets, in diverse portions and in diverse manners." The fathers who heard these prophets, heard the voice of God through them—a voice speaking with constantly increasing clearness and fulness of Himself as the All-powerful Creator of the universe, its All-knowing and All-wise Ruler, and the All-holy, Righteous and Loving Father of His people. And due to this fuller knowledge of God and Israel's belief in Him, is the immeasurable superiority of Jewish individual and social morals, and of their higher ethical conceptions of religion, as compared with the morals and religion of contemporary Gentile nations. God's revelation of Himself to the Jews, and the response they gave in their moral and religious life to that revelation—these together made possible everything that is great and glorious in their national career as God's people, chosen by Him as peculiarly fitted to serve the purpose of making His Name more perfectly known among men.

It goes without saying, however, that this Hebrew revelation, although it has come from God, was not fully and finally perfect. It was greatly in advance of what had gone before, but a great deal needed to be accomplished before that which is perfect in man's knowledge of God could be attained. Light passing through an imperfect medium upon the retina loses somewhat of its native beauty, splendor and purity. The light of the glory of the blessed God cannot be manifested in its resplendent beauty and attractiveness so long as it has to pass upon human vision through imperfect personalities. But once a perfect Man shall appear, it might have been anticipated by the Jews as it is now realized by Christians, God will be able to reveal Himself fully and finally in that Person. Through him, that which was true and permanently valuable in the old would be transformed and conserved in the higher revelation. Old things would pass away, all things would become new in the light he would shower upon them.

This perfect Man, sun-clear in his personal experience and knowledge of God, and Spirit-filled in his sinless and holy character—this perfect Man Christians believe to have appeared in history in Jesus, the Prophet of Nazareth of Galilee. "When the fulness of the time came, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman," and in Him—to adopt Brierley's happy phrasing—"emerged the complete Personality in whom was exhibited all of God that could be contained and manifested in one human form." The writer to the Hebrews, already referred to, declares the Son, in whom the Father hath spoken unto us, as "being the effulgence of His glory, and the impress of His substance." And in the language of Paul, "the light of the glory of God," was given for the illumination of man's heart, "in the face of Jesus Christ." In the gift of this Son, the Father bestowed His most precious and priceless legacy of knowledge concerning Himself upon His children.

In the transmission of this illuminating and enriching boon to man, Jesus assumes the validity of the earlier revelations which God had made of Himself. What he declared with

reference to the law holds true when applied to revelation—he had not come to destroy but to fulfill. His mission was not to rob men of their confidence in previously given “portions” of the truth, but to confirm them in their confidence and assist them to the fuller apprehension of its content. Hence he does not argue, does not attempt to demonstrate God’s being. He gives no proofs of God’s existence. He takes for granted that those to whom he addresses himself know that there exists a supreme Divine Person, who is perfectly holy, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent. Instead of dwelling on the existence and personality of God, and these previously recognized attributes of Deity, Jesus lays stress upon Love as being the very essence of God’s being, and the principle governing Him in His relation to, and all His dealings with men. Divine Love, in the thought and teaching of Jesus, transcends and uses as its instruments all the other qualities of the Divine nature. Love passes beyond mere justice and righteousness, is infinite in patience and compassion, in mercy and forgiveness, in tenderheartedness and fatherly concern, toward everyone of His children. By this emphasis upon Love, Jesus revealed the heart of God, and so makes his original, unique and revolutionizing contribution to man’s knowledge of God. Men’s growth in the apprehension of this contribution accounts for and justifies the amazing changes that have been wrought in our times in the way of giving ethical content to systems of theology and religious doctrines. At the same time, also, we shall see presently, the incalculable value which God places on spiritual character, and the ideal of true manhood which it suggests and fosters, are corollaries of prime import and significance in this contribution made by Jesus to our knowledge.

Meanwhile, it is worthy of note that in making his full and final, ethical and spiritual revelation of God as Love, Jesus regards it unnecessary by argument to persuade men into an acceptance of his conception of God. He does not undertake to demonstrate that his is the true view. He simply affirms it in his teaching as he acts it in his life. Here lies the secret of

his authority. He speaks as never men had spoken, not as the scribes. His authority resides not in an outward constraint of law, nor in a dogmatism that chills the affections and fetters the reason. His unwavering conviction that God is Love—a conviction impressively carried home to the hearts of his disciples—lent its authority to his word, and as men surrendered themselves to its appeal when seen exemplified in his deeds, it aroused an answering witness in the depths of their own being, convincing them of its “sweet reasonableness” and bestowing upon them a conscious experience of personal freedom and blessedness. The authority of Jesus thus recognized and acted on always brings believers home to God, makes them new creatures, one with Christ and the eternal Father.

This endearing name, Father, always used by Jesus with a single exception when praying to God, had before been applied to Him by others. The part of Jesus’ contribution to our knowledge of God at this point, lies, therefore, not so much in the term itself, as in the world of new meaning, exhaustless in its wealth of content, which, without explanation or theological discussion, it is shown to possess, and in the right he gave to all men to employ it as their own designation of God. Vastly enriched in its meaning as the name Father was on the lips of Jesus, it taught men to feel God’s living, loving, gracious presence with them in all their experiences, and made them joyful in a new-found sense of a real Divine interest in them and in their lives. How unspeakably grateful for a believing heart to hear the assurance—“Your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things.” How unutterably heartening and precious the saying—“If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those that ask Him.” Were these the only authentically reported words of his, men would owe him an eternal debt of gratitude for his revelation of a deeper knowledge of the Father-God.

As already intimated, however, the contributions Jesus made to our knowledge of God, which we have now considered, carry certain implications of untold significance for us. One of these is the infinite value which the Father attaches to man's spiritual character. "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which it possesseth." A man's worth is not to be reckoned by anything apart from his spiritual attainments. Spiritual worth is the only thing that counts with the God whom Jesus revealed. This reverses completely the judgments which too often prevail in the world. Its standards frequently stress the importance of outward riches, conventional probity, social position, success accomplished, fame achieved. In the mind of God, it is something of an entirely different order in man that has weight. It is the poor in spirit, the meek and lowly of heart, the peace-makers among men, those hungering and thirsting after righteousness, and those willing to suffer persecution rather than to depart from a faithful and steadfast adherence to the principles of right and truth—it is those diligently engaged in cultivating these spiritual graces and virtues that are building "life after God's plan." Theirs and theirs alone is the hallowed and hallowing consciousness of basking in the genial warmth of the Father's approving smile and benediction. So far as outward circumstances and material possessions are concerned, they may, like their Master, "have not where to lay their head"; in death, they may find it necessary, like him, to accept burial in a borrowed grave; on account of their external impoverishment, they may be neglected and forgotten by friends, and regarded by others with derision and scorn as melancholy failures; but having spiritual character and its accompanying satisfaction and peace, even the least of them outweighs in the scales of God the whole of the material universe.

And in revealing this Divine estimate of man's spiritual worth, Jesus sought to impress this additional truth, which is "good news of God" indeed, on every human soul, namely, that the possibility of attaining to this spiritual worthship is denied

to no man, no matter how steeped in ignorance and sin, or how undeveloped in moral life and religious character he may be, when the Gospel first finds him. This broad, all-inclusive sweep in the Evangel of Jesus, offering spiritual possibilities to every man, sounds a note which is distinctively its own, and which even to-day is regarded by many "too good to be true." "The Lord is not slack concerning His promises, but long-suffering, not willing that any should perish." In its origin Christianity was designed to make a spiritual salvation possible for all men, and whenever true to that design, its history, its doctrines, its efforts, have at once assumed and proved the efficaciousness of the design and the truthfulness of its underlying promise. The entire appeal and vital force of the Evangel rest on the fact, and men's belief in the fact, of the possibilities, inherent in the Gospel, of making a new human product out of the old life of anyone willing to avail himself of its proffered aid by faithfully committing himself to its gracious counsels and regenerating influences.

This is of the essence of Jesus' revelation of the Father's purpose and desire—a revelation which may well kindle renewed hope and more energetic effort in the penitent hearts of lost and wretched victims of ignorance and sin. It may well fire with new zeal, also, the Church's evangelistic enterprises, at home and abroad, in the interest of bringing humanity as a whole to the recognition and the cultivation of the spiritual, as the highest and most valuable in all of life's aims and relations. "Churches become centers of irresistible power, and homes the scenes of sunny brightness," says a distinguished and widely influential religious leader and brilliant contemporary writer, "when the men and women composing them recognize as a truth and realize as an experience that they were made with a view to an actual union with God, a combination of His nature with their own, out of which a new and higher form of life is to emerge."² And when the

² *Studies of the Soul*, by Rev. J. Brierley, B.A., cloth, 303 pages, price \$1.20, Thomas Wittaker, New York.

men and women, referred to by the author quoted, shall come to a due appreciation that this "union with God," this "combination of His nature with our own," is possible for every child of the Father and yearned after by Him, they will labor more earnestly and sympathetically, and sacrifice more cheerfully and generously, for speeding the approach of the day which shall see God's purposes in this regard triumphantly accomplished.

The other corollary above alluded to as issuing out of or accompanying Jesus's revelation of God as Love, here offers itself for consideration. It is closely akin to the one that has just now received our attention, and yet is distinct from it. The incalculable value, which, in the mind of God, attaches to human character transfigured through union with Him, necessarily discloses the Father's ideal of perfected human personality which He meant His children to seek after and progressively to achieve. "Ye therefore shall be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect." Had Jesus given simply oral utterance to this lofty and seemingly impossible counsel, it would soon have been disregarded and forgotten. But he incarnated the precept in his own perfect human Personality. In what he personally was, men are allowed to see the Divine ideal of perfect Manhood actualized, and made historically and concretely potent for arousing in his brethren God-ward aspirations, and supplying them with motive abidingly adequate to sustain and support them in the steadfast pursuit of those aspirations.

Such power never attends merely abstract moral precepts. Philosophers have been conscious of this and have called attention to it; parents and teachers are constantly realizing it. So long as ethical principles and precepts, unembodied in living example, float merely in the air, they are largely futile and ineffective. In the case of Jesus, the absolutely perfect Manhood is vitally incarnate, giving forceful influence to his instructions and quickening practical effort to profit by them. This accomplished Ideal, held aloft to human vision, from

the beginning drew men to himself with unique power, and in every succeeding age has increasingly continued performing this helpful, saving ministry. And in yielding themselves to the drawing power of this incarnate Ideal, men discover that it does not infringe on their personal freedom, that it does not intimidate or impose an external compulsion, but that it woos and attracts, humbles and cheers, quickens and strengthens, with a tenderness of love that never wavers or despairs in the face of conflict, suffering or doubt. Jesus constantly calls forth renewed moral and spiritual effort on the part of his followers, and the resulting experiences invariably justify such effort. Step by step they are led into multiplied victories over things seen and temporary, and into possession of things not seen and eternal. Their characters are enriched in depth and purity, their lives are enlarged in purpose and service, their souls persuaded that they are moving on towards the attainment of the perfect manhood for themselves which God means to be their own. "We shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is."

In connection with these illuminating experiences and reassuring convictions, the revelation of Jesus brings the human soul to its deepest consciousness of God as the Sustainer and Ground of the perfect human personality, and to the certitude of its immortality. "The more deeply individualism and the desire for self-perfection have taken hold on a person," writes Professor Hugo Münsterberg, "so much the deeper is his conviction that the short shrift before death is not the whole meaning of human existence, and that his craving for personal development hints at an existence beyond this world." "Hints" is not the word one should prefer to find here, because it seems not to express with sufficient positiveness the unquestioning assurance of a life to come, which is so abundantly warranted and justified, once "the craving for development," natural to man, is enlightened and stimulated by a knowledge of the perfect human Personality achieved by Jesus. Through his consciousness of God, his filial trust in Him, and

his uninterrupted communion with Him, Jesus had an unclouded and triumphant certainty of continued personal life after death. "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." "Behold we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of man shall be delivered into the hands of sinners, and put to death; and the third day he shall rise again." History records the fulfilment of what these words show he so confidently anticipated.

The possibility for the followers of Jesus to attain to a corresponding certitude of immortality is clearly implied in his experience, but it must be achieved in accordance with the eternal law that wrought this consciousness in the Saviour's soul. It is not the immediate result of a mere intellectual acceptance of others' testimony as to the reality of an immortal life, nor of mere determination of the will to believe in what Martineau calls the "vaticinations" of our own minds and consciences. Vaticinations doubtless give vague intimations to us of another life, the testimony of others may contribute added force to those intimations, but the personal certitude our spirits are yearning for, comes only to those, who, conscious of their union with God and through personal intercourse with Him, cultivate spiritual kinship with Him in obedience to the command of His Son, "Be ye therefore perfect." In that way alone we can attain to a consciousness of the in-dwelling presence of the Holy Spirit and realize for ourselves that which it was the high and holy ambition of Paul, for instance, to achieve in his career, namely, a personal knowledge "of the power of the resurrection." Counting all things but refuse as compared with the excellency of perfected personality, disclosed in the Master, he heard God's "upward calling" addressed to him through His Son, and so pressed forward to win for himself a similar joy as the crown of life. More and more, as his Christlike life spent itself in the service of God, did his personal consciousness grow into the light of an eternal existence. "I know Him whom I have believed, and am persuaded that He is able to guard that which I have com-

IX.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

THE MISSIONARY MOTIVE.

As an historic movement the missionary work of the Christian Church is unparalleled in its scope, method of operations, purpose, and results. It surpasses in its vision the wildest dreams of empire. Its purpose is different from that of the state, the school, the guild, or the fraternity. Its results, notwithstanding almost insuperable obstacles and checks, exceed in spiritual and moral influence those of any other social, political, philosophical, or religious propaganda. Its unbroken continuity for two thousand years, surviving the decline and fall of two great ages of human history, is a powerful testimony to its divine origin and its human need. Royal dynasties, schools of philosophy and art, religious cults, and political systems have come and gone, but the Christian missionary is laboring patiently in every land and is proclaiming his Master's message in every tongue. When one follows this stream of life flowing down the centuries, healing and refreshing the nations, he finds its spring in Galilee, in a teacher of the Jews, a man of God, a servant of men, Jesus Christ. He kindled a spark in the bosom of His followers into a flame which, with its brightness and warmth, has encircled the earth.

What is the secret of this perennial enthusiasm for God and humanity? What new dynamic has the Nazarene introduced into the lives of men? When men leave houses and lands, kindred and nation, and imperil their lives on sea and land, among savage tribes and city mobs, in the heat of the tropics and the cold of the arctics, in the service of an unseen Lord and a foreign people, and do all this with ever growing zeal for two millenniums, we may well pause to inquire into the motive of missions.

The mere command, "Go ye therefore and make disciples of all the nations," does not suffice. The authority of an outward injunction must become the constraint of an inward and spontaneous impulse. The Christian disciple is not to render blind obedience even to his Lord, like the soldier in "The Charge of the Light Brigade,"

"Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die."

We are not servants who know not what their Lord doeth. He has called us "friends," and "all things that He hath heard from His Father He has made known unto us" (John 15:15). The rationale of the command must be found in the character of Christ. The quality of His life, His revelation of God, His ideal of man, the fellowship of faith which He effects between God and men,—these are various aspects of the ultimate and permanent motive of missions.

From time to time Christians have been controlled by what may be called minor or secondary motives, which we by no means despise. For such vitality as they have they draw from the major motive. Even Paul conceded that "some indeed preach Christ even of envy and strife; and some also of good will;" the one of "love," the other of "faction." He rejoiced, however, "that in every way, whether in pretence or in truth, Christ is proclaimed" (Philip. 1:16-18). Yet as times change and men change with them, some of these motives necessarily lose their force, and missionary enthusiasm must be rejuvenated by a return to Christ who is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.

Once men believed and taught that a heathen soul goes to perdition with every tick of the clock. That is a startling and chilling statement, but it aroused men to missionary endeavor. The modern man will hardly respond to such an appeal, nor is the minister of the gospel inclined to make it. It remains true, nevertheless, that every person, dying in paganism, has passed through life and enters eternity without the blessings

and comfort of the gospel. A devout Christian will consider this an incalculable deprivation and loss, which it is his duty in the future to aid in forestalling.

At times heathen religions have been considered totally depraved, even of diabolical origin. They were presumably intended to thwart the gracious purpose of God and to deceive, if possible, the very elect. Now there is a tendency to magnify the ethnic religions. The experience of missionaries and the comparative study of religions show clearly that even among the gentiles the spirit of truth and righteousness is preparing the way for the gospel of grace. Men everywhere are seeking God, if happily they may find Him; there have been prophets among the nations since the world began. This, however, only proves that man is by nature religious, not that natural religions are sufficient. Their inadequacy is all the more glaring in the light of Christian ideals and achievements. The recognition of virtue in paganism does not, therefore, minimize the missionary responsibility of the Church.

Men have been impelled to missions by the humane purpose of sharing with the tribes and nations of the earth the benefits of Christian civilization and culture. It is urged that the oriental people need the politics, industry, medicine, and schools of the occident. The only safeguard against the "yellow peril" is to preach the gospel of peace. The force of this motive has been somewhat neutralized, however, by the discovery in missionary countries of a civilization with its art, philosophy, and morality, older by centuries than that of the Romance or Teutonic nations, and in some respects bearing favorable comparison to that of the West. Recently the army and navy of an eastern power has astounded the world, no less by its mastery of all the details of the art of warfare, than by its victory over one of the greatest and proudest monarchies of Europe. It is doubtful, however, whether men can be frightened by the "yellow peril" to go or to give for the world's evangelization. Nor will the enthusiasm for propagating civilization and culture be an adequate motive for missions. While

the gospel will transform social institutions, improve the body and the mind of man, and establish peaceful and profitable commercial relations between the nations, these blessings are not the primary aim, but only a secondary result, of Christian missions.

Let it be granted then, that we no longer pass sentence on the heathen after death, that we recognize truth in their religions, that they have a civilization which is not to be destroyed but perfected, and that we are not frightened by the threat of the "yellow peril"—the original and ultimate motive still remains as valid to-day as in the days of the Apostles.

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says: "God having provided some better thing concerning us, that apart from us they should not be made perfect." He refers to the saints of Israel from Abel to Malachi,—law-givers, psalmists, prophets. Great as was their faith, heroic their service, and glorious their death, they should not be made perfect apart from us, that is, from Christ and the fellowship of Christians. The greatest of them was less than the least in the Kingdom of Heaven. They became complete only in Christ.

Even with more emphasis we may say of the heathen nations, that "apart from us, they should not be made perfect," for there is not a truth or a virtue in pagan religions which is not found in purer and richer form in the gospel. Robert E. Speer says: "It is true that Hinduism teaches the immanence of God; it is true that Mohammedanism teaches the sovereignty of God; it is true that Buddhism teaches the transitoriness of our present life; it is true that Confucianism teaches the solemn dignity of our earthly relationships and our human society. But are not all these truths in Christianity also? And in Christianity each one of these truths is balanced by its just corrective, which is absent from the non-Christian religions. Hinduism teaches that God is near, but it forgets that He is holy. Mohammedanism teaches that God is great, but it forgets that He is loving. Buddhism teaches that this earthly life of ours is fleeting, but it forgets that we must

therefore work the works of God before the night comes. Confucianism teaches that we live in the midst of a great framework of holy relationships, but it forgets that in the midst of all these we have a living help and a personal fellowship with the eternal God, in whose lasting presence is our home."

The supremacy and finality of the Christian religion appear not only in its ideas of God, man, and the world, but in its power to effect the fellowship of faith and love between God and man, and to enable man to overcome the world and to live unto God. The Father of Jesus is not an immanent force pervading the universe, not an arbitrary despot far removed from the world, but Holy Love who pardons and provides, who inspires and upholds, who directs and perfects men. The gods of the gentiles have driven men frantic with fear, made them savage with lust, turned them despondent into the desert, or aroused in them a proud and disdainful defiance of the spirit of the universe. They develop a sickly sainthood, an indulgent epicureanism, a heartless stoicism, a sneering cynicism. Christ not only saves men from their sinful natures, from evil in the world, and from terror of the coming judgment; but awakens joy in the heart in the midst of the world's sorrows, trust in the face of the world's difficulties, hope in the prospect of the world's decadence and death, love in answer to the world's hate. Manhood, physical and spiritual, finds its crown and completion in Christ. He is the life of the world; and apart from Him the human ideal is not attainable. Nor does He save and perfect the individual only; but He transforms social institutions, and becomes the principle of the highest civilization and culture. Christian theology will eventually find its counterpart in a Christian sociology.

Our missionary enthusiasm will be commensurate with our personal experience of the benefits of the gospel. So long as Christianity does not crystallize into dogma, harden into an institution, or turn into an æsthetic cult, but remains life-giving power in the soul, it will impel men by its inherent force

to share the blessings of salvation with their fellows even unto the ends of the earth. For, unless we are elder brothers, we shall watch and pray, toil and hope until the prodigals of the world have returned to the Father's house.

If they apart from us cannot be made perfect, it is equally true that we, apart from them, cannot be made perfect. The question is not whether the heathen can be saved without Christ, but whether Christians can be saved without the heathen. Humanity is not an aggregation of individuals having no relation to one another; it is an organism in which each member is vitally bound to the other. The perfection of the individual is possible only through the perfection of the organism of which he is a part. "Christianity," says Dr. Nevin, "must penetrate and transform into its own image the life, the whole life of the race, as such; and not till this shall have been done, can it be said to have fulfilled its mission, or actualized its idea, or accomplished its full development in the consciousness of the world." The constitution of humanity, no less than the nature of Christianity, logically bids us go and make disciples of all nations.

The "struggle for the life of others" is the distinctive and the deepest motive of Christianity. It is the ultimate principle of eternal love. It is the mystery of Calvary. "He saved others; himself he cannot save." Even Christ "had to suffer these things and to enter into his glory." Only after he was "lifted up" could he "draw all men unto himself." The larger life can be reached only through death. "Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth by itself alone; but if it die, it beareth much fruit." Individuals and congregations too frequently are engaged in working out their own salvation without concern for others,—clearly an impossible task. They seek life in Christ without sharing in the sacrifice and death through which Christ entered into glory. The way to glory always leads over Golgotha. This, indeed, is a hard saying; but a necessary and salutary appeal to the heroic element in men in a pleasure-loving and labor-saving

age. If our churches are to accomplish their mission, to enjoy the favor of God and the respect of the world, they must fulfill the law of the Cross, which is none other than active service for the salvation and the perfection of mankind.

G. W. RICHARDS.

THE REIGN OF THE BIZARRE.

When, in moments of quiet rumination, we look out upon the passing show of life, we cannot fail to be impressed by certain phenomena which, though varied in kind, are of like import. In literature—be it novel, play, magazine, or newspaper; in art—be it canvas of impressionist or colored supplement to the Sunday edition; in the moving-picture show; in architectural freaks and musical absurdities; in women's coiffures, hats, and gowns; in the marvelous get-up of the wealthy motorist, out for a speedy run; in these and other like phenomena we behold the unquestionable reign of the bizarre.

Fiction provides us with an apt illustration, in the novel of the so-called "fleshy" school. The demand now, we are told, is for strong, virile work. The day of the sentimental novel—the sweet, simple love story, where all ends happily—is past. Even the moving tale of passion, in which the conventions and reticences of civilization are respected, is now too colorless. The modern age, it would seem, hears again "the call of the wild," and is lured by its fiction-mongers to respond. In the pages of the erotic novel human nature is shown, "red in tooth and claw"; men and women, stripped of the outward decencies which society has seen fit to impose, are exhibited, as to their passions, in a state of primeval savagery—naked and unashamed. That the writers of these virile (!) tales are often women, only accentuates the unnaturalness and unwholesomeness of the work. It is extravagant, inartistic, unbeautiful, bizarre.

On the stage we may see similar phenomena. Leaving out of count the simply stupid, the disgustingly vulgar and indecent plays, the name of which each year is legion, we shall

find in the work of many representative dramatists much that is not only morbid but also fantastic and bizarre. Ibsen, it is true, is dead; but are not Shaw and Sudermann, Maeterlinck and D'Annunzio yet alive? And are they not drawing to our theatres each season men and women who crave the unusual, and who do not always perceive that it is likewise the unnatural, the half-true, and the false? And what shall we say of Rostand? Despite the beauties of his charming phantasy, "Chantecler"; despite its poetic symbolism, its clever characterization, and subtle suggestiveness, when read in the library or interpreted by the literary critic, is it not, after all, a mere *tour de force*, when estimated as a play? Are birds and beasts and barn-yard fowl—made up as such upon the stage, yet revealing human faces and speaking the language of men and women—a legitimate theme for the drama, "whose end, both at the first and now, was and is to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature," to show character, *human* character, in action? When, then, the supreme test is applied, even the genius of Rostand, as expressed in his latest and much-discussed production, has clearly gone astray. In "Chantecler" we see again the triumph of the bizarre.

The metropolitan daily, with its flaring head-lines, sensational news items, and tawdry illustrations, must be placed, without question, in the same category. If contemporary society is to be judged by the testimony of our most widely-read journals, then murder and rapine, divorce and suicide, burglary and arson, graft, corruption, deceit, and perjury are its distinguishing characteristics. As for the monster Sunday sheet, with its numerous special features, including the woman's page and the colored atrocity meant for the amusement of children, a self-respecting woman or child may be permitted to wonder why it ever came to be, and wherefore such waste of energy and valuable wood-pulp.

The impressionist picture, in its extreme form, produces upon the uninitiated a similar effect. The plain man, who expects to find upon the artist's canvas a moderately faithful

representation of what the normal eye discerns in the contemplation of nature or the human subject, stands aghast in the presence of one of these color symphonies. Truly the artist's eye, "in a fine frenzy rolling," has seen things in earth and heaven never dreamed of in our everyday philosophy. When one passes, in the great galleries of Europe, from the salons and cabinets containing the masterpieces of other centuries, to the room in which are displayed the works of contemporary impressionists, his faith in the evolutionary hypothesis, as exemplified in art, receives a rude shock. If art has come to this, it is difficult indeed to comprehend how the theory of progressive development can be justified of its adherents. Reversion to the infantile seems here to be so clearly demonstrated!

Perhaps, however, the modern woman *a la mode*, as she may be seen any bright afternoon on the Bois de Boulogne, on Fifth Avenue, or on any crowded thoroughfare nearer home, supplies us with a yet more convincing proof of our contention. In her marvelous coiffure, prodigious hat, grotesque skirt, and astounding figure, she presents an *ensemble* which defies alike the conventional ideas of feminine anatomy and that higher law of beauty which woman, of all creatures, is supposed instinctively to obey. The mandates of Fashion are, it is evident, supreme and inexorable; and when Fashion decrees that the bizarre shall prevail, woman unhesitatingly waives all scruples of grace and beauty and becomes, for the nonce, an unqualified exponent of the bizarre.

Of the male motorist, crouching behind a wind-shield, arrayed in cap, ear flaps, goggles, and great-coat of approved pattern, and holding between his clenched teeth a cigar which, in the nature of the case, quickly accomplishes its own combustion without any aid from him, we need say nothing. "In shape more like a monster than a man," he incarnates for us the spirit of the age which, in its varied manifestations, we have termed—for want of a better name—the bizarre.

Shall we, then, conclude that the obsession of the bizarre,

so unmistakably evident all about us, is a sign of decadence? Obviously, that would be a simple and downright deduction from our premises. Or shall we, with characteristic American optimism, catch at the always available straw, and thereby save ourselves from the bitter consequence? When segregated, all the phenomena we have discussed testify clearly to decadence. That which is morbid, extravagant, grotesque, or irrational cannot be indicative of normal growth or healthy development. If we be serenely philosophic, we may regard it all as demonstrative rather of a temporary reaction, a deplorable hitch in the process of evolution—at best, painfully slow. Our faith in the essential soundness of the race will not permit us to be unduly depressed by manifestations which are, after all, far from general or conclusive.

It is interesting, at this juncture, to recall what Wordsworth wrote, a little more than a century ago, in the Preface to the second edition of his "Lyrical Ballads." Commenting upon the tendency to strong sensations, so apparent then in poetry and the drama, he wisely says: "The human mind is capable of being excited without the application of gross and violent stimulants; and he must have a very faint perception of its beauty and dignity who does not know this, and who does not further know that one being is elevated above another, in proportion as he possesses this capability. . . . A multitude of causes, unknown to former times, are now acting with a combined force to blunt the discriminating powers of the mind, and, unfitting it for all voluntary exertion, to reduce it to a state of almost savage torpor. . . . To this tendency of life and manners the literature and theatrical exhibitions of the country have conformed themselves. The invaluable works of our elder writers are driven into neglect by frantic novels, sickly and stupid German tragedies, and deluges of idle and extravagant stories in verse. When I think upon this degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation, I am almost ashamed to have spoken of the feeble endeavor made in these volumes to counteract it; and, reflecting upon the magnitude of the general

evil, I should be oppressed with no dishonorable melancholy, had I not a deep impression of certain inherent and indestructible qualities of the human mind, and likewise of certain powers in the great and permanent objects which act upon it, which are equally inherent and indestructible; and were there not added to this impression a belief, that the time is approaching when the evil will be systematically opposed, by men of greater powers, and with far more distinguished success."

So Wordsworth felt and so he hoped, one hundred years ago. Again the pendulum has swung far from its centre of oscillation. May we not hope that it has well-nigh completed its arc, and that, after a brief rest, it will begin its long sweep backward towards a safer, saner region of life and thought?

C. ERNEST WAGNER.

A CATECHETICAL MANUAL.

A good brother recently wrote us, raising the question whether the General Synod, at its next meeting, should not inaugurate a movement looking to the revision of the Heidelberg Catechism. He also states that there are at the present time a large number of ministers in the Reformed Church who, in a private way, are seriously debating the propriety of some such action.

We have no means of ascertaining how extensive the desire for such a revision may be; but we have some clearly defined convictions on the subject. We are well aware that the question has been raised before, both in this country and in Germany. There always have been, and there likely always will be persons who are dissatisfied with the Catechism, and who would be glad to see either a revision or else a new confession.

It needs to be remembered that the Heidelberg Catechism has from the beginning subserved a twofold purpose. It has been our one and only confession of faith; and it has been our manual for imparting religious instruction to the young. And so far as there has been dissatisfaction with it, it has grown sometimes out of the one and sometimes out of the other

use to which it has been put; but generally, we believe, it has grown out of its use as a manual for religious instruction.

The excellencies of the Catechism as a confession of faith have been generally recognized. We have been told again and again that, as a confession of faith, it surpasses all the confessions of the sixteenth century; and we believe that the claim can be substantiated. It possesses unusual excellencies, which have often been extolled, and which have not been outgrown by the lapse of time. It is hard to believe that the General Synod could raise a committee which could produce a work of equal merit. This is not an age of confessions. It is doubtless an age of great theological unrest; but for that very reason it is ill fitted for the production of a confession of faith. New problems are looming up on every side; and until there has come to exist far greater unanimity as to the proper solution of the problems than exists to-day, the time is not ripe for the production of a confession of faith which shall satisfactorily gather up the results of modern study.

It is doubtless true that many of the statements of our Catechism were better suited to the sixteenth century than to our own; and it is equally true that the form in which some of its doctrines are stated does not meet the requirements of our present-day thinking. There is probably no one in the Church to-day, who has given serious thought to the matter; who is satisfied with the answers to questions 44 and 80. While there are probably few, if any, who question the *fact* of the atonement, there are many who are no longer satisfied with the *theory* of the atonement which was held by the authors of the Catechism. The same may probably be said of other doctrinal statements. And yet with the general scheme of doctrine which underlies the Catechism there is still very general agreement.

We hence believe that any attempt to revise the Catechism, with the view of obtaining a more generally acceptable confession of faith, would be unfortunate and in the end doomed to failure. Suppose we grant that there is a new movement in theology on foot, which will ultimately make it necessary

for the Church to restate its faith in a new confession, we are persuaded that the time for such restatement has not yet come. Any attempt at this time to produce it could only end in fruitless and disastrous controversy.

But when we come to look on the Catechism as a manual for religious instruction, the matter assumes a different aspect. Just as Luther soon felt that his larger Catechism was not what the Church needed as a catechetical manual, and thus set to work to prepare his shorter Catechism, so it was in the Reformed Church. A shorter Heidelberg Catechism was published as early as 1585; and Child's Catechisms have been prepared from time to time by many of our best and ablest pastors. And the reason for it is not hard to see. A confession of faith must of necessity be somewhat formal and doctrinal; and in the nature of the case it cannot well have that simplicity and directness which a manual, which is to be placed into the hands of children, should have. That has been a ground of objection to the Catechism from the beginning; and it is no doubt the reason why so many have at various times tried to prepare either abridgments of the book itself, or else simplified manuals.

In addition to the above, several other reasons may be given why a simplified manual is desirable. The teaching of the Catechism is clothed in the thought forms of the sixteenth century, and is hence more or less foreign to the thinking of the present day. Before children are prepared to understand its teaching, much of it must be translated into simpler language and into language which is current at the present day. The answers to questions are as a rule long, and many of them complicated, so that they are neither easily understood nor readily remembered by young persons. And there are aspects of Christian duty which need emphasis to-day which are not brought out in the Catechism.

We hence believe that, while a revision of the Catechism as a confession of faith is uncalled for and inexpedient at the present time, a simplified manual is desirable. And such a manual, it strikes us, might be prepared by a judicious com-

mittee. It should as largely as possible avoid all merely theoretical and speculative questions, and should emphasize the ethical and spiritual elements of our holy religion. And that, it strikes us, might be accomplished without precipitating any controversy such as would likely follow an attempt to restate our doctrinal standard. The Heidelberg Catechism is especially rich in just such ethical and spiritual elements; and these might furnish the basis on which the work might be built up. As a supplement to the Catechism and in harmony with it, not as a substitute for it, such a manual might receive the sanction of the General Synod, without raising it to the dignity of an ordinance.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.

XI.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE WORLD A SPIRITUAL SYSTEM: An Outline of Metaphysics. By James H. Snowden, D.D., LL.D. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages ix + 316. Price \$1.50 net.

One of the significant signs of the times is the fact that notwithstanding the scientific progress of the age and the large amount of time given to original research in the various departments of study, there is unmistakably a strong trend towards the study of metaphysics. Men are not satisfied with a knowledge of the phenomena of nature; not even with the interrelation of these phenomena and the discovery of the proximate causes upon which they depend and the laws by which they are governed. There is a tendency everywhere to get beyond the phenomena to the underlying reality, and to find a unifying principle in the light of which the whole system of things in the bosom of which we live may be explained. And in this process of inquiry there is a further tendency towards monism, and in monism towards idealism.

Dr. Snowden, the author of the book under review, is a thorough-going idealist. He is a clear thinker and he has more than ordinary facility in expressing his thoughts so that they may be easily followed even by the reader who is not familiar with technical terms and the phraseology of philosophers. He does not believe that metaphysics is "that, of which those who listen understand nothing, and which he who speaks does not himself understand." On the contrary he accepts Professor William James's definition that it is simply "an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently." In the book before us he tries to show that the world in which we live is a spiritual system through and through, and his reasoning, if not at every point convincing, is at every point highly suggestive, and his exposition is frequently striking and eloquent. There is ample food for thought, both for the plain man and for the scientific thinker; and any one who is in search of the truth and feels the unsatisfactoriness of materialistic science will find here a great deal that is interesting and helpful.

After a preliminary discussion of the nature of metaphysics, the author shows how different the world may appear to three different men according to their viewpoint. To the plain man, that is the "unreflective" man, the world seems to be just as it appears to his senses. The sun rises and sets, the landscape is bathed in glowing colors, and everywhere rock and soil, field and forest, are

solid, substantial and continuous. To the scientific man, however, while he accepts the world of appearances and lives in it just as the plain man does, "things are not what they seem." The sun does not rise and set by moving from east to west, but is fixed in the center of the solar system. Green and blue and yellow are only vibrations in ether of certain rates of rapidity. Material substance is not solid and continuous, but consists of molecules or atoms or ions capable of independent motion with large spaces between them. The metaphysician, accepting both the plain man's world and that of the scientist, goes a step farther and absorbs all these external phenomena into his own sensations. "There is no song of birds in the air, or sweetness in the apple, no pungent odor in the crushed pine leaves, and no hardness in the stone. These are subjective states in the mind, though they have objective causes." But here metaphysicians divide; some are dualists and some monists. The former hold that there are two forms of reality: a mass of extended reality existing in space and time, and a spiritual reality or mind holding intimate and definite relation with it. The latter go farther and resolve the whole universe into one ultimate reality differing according as their monism is materialistic, idealistic, or agnostic. The idealist, with whom we have to deal here, conceives that space and time are intuitions of the mind, and the qualities of things are modes of our experience excited by the objective reality which is mind or spirit, and the idealist usually conceives it to be one Absolute Spirit or God. "The idealistic metaphysician thus regards that landscape and the whole world as the reaction of our mind on God's mind. Sensation, space, and time are subjective in our mind, but they have their exciting cause and objective reality in God's mind" (p. 31). In the course of his argument the author insists, however, that our experiences, on this view, are just as real as those of the "plain" man, and he tries to guard against pantheism, by asserting the personality of God, although he is not only immanent in nature, but nature is the projection of the divine thinking, sensibility, and volition.

Space forbids the following out in detail of the author's argument. Suffice it to say that he first shows the subjectivity of all sensation and follows Kant in making space and time subjective with the difference, however, that our mental states must necessarily take the time form although they do not have spatial existence. The starting point of objective reality, the author's *pou sto*, is found in the nature of the soul of which the soul itself has intuitive or immediate knowledge. From this he proceeds to a knowledge of external reality, as over against solipsism or the belief that self is the only reality. To reach such knowledge the appeal is to experience. Conscious states move in two parallel streams. One of them consists of sensations over which self has

no control. Sensations are thrust upon us and the self cannot produce them nor direct their flow. The other consists of ideas, images, thoughts, and volitions, the course of which is directed by the mind itself. The former stream, therefore, the author argues must be due to something external to the mind which affects it and offers resistance. This confronts us first in the body which stands in the closest possible relation to the soul, and from it the step is easy to an external world of which we are a part. In it we find next certain spots or units of phenomena strikingly similar to our own phenomenal body, and from this we logically infer that these phenomenal bodies are the expression of inner life, or of souls, like our own.

From this point the author proceeds to discuss the nature of external reality. He finds that the world is first a phenomenon, then it is mind in man, then life, thought, sensibility and will. After this he inquires into the relation of God to the world. The objective world is the projection of God's own thoughts, so that very literally "in Him we live and move and have our being." But in the upward development of the system of things thus constituted we come to a point where independent units cut loose, as it were, from the general stream and become *personalities*. Man is therefore in the image and likeness of God, possessing selfhood, intelligence, will and character. "From the nature of our own soul we deduce the nature of God. God is mirrored in man as the great globe of the sun is mirrored in the dewdrop" (p. 181).

The least satisfactory part of the book; it seems to us, is found in the author's discussion of the nature of objective reality. Much that he says might with equal truth be said from a dualistic point of view. And the assertion that life and organization are found in the mineral world as well as in the plant and animal worlds, will not be generally accepted unless, with Grindon, life is defined in quite other terms from those to which we are accustomed. So also the extension of will downward so as to include reflex action, and the confounding of teleology in nature with morality add nothing to the force of the argument and are misleading.

The discussion of the problem of evil, although by no means a solution, contains many good points and is highly suggestive, and it would be difficult to find the arguments in favor of immortality more forcibly and eloquently presented than they are set forth by the author in the tenth chapter in which he treats of the Application of Idealism.

JOHN S. STAHR.

THE FINAL FAITH. A Statement of the Nature and Authority of Christianity as the Religion of the World. By W. Douglas Mackenzie, President of the Hartford Theological Seminary. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages 243. Price \$1.75 net.

This book is one of the fruits of the recent World Missionary

Conference, held at Edinburgh. It was written under the conviction that the Christian religion has come to one of the great crises in its history, and that the greatest need of the hour is "that many attempts should be made to define or describe the Christian Faith, as it confronts the great world with its claims and promises." With a view to establish the claim that Christianity is the absolute religion, and, therefore, the final form of faith, the author makes this contribution to modern Apologetics. He seeks to vindicate the Christian religion, not by an appeal to prophecy or miracle, or to some external authority, but by a thoughtful exposition of the essential doctrines of Christianity, and by their critical comparison with the non-Christian religions. This method of sole reliance upon the objective truth of Christianity will commend itself to discriminating readers as the only apologetic method in harmony with the free spirit of the age. The place of Christ in the life of the world will ultimately depend on the appeal made to the mind, will, and heart of man by the doctrine, duties, and hopes of the religion that arose from his revelation of God. In the vast missionary campaign for the spiritual conquest of mankind, the religion of Christ is thrown into vigorous competition with Buddhism and Mohammedanism. In this missionary contest, not to mention similar conflicts with Atheism and Pantheism in Christian lands, the power of Christianity and its prospect of becoming the world religion depend solely upon its intrinsic character and worth.

Animated by these convictions, the author essays the task of expounding Christianity afresh to this generation as the absolute and final religion of the world. And he sends his book out in the hope that it may be used as a hand-book, by many of those who are, in growing numbers, fired with missionary enthusiasm, for strengthening their own faith and for lighting the same fire in other hearts. The theological standpoint of the author is that of liberal conservatism. He finds the absoluteness of the gospel in the fact that it reveals God Himself in His relation to man as a moral being. And the finality of Christianity lies in this, that henceforth God acts upon the conscience of man only through Christ and his spirit.

In the body of his book the author treats successively, *The Rise of the Final Religion*, *The Christian Revelation of God*, *The Christian View of Christ*, *The Christian View of Sin and Evil*, *The Christian Message of Salvation*, *The Principle of Faith*, *The Vital meaning of the Church and the Bible*, *The Missionary Impulse*. The mere fact that this theological treatise ran rapidly through a second edition, which is nearly exhausted, suggests that both in the selection and exposition of his topics, Dr. Mackenzie has reached the modern mind effectively. Careful perusal of the several chapters serves to strengthen that impression. Just to adversaries, irenic in discussion, critical and yet conservative in

his positive attitude toward the verities of the Christian religion, the author has placed the heart and mind of the Church of Christ under large obligations. His volume will occupy a prominent niche in the growing library of modern Apologetics.

THEO. F. HERMAN.

THE NATURE OF GOD. A Series of Lectures. By John A. Hall, D.D. Philadelphia, The Lutheran Publication Society, 1424 Arch Street. Pages 328. Price \$1.25.

This volume consists of a series of lectures that were delivered before the students of Wittenberg Theological Seminary during the winter of 1908 and 1909. Their publication in book form is a welcome addition to the theistic literature of our day, and deserves wide reading. From cover to cover the book is a challenge to concentrated thinking. The author attempts to present the Christian idea of God as opposed to that of philosophy. That is the primary object of the book and the writer is at his best in setting forth the concrete character of the Christian God as contrasted with the barren Absolute of philosophy. The richness and fullness of the divine nature, as revealed by Christ, is unfolded in two chapters on the Trinity. The reviewer is not aware that this abstruse technical doctrine of the inner being of God has been treated anywhere more practically and presented more convincingly than by Dr. Hall. These Trinitarian chapters alone should win for the volume the approval of all who are interested in rescuing theology from the region of scholastic formulas and restoring it to a place of power.

Besides this excellent statement of our trinitarian faith, the volume, in its fifth chapter, presents a sapient and sound argument on the certainty of religious knowledge. It is difficult to see how sincere sceptics can escape the force of the author's cogent reasoning that the validity of faith-knowledge, like that of scientific knowledge, can only be tested and determined by those who are qualified to judge. The experience of the religious soul may be had by all who conform to the conditions of trust and surrender to the God of the Christian revelation. Those who refuse to make the experiment, in faith as well as in the chemical laboratory, are of necessity debarred from the experience which brings knowledge.

These are some of the salient features of the constructive portion of a book that grips the heart in dealing with so-called speculative topics. Even where the author evokes dissent, as for instance in the rejection of the evolutionary principle, as interpretative of the genesis of religion, the reader will find his statements stimulating. The style is simple and luminous. The book is recommended to all who are interested in Christian Theism.

THEO. F. HERMAN.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. By Philip Schaff. Volume V. Part II. The Middle Ages. From Boniface VIII, 1294, to the Protestant Reformation, 1517. By David S. Schaff, D.D. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910. Pages xi + 795. Price \$3.25 net.

This volume is the second part of volume V of the *History of the Christian Church* which is now completed in seven volumes as originally planned by Dr. Philip Schaff. It must be a great satisfaction to Dr. D. S. Schaff that he was permitted to finish his father's task, and share with him the honor of writing and publishing the most elaborate history of Christianity that has yet come from the American press. We extend to him the congratulations of the Reformed Church in whose Theological Seminary, then located at Mercersburg, Pa., Dr. Philip Schaff prepared his first historical work on the *Apostolic Age* in the fifth decade of the last century. Thus a period of nearly seventy years of the most painstaking investigation, extensive reading, and enormous accumulation of material has been spent in the preparation of this monumental work.

The closing period of the Middle Ages is the subject of this volume. It may be considered also as the preparatory stage of the Reformation. For during this time Medieval Catholicism is gradually disintegrating, and the hidden and repressed forces and tendencies working for a new era are coming more and more into ascendancy. The author clearly discerns and describes these aspects of the life of the Church. In each chapter one finds evidence of an irreconcilable conflict of two conceptions of Christianity, which in time must result in two distinct branches of the Church Catholic.

The material is grouped in ten chapters with the following headings: I, The Decline of the Papacy and the Avignon Exile, A.D. 1294-1377; II, The Papal Schism and the Reformatory Councils, 1378-1449; III, Leaders of Catholic Thought; IV, The German Mystics; V, Reformers Before the Reformation; VI, The Last Popes of the Middle Ages; VII, Heresy and Witchcraft; VIII, The Renaissance; IX, The Pulpit and Popular Piety; X, The Close of the Middle Ages.

The former power of the papacy is waning. The spirit of independence appears in the new nationalism, the innovations of the sects, the freedom of inquiry of some of the later schoolmen and of the rising humanists. Reformers before the Reformation lift up their voices in protest against the doctrines and practices of their Church. The mystics find a new access to the throne of grace, and the people themselves feel the stirring of new life, new hope, and new aspirations. The dawn is gradually breaking and the sun of a new day rises upon Germany and Switzerland. The author shows how this is the one divine event toward which the whole western world is moving.

He occupies his father's point of view and significantly repeats

on the title page the Latin epigram found in each of the seven volumes: *Christianus sum. Christiani nihil a me alienum puto.* While he is a firm believer in the superiority of evangelical Protestantism, he is by no means blind to the glory and worth of Medieval Catholicism. He strives to do justice to the facts in the sources. He is fearless indeed in his criticism and condemnation of some of the popes, without, however, despising the papacy. His condemnatory judgments are not passed on these men because "they occupy the papal throne, but because they are personalities who in any walk of life would call for the severest reprobation." He freely acknowledges the debt which Protestantism and the modern age owe to the great personalities of this period. "Without the medieval age, the Reformation would not have been possible." Well may we pray for men to speak to our generation as Saint Bernard, Francis d'Assisi, Saint Elizabeth, Saint Catherine of Siena, Gerson, Tauler, and Nicolas of Cusa spoke to theirs. They were men of God, the influence of whose life reaches far beyond the boundaries of their Church. It is the author's catholicity, moderation and poise, his thorough acquaintance with the original sources and the standard authorities, his loyalty to the facts and independence of judgment, which make this work an invaluable contribution to the historical literature on the middle ages, and especially helpful to the English reader.

Following the plan of the other volumes of the series, the sources and literature, usually covering four and five closely printed pages, are cited at the head of each chapter. Extensive footnotes contain illuminating discussions of the views of leading authorities on difficult questions and the conclusions which the author has reached through his own investigations. The volume closes with a comprehensive survey of the dominant tendencies in the three periods of the middle ages, extending from 600 to 1,600, and the new currents which began to flow in the stream of history which found an outlet in the various channels of Protestantism.

The great majority of the readers of the REVIEW have in their possession the other volumes of this history, and will now doubtless welcome the opportunity of completing the series by procuring the two parts of volume V.

GEO. W. RICHARDS.

COMMENTARY ON GENESIS. By John Nicholas Lenker, D.D., Translator of Luther's Works into English. Vol. II. Second Thousand. The Luther Press, Minneapolis, Minn., U. S. A., 1910. Pages 329. Price \$1.50 net.

This is the second volume of Luther's Commentary on Genesis which appears now for the first time in English. The eight volumes of his Gospel and Epistle Sermons and the one volume of his principal catechetical writings have been favorably noticed from time to time in the REVIEW. Each group of his writings has its

own unique purpose and value. All, indeed, are important to understand the genius and influence of the great reformer. In the commentaries one obtains an insight into his mind, a practical application of his principles to the life of his age, and his method of interpreting the Scriptures which were to him the source of truth and life, as probably in none of his other writings. He not only expounded, but also re-lived, the Bible; and on that account there is a perennial freshness in his expositions which makes them interesting reading and valuable helps to the minister of to-day.

While he called the Epistle to the Galatians his "Catharine von Bora" and doubtless found in it the clearest reflection of his own experience in passing from Romanism to Protestantism, he also speaks of his "dear Genesis" and found in it the free evangelical religion which he proclaimed in opposition to the "Babylonian Captivity" of the Church of his fathers.

This volume contains his comments on chapters four to nine inclusive. The fact that 329 pages are devoted to so brief a portion of Genesis is proof of the wealth of material which he unearthed in what to many may seem a comparatively obscure part of the book. His method of treatment is not that of the historico-critical exegete, but of the expositor and practical commentator. He finds in Cain, Seth, the Flood, the Salvation of Noah, the Rainbow Covenant, the Sons of Noah, and Noah's Fall, typical persons and events in which the ways of God to men in every age are depicted. His comments are always timely and have a religious end in view, namely, the stirring of men to repentance, the quickening of faith, and the awakening of a new and living hope. As the author, or authors, of Genesis used the traditions of the Ante-Deluvian and Deluvian times to teach his age God's relation to men, and men's to God; so Luther, through this ancient narrative shows his generation under new conditions the mind of God.

In the introduction by Professor Lenker on "Luther and World Evangelization" a plea is made for the reading of Luther in English. This is to help the Germans and Scandinavians in this country to make the transition from the distinctive church life of their native lands in Europe to the Anglo-Saxon or American type of Christianity. Thus the substance of Lutheranism will be conserved, though it will live on in the forms and environment of the New World. His argument is worthy of careful consideration. He also shows how the Lutheran Church has exercised a world-wide influence in the evangelization of the nations; a fact which is often overlooked by English and American writers of *missionary history*.

GEO. W. RICHARDS.

HONOR THE LORD WITH THY SUBSTANCE. By Rev. A. C. Whitmer. Published by the Board of Home Missions of the Reformed Church in the United States, Philadelphia, Pa., 1909. Pages vi + 183.

This is a delightful little book. In its form it is a thing of beauty and does credit to the contents no less than to the author, the publisher, and the generous donors who have made its publication possible. Its purpose is to rouse in men a sense of their opportunity, responsibility, and privilege to "honor the Lord with their Substance." While its contents were originally used in the pulpit, church papers, and tracts during the twenty years' service of the author as Secretary of the Home Mission Board, its influence reaches far beyond the scope of Home Missions. To quote from the preface: "These chapters are broader than Home Missionary interests. They are intended to cultivate that deep sense of stewardship which embraces all church work." The book is full of the breadth, sympathy, and devotion of the author, whose loyalty to his Church, fidelity to his Lord, and abundance of good works have won for him universal esteem.

As one reads the crystal epigrams, the crisp sentences, the paragraphs packed with pertinent facts, not a useless word in the book, he seems to hear the author address a synod, a classis, or an intently listening congregation. Rarely is one able to write as he speaks, an art which Superintendent Whitmer has mastered. He presents truth in forms of beauty.

The book has been widely circulated the last two years, but it should not remain idle on the shelf. It deserves to be continually spread among the members of congregations, the officers of consistories, and of course will always be a source of material for the practical work of the minister.

GEO. W. RICHARDS.

THE BOOK OF THE PROPHECIES OF ISAIAH. By John Edgar McFadyen, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Language, Literature, and Theology. United Free Church College, Glasgow. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910. Price 90 cts. net.

This excellent little hand-book belongs to "The Bible for Home and School," published under the general editorship of Professor Shailer Matthews, of the University of Chicago. Like the rest of the series, its aim is to place the results of the best modern biblical scholarship at the disposal of the general reader. The introductions—for there are three of them—are excellent; and they give just such information concerning the *authorship*, the *occasion*, the *purpose*, and the *contents* of these prophecies as the general reader of the Bible needs.

As is well known, the problems of the book of Isaiah are very numerous; and the volume before us gives very little more than the results at which modern biblical scholarship has arrived. Processes, which justify these results, are necessarily excluded.

The author is frank to acknowledge that "frequently the data are so slender and capable of so various interpretations that those results are very far from certain." Not infrequently, where two scholars adopt the same critical methods, they differ by half a millennium in their estimate of the date of a passage; and hence it is quite clear that "we are yet a long way from unanimity."

According to Professor McFadyen, the entire book of Isaiah falls into three parts. The first, comprising chapters 1-39, contains the prophecies of Isaiah, and belongs to the eighth century B.C.; the second, comprising chapters 40-55, called "the Exiles' Book of Consolation," contains the messages of the Deutero-Isaiah, belongs to the period of the Babylonian Captivity, and is hence two centuries later than the first; while the third, here called the Trito-Isaiah, comprising chapters 56-66, belongs to a period eighty or ninety years later than the second, and like the first presupposes a Palestinian background. Each part has an excellent introduction.

The text of the Revised Version is given, accompanied by brief but pointed comments. Altogether the book makes an excellent popular hand-book; and we commend it to the general reader of the Bible, and especially to the Sunday-school teacher.

WM. C. SCHAEFFER.

WRITING ON THE CLOUDS. By Arthur Newman. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French and Company. Cloth. Pages 91. Price \$1.00.

Thirteen short chapters on as many different religious subjects comprise the contents of this beautiful and readable little book. They are studies of biblical topics which may have served a pastor's purposes in regular pulpit ministrations. They bear the marks of a mind that is not fettered by conventional methods, and that has the power of stating truths as seen in a way at once forceful and strikingly attractive. The book is meant to emphasize the broad, balanced, and complete revelation of the Christian Scriptures in the light of present-day knowledge, and to afford help toward the solution of some of the problems which confront men at this time, in the home, in the Church, and in the state. The author has unusual skill in *suggesting*, instead of formally and explicitly *stating*, the conclusions which he wishes his readers to share with him. In this regard he acts upon the best principles governing wise teachers. Readers will find in the pages of this volume, lucid expositions of interesting and important passages of the Scriptures, wise counsel for the guidance of personal and social conduct, and sound comfort for hours shadowed by distress and sorrow. In filling these offices, the book serves ends that are worth while, and at the same time reinforces strongly the spiritual structure of the Christian faith.

A. S. WEBER.

THE REVELATION OF PRESENT EXPERIENCE. By Edmund Montgomery. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French and Company. Cloth. Pages 92. Price 90 cents.

The author of this brilliant outline of a scientific world-conception is a thorough-going evolutionist. Instead of basing his philosophical interpretations upon conceptual premises intuitively arrived at, or on mere mythical fancies traditionally consecrated—methods which he thinks are bound to lead all thought astray—he proposes to build on the present experience of cultured men, an experience due exclusively to the sentience and consciousness of the human organism, and commensurate with the collective results attained in the various provinces of scientific research. The evolutionary process which has issued in the present experience of scientifically enlightened thinking, is interestingly followed from its beginnings in the earliest discoverable stages of animal development, on to the lofty attainments which now afford men an ever-widening outlook into the higher reaches of life and its meaning. The "comparative considerations" given by the author to "idealistic" philosophers and their systems, in the course of his scientific discussions, and the bearing of his contentions on current ethical and theological ideas, are features of these pages that lend them an uncommonly striking and valuable importance. The amount of enlightening biological and philosophical information crowded into the little volume is altogether out of proportion to its size and cost, and, whether or not one is prepared to accept its conclusions, it will richly repay one for devoting the time needed for so doing to its careful study.

A. S. WEBER.

THE FACTS OF FAITH. By Charles Edward Smith, D.D. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French and Company. Cloth. Pages 90. Price 80 cents.

One of the books in the library of the late Rev. William M. Reily, Ph.D., and highly prized by him, was "The World Lighted," an earlier work by the author of the present volume. The vigor and lucidity of his literary style, the profound insight with which he held to the mystical elements in the Scriptures, particularly of St. John's writings, and the forcefulness with which he mustered arguments in defense of his contentions, appealed strongly to this departed ministerial brother of our Church. In *The Facts of Faith* these characteristics of our author are in evidence on every page. We know of no volume in which such an array of facts in defense of the faith is brought together, and none in which such facts are so clearly and forcibly set forth. Robert Browning, he tells his readers in his "Foreword," once wrote to a friend, "I want you to give my convictions a clinch," and the purpose he has in view in writing this little book is to 'clinch' the Christian convictions in the minds of his readers. Face to face with "the giant fire-crackers of infidelity" which

unnecessarily alarm many, they will be glad to welcome, he thinks, the testimony concerning facts of faith of one who is assured of them beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore rests upon them without misgiving. The book is abundantly worth possessing by every minister, and is well suited to hand to friends who are assailed by religious or doctrinal doubts. The clearness of its thought, the brevity and precision of its statements, and the cumulative potency of its argument, combine to make it a very useful and important contribution to apologetic literature.

A. S. WEBER.

BELIEF IN A PERSONAL GOD. By A. v. C. P. Huizinga. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French and Company. Cloth. Pages 52. Price 50 cents.

This brief essay deals with one of the highly important topics of current theological discussion. Its author shows a wide acquaintance with contemporary tendencies of thought, and possesses a master's ability for showing which of them are, and which are not, making for the conservation of the faith once delivered to the saint. His criticism of "the preacher-journalist" Lyman Abbott's statement, made some time ago, that "he believed God to be impersonal," is animadverted on with keen incisive severity, its misleading and pernicious effects on morals and religion pointed out, and the validity of the orthodox conception of the Divine Personality defended with convincing vigor. He shows conclusively that the disregard of the personal God revealed in Christ results in belittling conscience, destroying its authority, and reducing morality to a mere conventionalism. Inward religion always centers on an acknowledged responsibility to a personal God. These convictions he defends with pertinent and cogent utterances gathered from the writings of many of the mighty characters whose names and services adorn the history of Christianity. He laments that an impersonal, undefined, sentimental pantheism, through an undue and one-sided emphasis of the divine Immanence, is rapidly finding its way into the Church and rendering it powerless in the community as an organ for righteousness. The timeliness of the author's discussion of this topic, the philosophic and theological and literary learning which he brings into his service, and the full-hearted conviction with which he speaks for the personality of God, give great value to his pages—a value entirely disproportionate to the size and inexpensiveness of the volumes. It deserves to be carefully studied.

A. S. WEBER.

COMMENTARIES ON SIN. By George Frederick Jelfs. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French and Company. Cloth. Pages 105. Price \$1.00.

One reading this book is likely to conclude that the author of it is not a clergyman and not a theologian. He is, however, thoroughly conversant with the Scriptures, knows the estimate

put on them by critico-historical research, and has the courage of stating his own radically negative position plainly and without hesitation. His object in writing these commentaries is to give publicity to his reasons for believing that "men will never succeed in doing God's will and become righteous so long as" certain theological errors concerning sin continue to exist unchallenged and unrevised. Among the six errors indicated, the first is "that sin originated with 'Adam's Fall' as reported in the Book of Genesis," and the third, "that in doing evil men sin against God." Jesus, in his judgment, sought to deliver men from these errors, but the trend of his instructions was turned back into the old Hebrew channels by the Jewish prepossessions of Paul whose views concerning sin and redemption came to prevail in the Church rather than those of its original Founder. An entire chapter—perhaps the most important one in the volume—is devoted to an inquiry into Paul's Doctrine of Redemption. It need not be said, that from the author's view-point, that doctrine is not accepted by him—"it is based," he says in words quoted with his approval—"on Jewish preconceptions which have neither validity for us nor foundation in the personal religion of Christ." He apprehends that maledictions against him will be poured out on him by "old orthodox believers of all sorts for having attempted to discredit and deprive them of their only spiritual comfort." But he believes, and therefore has spoken, that in the interests of righteousness Paulinism should be overthrown. He "firmly believes that with every manifestation of the errors considered, the progress of humanity in morality and Christianity has suffered a check, and that unless men revise their beliefs and give a new meaning to their religion, they may be faithful followers of Paul, but have no better claim to the title of Christians than the Jews or the Mohametans."

A. S. WEBER.

ENGLISH LITERATURE IN ACCOUNT WITH RELIGION. By Edward Mortimer Chapman. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910. Pages 578. Price \$2.00 net.

The volume before us contains a series of brilliant essays in which the influence of religion on the literary characters and movements of the nineteenth century is clearly traced. The purpose of the book is not to expound the "religion" of this poet, or to define the "faith" of that novelist, as many have attempted in recent years, but rather, as we are told in the Preface—"to set forth something of the debt which Literature owes to Religion for its subjects, its language, its antagonisms and inspirations, as well as in many cases for the training of its writers; while on the other hand to suggest the debt which Religion as indisputably owes to Literature for the extension of its influence and the humanizing of its ideal." This two-fold purpose was first pursued by the author in a number of lectures delivered at Yale in 1906. The further

development of his studies along these lines resulted in the present volume.

Mr. Chapman is one who can speak with authority on literary subjects. His work is characterized by a superior style, and throughout we are made to realize that we are following the mature criticisms of a mind keenly sensitive to literary values. Furthermore, he has a deep appreciation of the fundamental verities of Christianity. Since great literature relates and preserves in artistic form the deeper experiences of life, and as religion is one of the real and determining factors in these experiences, it must be taken into account by the student of literature. Natural environment will not explain everything, as M. Taine supposed and almost convinced the world in his "History of English Literature." Mysterious spiritual forces which spring from a living faith influence literature, because they mold life, the subject-matter of literature. There is an "accounting" therefore between the two. This, in brief, is the thesis of the book.

The author is happy in the selection of chapter subjects. The chapter dealing with Wordsworth and Coleridge is termed "The Sons of the Morning." Byron and Shelly are called "The Apostles of Revolt," and Carlyle and Ruskin the "Elijah" and "Elisha" respectively of their day. Tennyson and Browning appear under the title, "The Great Twin Brethren."

The chapters devoted to fiction are particularly interesting. Almost every page contains suggestive ideas of far reaching importance. For example, in explaining the humor of the great novelists he shows that it has a religious foundation. "True humor, then, whereby I mean that which not only tickles fancy's palate to quiet mirth, but also leaves so sweet a taste as to make rumination pleasant—must depend for its wholesomeness upon faith. . . . The essence of humor is a fairly confident attitude toward the confusion of events. Take away a man's faith in God and his own soul, supply its place with a theory of the malignant lordship of chance, and his laughter must lose its heartiness, while his smile fades into wistfulness or scorn." Although much of modern fiction is darkly tinged with skepticism, it unconsciously bears witness to the necessity of faith. A case in point is that of the novelist Phillpotts, an active member of a rationalistic society, who whenever he draws strong characters has recourse to men and women of faith. "In fiction as in life some faith seems needful for ultimate conquest of circumstances."

This original and stimulating volume is a distinct contribution to the subject essayed and amply warrants a careful reading.

LEE M. ERDMAN.